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'This (lissi'riatioii ('xamiiu's ix'gulalory mechanisms in an oligopolistic context. /\f- 
t('r the introductory Part 1, Part. 2 criticizes the Bavx'sian incentivx' theory in regu­
lation from sevx'ral asi)ects. Chapters 1 and 2 provide sonu' im])lications of ix'laxing 
th(' commonly known prior belief assumption in Bayc'sian mechanisms, ( ’hapter 
1 ('xamiiK's corruption and learning in Baron and Mytuson's (1982) model of reg­
ulation wh(ui the prior belief of t,he regulator about the private parameter of the 
regulated monopolistic firm is unaccountable to the public. The lesults of Chapter 
1 ai (' generalized to the case of a generalized regulation model of Cm'snerie and Laf- 
font (1984) in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 discusses the tradeoff betwo'en efficiency and 
r('n('gotia,t,ion-proofness in dynamic monopoly regulation mechanisms. Part 2 con­
tains some a|)|)lica,tions of incx'nt.ive theory. Cha[)ter 1 ('xamines monoi)oly regulation 
uiuhu· asymnu'tric infornuition in an o])('ii economy wluux' the donu'stically produced 
good is a perfect substitute ol the imported good. (2ia.pt('r ö considcu’s a. simila.r opcm 
economy n'gulation problem foi- t.he case when' the domestic and imported products 
ar(' impc'rfect svd)stitut('s of each other. Chapter 6 provides a hic'rarchical framework 
to monopoly rc'gulation which inclinh's the inc('ntiv('s of tin' manag('rs. as W('ll. k'i- 
nally. in (2iapt('r 7 tin' mono|)oly regulation model of Baron and Mvx'rson (1982) is 
('xt('nd<'d to a Couriiot.ic oligopoly.
Keywords: Regulation, monopoly, mechanism design, corruption, h'arning, incom- 
pl('t(' iid'ormation, prior belief, social welfare, tariff, renegotiation-proofness, hierar­
ch v.
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Hu ara:ştırma rc'gülasyon mekanizmalarım oligo|)olist,ik bir eerrevedc' incek'inek- 
l('(lir. (iiri j^ bölümünden sonra ikinci bölüm, regülasyonda Bayesvari insentif teoriyi 
mubt.<'lif açılarda.!! eleijtirmektedir. İlk makale regülatörün regük' ('dilen kiçinin özel 
('!!formasyonu hakkmdaki ilksc'l sanılarının kamu tarafından gözb'inlenemediği du­
rumlarda, Baron ve Myersoıbun (1982) maliyeti biliımu'yen bir tel«'l lirmayı regüle 
eden modelinin regülatör tarafından nasıl tahrif ('dilebileceğini ve öğrenmenin bu 
mekanizma çerçevesindeki etkisini incelemektedir. 1. makaledeki bulgular, 2. makah'- 
(!(' (îuesnerie ve Lalfontbm (1984) genellc'ştirilmi,'^ regülasyon mod('liıi(' geniı^lc'l,ilmek­
tedir. 3. makale ise dinamik tc'kel regülasyon nu'kanizmahu'inda ('ikildik ve tekrar 
müza.kere kabul etmezlik arasında görülen ikileme dikkat. çekmekt('dir. Üçüncü bölüm 
( 1 . ve 7. makaleler) Mnsentir tc'orinin bazı uygulamalarım iht iva etmektc'dir. 4. 
makale, asimetrik enformasyon durumu altında tekel r('güla.syonunıı y('rli mal ile ithal 
malının ayırdedih'mcdiği bir açık ekonomi için incelemektedir, i), makale, benz('ri bir 
açık ('konomi regülasyon probk'inini yerli mal ih' ithal malının kısnu'n farklı olduğu 
bir durumda ('!(' almaktadır, (i. makah' tekel ri'güla.syonuna. lirma yöiK'ticih'rinin (h' 
m('nfa.a.tla.rini göz önünde tutan hiyı'rarsik bir yaklaşım getirınekl.('dir. Son olarak, 
7. makaled(' Baron v(' \4y('rson un (1982) tekel ri'gıilasyon mod('li (loıırnot.ik bir 
oligopolistik pazara genell(.'ştirilmekt('dir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Regülasyon, tekel, mekanizma dizaynı, tahrifat, öğrenme, 
('ksik ('11 formasyon, ilksel sanı, sosyal refah, tarife, müzakere kabul ('t.mezlik, hiyerarşi.
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Part I
Introduction
'FIk! aim of this dissertation is to build a theory on corruption and learning in 
Bayesian mechanism design and to apply incentivci theoiy to various problems in 
industrial organizcition. In recent years, ('conomists have been ('xtcuisively interested 
in uHX'lianism dojsign under incomph'te information. .Mechanism design l)asically 
(h'als with the implementation of economic chicisions such as production or alloca­
tion ruh's as a function of the individuals’ private information about their types. 
])refer('iic('s or endowments.' Among the various examples in the mechanism design 
context, oligopoly regulation, income taxation, price discrimination, principal-agent 
pi'obhmi, optimal auction design and bargaining games are soiru' widl-known ones. 
Although all of these problems have been heavily studied for many years, the main 
bulk of the contribution has been done within the last (wo d(x:ad('s.
As a special kind of oligopoly ix^gulation, the problem of ix'gulat.ing a natural 
monopoly has been one of the central issues, dlie necxl l,o regula!,e a monopolist is 
obvious from the viewpoint of the society since the monopoly price is above the price 
which maximizes the social welfare unless the demand is infinitely elastic. Hotelling 
(1938) and Dupuit (1952) showed that in case of zero marginal cost if the price is 
s('t equal to marginal cost and if the firm is provided with a subsidy equal to its 
lix('d cost, then consumers’ well-being would be maximized whih' the firm would 
ma,k(! no losses. 'I'liis f)roposi(ion rests on the assumption (hat (,1k' regulator has 
comi)lete information about cost and demand; bu(. it is na(,ural (,o (expect (,hat a 
firm has superior information about its costs than do('s the rc'gnlator. k'or a long 
time', rate-of-ixdurn regulation which re'ciuiix's the compk'tc' moni(oi'ing of llu' cost 
structure' of the monopolist was the only solution known to the i)robleun of natural 
monopoly.·^ 'I'hei rationale behind ratei-of-return regulation was simply to a.ttract 
capital to firms while preventing them from opoirating as mone)polists. Rate-e)l- 
re'turn regulation induced the; monopolist to choose the requireel level of inputs of
' Im)!' a m oni general d iscu ssion  of m<M:lianisin d esign , sec H olinslrdm  and Myt-'rson (198d).
“S(M( Av(u-ch and Johnson (19(11) and P osner (19()9).
production such as capital ami la.bor so as to guarantee t hat ( he ra1('-of-return which 
is the accounting jiiofits per capital stock will be above (lu' market rate of return 
ou investments. Prices are determined to equate a.v(;ra,ge costs and remain fi.xed 
during the regulatory lag until a r(;gulatory review (kitermines tlu' m'w prices. Some 
advantages of this regulatory scheme are that the monopolistic linns are protected 
against bankruptcy and furthermore tfui firms are offered a lOng nm commitment 
tfirougfi a fair rate-of-return on capital promised by tlui regidatory commission. This 
regulatory scheme was, however, severely criticized from various aspects. First, a 
profit-maximizing regulated firm has no incentive to equate marginal rates of factor 
subst.if.ution to the ratio of factor cosf.s since tlie prices aix' ecjuatc'd (o average; costs 
under rate-of-return regulation, thus the social cost is not minimized at the resulting 
outp>it. .Vloreover, as the; reward given to tlie firm is diix'ctly relal.ed t,o the capital 
of t,lu' firm, rate-of-return regulation led to overcapitaliza.tion, the' so-called Av(;rch- 
.Jolmson effect. Later, Das (1980) proved that the Av(;rch-.]ohnson effect also occurs 
under demand uncertainty.
Slu'shinski (1971) and Klevorick (1971) asked at what socially optimal level the al­
lowable rate-of-return should b(; set. Klevorick conjecf.uix'd that under Uie constant 
returns to scale technology, the optimal rate-of-return should not exceed the mo­
nopolist’s unregulated rate-of-return, but should be higher than (he cost of capital. 
Callen, Mathewson and Mohring (1976) showed that this conjecture is not valid when 
incr(;asing returns to scale are involved. They also discuss(;d some benefits and costs 
of ra(,e-of-retuni regulation. A very natural criticism to rate-of-ix'turn regulation is 
also ('xplicitly given in the work of Callen, Mathewson and Mohring (1976) where 
they stated that no less informa,tion is necessary to det('rmine ( he optimal ra,t(;-of- 
ix'turn than to directly dictal.e the inputs necessary (o produce ('llici('utly the output 
l('V('l which maximizes the social welfare. Later, Laffont (1994) criticized rate-of- 
ix'turn ix'gulation from a normative aspect. Ih' clainu'd (,hat then' is no jusl.ification 
foi· why the rate of return to ca,|)ital is cliosen higlu'r (han (,he mark(;t rate, (hat is 
(,o say, (,hat (,he rate-of-r(;turn r(;gulation does not d(;riv(' from the maximization of 
a well-defined social welfare function.
;M1 these critiques on rate-of-return regulation led some economists of 1970’s f.o 
d('velo[) alternative regulatory procedures. Weil.zman (1971) compa,i(;d the prices and 
qua,ntiti(;s as plantdng instruim'nts when the regulator has incomplete information.
l'ii(l('r l.lui lull inlonnalion assumption, it had already Ikhui known that dielaling the 
marginal cost prices or dictating (|uantities which ecpiati' tlu; marginal social Ixuielits 
to th(' monopolist’s marginal cost of production aix' completely id(uitical. However, 
in th(' incomplete information case where the social benefit and the firm's costs 
stochastically change, the two types ol instruments, prices and quantities, may bring 
about different implications. 'The optimal quantity instrument under uncertainty is 
tlu' out.put lev(d which maximizes the expected social welfare wlnuxuis the o]b,imal 
pric(; instrument under uncertainty is the [)rice which maximizes tiu' expected social 
wx'lfaix' givx'ii the monopolist’s |)rofit maximizing quantily reaction Ix) any dictated 
pricx'. .Nx'ither pricx' nor quantity instrument, howc'ver, yi(dds an 0])timum (;x post 
siiux' it is unlikely that the ex ante (expected) stochastic changx's will b(' exactly 
th(' sanui as ex post (realized) changes. Nevertheless, it was worth to study which 
modi' of control is superior for implementing a plan. VVi'itzman (1974), (X)inpar('d the 
ex|x'cted social wi'lfaix; under the price and quantity ix'gulation using a second-order 
ap|)roximation to cost and benefit, functions. Me found t hat as tlu' iru'an square error 
in marginal (X)st incrc'ases, the prices be(X)ine a more pix'h'nx'd inst rument. .Moreover, 
tlu' pri(X! mode looks advantageous when the Ix'iiefit function is closer to Ix'ing linear 
than the cost function. Conversely, the quantity mode is superior when the benefit 
function is more sharply curved than the cost function. VVi'itzrnan ( 1974) also proved 
that, despite some advantages prices can be a disastrous (4ioi(x' of instrument fai' more 
oft,('ll than quantities can.
In the light of this (X)niparative analysis, Weitzman (1978) stall'd that it is highly 
unlikely that either price or (|uantity ix'gulation alone is optimal. So. he formali/x'd 
an oi)tima.l revenue function which is the (X)mbinalion of pric(' and (piantity modes. 
Cndi'r th(' mux'rtaint.y assumptions a,bont the social Ix'iK'lits and monopolist's (X)sts. 
tlu' optimal rev('nue |)aid to the regulali'd firm is tlu' outcome of a mix of a tradi­
tional pri(x' signal plus a quadratic ¡x'iialty for (h'viations from the target output 
(cpiota) which maximizc's the expectc'd social welfare. 4 Ix' opl ima.1 weight of the 
pi'iialty with respect to the price signal is uniquely (h'tc'rmined by t he characteristics 
(such as curvature and interd('pendence) of the observed and stochast.ic parts of the 
benefit and (X)st functions. When this weight is zero, the optimal ix'ward becx)m('s the 
outxome of a i)ure pricx' signal; and when this weight is infinitely large, the oi)tirnal 
sdu'iru' Ix'comes a, quota systc'in.
4
Anotiier approach in t,ho ri'gulaiion context was that of Dcnnsetz (1968) who 
ai'giK'cl l.hat il tlu'ix' arc; at least, I ,wo linns which bid for the mono|)oly franchisi' l.lu'n 
I lui price ol the service would l)e reduced below t.he monopoly lev<d ev<>n though the 
conditions in the market allow ordy one firm to opérai,e. 'I'his pro])osit,ion has been 
ciiticized by Williamson (1976) as in many cases the franchise arranginnent may not 
b(; superior to the rate-of-return regulation. If the number of firms which compete 
for the monopoly franchise is not sufficiently large, then it, might be t,he case that the 
existing firms form coalitions to share the benefits from not lowering the service price 
Ih'Iovv tlu; monopoly pricxx .Moreover, a. franchise agrecmu'nt may rcvpiire a I'egidatory 
body to oversee its administration.
'Flui long discussion between the opponents of franchise control and rcite-of-return 
regulation decayed after the famous work of Loeb and Magat (1979) who believed 
that;
“... the only way to escape the disagreciable choice biitwecm the regida- 
tion and franchise control is to design new social institutions.'’
Lo(d) and Magat (1979) (L-M) examined the problem of natural-monopoly for the 
case where the monopolist privately owns the information about his cost while the 
d('inand curve for the monopolist’s output is common knowledge'. They proposed 
that the marginal cost pricing, which maximizes the social we'lfare (defined as the 
('(lually weighted sum of the monopolist’s profits and consumers surplus), can be 
attained if the monopolist is given the right to choose 1,h(' selling price of the output 
and if the regulator subsidizes the monopolist by an amount ecpial to consumers’ 
surplus at the sek-icted price, 'lb reduce or eliminatx' llu' net siibsidy provided i,o 
tlu' monopolist, Iv-M further propose a lump-sum lax or tlu' sak' of tlu' monopoly 
franchise;.
'This mwv system is superior to ral,c-of-return regulation in sevc'ral r<;sp(;cts. h'irst, 
of all, this system solves the allocative efficiency i)robl('m wlu're'as under rate-of- 
r('t,\irn regulation there might arise a welfare loss diu' to underestimation or oveu'esti- 
mation of the monopolist’s cost. Secondly, in contrast wit fi rate-of-return regulation, 
L-M’s mechanism encourages efficient operation as tfie firm continuously reaps the 
In'iH'fits ol cost reduction, 'riiirdly, in the L-M syst('m there is no need for mon- 
itoring th(' cost of th(' monopolist as the price d(;cisions are dec('ntralized wh(;reas
umU'r ra1.e-ol-rotviril regulation tlu'y ari' ( ('ntralizixl ami partially di'peml on l lio mo­
nopolist's cosl, r(;ports. ГЬеп'Іоіч'. tlu' rato-ol-roturn rc'gulation has t he ('xponises ol 
collecting and verilying data, and it is unreliable as tlu' monopolist has incentives to 
overstate his costs.
In spite ot these advantages that the L-M mechanism offers compared to its al­
ternatives, it was objected to in several respects.’^ First, the subsidy paid to the 
monopolist must be collected elsewhere; so it may distort other sc'ctors of the econ­
omy and cause allocative inelliciency. Secondly, the L-M subsidy requires t.hat the 
ri'gulator nu'asuri's the demand function correctly. Ollun wise, tlu' monopolisi, may 
produa' an output larger than necessary for t.he іч^ аі demand to іччч'іѵе a larger sub­
sidy. 1''іпа11у, when tin; (luality ol the service is at least as impoiiant as the jirice of 
that servi(4i in granting a franchise, it is likely that the realized franchise bid will be 
v(u v low compared l.o the L-M subsidy.
Later, Baron and Myerson (1982) (B-M) criticizcxl L-.M's approach claiming that 
iindc'r L-M’s mechanism the equity issue was unresolvcxl. B-M stated that in the 
abscuKX' of an auction possibility (for the monopoly franchise), the' consumers would 
prc'fer the; firm to operate as a monopolist rather than transferring the total surplus 
to l,hc; lirrn. Regarding the lump-sum tax which is the other approach to transfer 
surplus from producers to consumers, B-M further argued that il 1,he tax is set too 
high, then there is a risk that the firm makes losses and hcnice stops producing.
Another weakness of L-M’s approach which is implicit in the study of B-M is that 
L-.VI’s scdierne is not very general as it treats the soc:ial wellarc' to be; the c'cpially 
wc'ighted sum of consumers’ gain and prodnexu 's gain. Л more' gencual scheme' whic:h 
would be more' suitable for political concerns, however, is one whic:h allows producer’s 
gain to bc' Ic'ss weighted in social wc'lfare than cxinsumc'rs' gain, as wc'll. Aftc'.r all of 
thc'se criticisms, B-M proposed a new rcigulatory mc'cLanism which is superior to all 
of the prc'vious rc'gulatory mechanisms for a monopoly.
ГІ1С' approach takcni in thc'ir paper to regulation unclc'r asymmc'tric iid’ormation 
is based on the work of Vlyerson (1979) and (1981) while' adopting the technique! 
of Mirrlees (1971). B-M assume that the regulated firm has betteu· information 
about its own cost than the regulator, while demand is ечяпгпоп knowledge. In their 
sc'tting, the firm has a exist function whic.h is bilinc'ar in output and a parameter Ѳ
'S(Mt VV.W Sharkoy, 1979.
vvliirh Ibrnis t,h(! i)rivat.o aspect of infonHalion. B-M restrict themsc'lves to iiic('ntiv('- 
coinpatible n'gulatory policies by the lievcrlal ion Priiici])le. rhis pi'inciple, which was 
discussed in several papers,'* basically says that via, a direct revcdatioii rnechanisni 
which induces truth telling it is possible to reach any dominant strategy equilibrium 
oul.corne obtained in ev(;ry possible mechanism, however complex, f or l.lie monopoly 
regulation problem, B-M restate this principle as follows:’^
“Without any loss of gcuierality, the regulator may be rc'stricted to 
roigulal.ory polici(is whicfi r('(|uire tlie firm to r(q)ort its cost parameter 0 
and which give the (irrn no incentive to li('.”
So, 13-M designed a ix'gulatory policy which is incentive-compatible. Via a subsidy 
(f.ax) as a function of the cost, report of tlie firm, the regulator induces the firm 
to truthfully report its cost. Transferring this subsidy from consumers to tlu' pro- 
duc,('r. the regulator’s o])timization problem beconu's to find the output level which 
maximizes the expcicted social welfare under the rc'gulator’s prior beli('fs about the 
unknown cost parameter O}'
B-M’s regulatory i)olicy consists of four outcoitte functions: the |)i ice and quantity 
of outirut (which are compatible with demand), the probability l.hat the firm is 
allowed to produce and the subsidy (tax if negativ(i). '['he probability that the 
ixigulator will permit the firm to produce is introduced by B-M to ])rovide consumers 
a nonnegative net gain when the firm is allowed to |)roduce. Tlu' firm is allowed to 
produce only if the oj)erating ])rofits of th(' firm do not exceed consumers’ surplus.
Under the B-.VI regulatory mechanism, tlu' optimal values of tlu' oiitcoitu' functions 
all depend on the cost reports of the linn, the invcTse likcdihood ratio^ (which is a
’ S(M' 1 )asgupt,<i, Utiinmoiui and Maskin (1979),  ( î ibbard  (1979),  Harris and 'lownstnul (19S1) and Myorson (1979).
'^1‘1кмг ])ГО()Г Гог this  proi)osition is (inito slraiglitforward b\iL instmetivo:  Siipi)os(^ Нк' r<iguIalor iinphnnonts a 
ruhî via a m ech an ism  which do(îS not induce l.rutli tel ling. 'Then Гог (îaclı О, let Ф(0) lxî (Ikî cos t  rcîport оГ the  firm 
which m ax im izes  its expcicted profit when its cost  param eter is 0. . \ow  ( .onstnict  a new regulatory i)olicy in the  
ibllowing way. hor each 0 ca lculate Ф(0) «'md then eniorctî the  policy  which learls to the  oult'ome which would hav(î 
b(î(îiî riîached under the Гоггпег policy İT ^(0)  had been  reported there. Г1и^ п the  firm will truthi'ully report its cost  
param eter  under this new regulation, Гог otherwise  it would not luive rej)orted Ф(/?) under I İkî first regulatory policy,  
(îither.
■' l'İKî social welTare in H -M ’s framework is def ined as the su m  of  tluî c o n su m ers ’ surplus net o f  th(î subs idy  paid  
to tİHî firm and a fraction of  the produc<îr's i)rofits ])his the subsidy.
' \V h(‘ii(îV('r the  profluc(îr’s and consmiHîis' gains are (î(iually W(îight(îcl  in the  soci¿ıl W(îlf¿u·<î function, the  B-M
G
['uiiciion ol'ilu' r<;guhü,or’s Ix'lic'fs al)out cosí ) and ()\ which is l.lu' higlu'sl vahu' i hal 
1.İK' linn s cost, |)aranu't('r 0 can l.al«'. I'Ik' aimlysis of tin' opl.iinal solul.ion shows that, 
B-M’s inechanisin onicourages (dficient, production t,('chnologios, that is. the low(n· the 
cost, of the firm, the lower is the |)rice of the output, while the higher is th(' (inn's 
md, gain, and vice verse. So, the firm has incentives to spend (dforts to ini])rov(' 
i(,s t(;chuology which will reduce the cost pararnetcu· 0. lloweven iu contrast with 
tlui L-M inechanisin, the B-M inechanism is not allocatively efiiciinit. Unless the 
firm has (.he lowi'st |)ossible cost or tin; regulator has lull irdonnation about the 
linn's cost or the i)roducer’s gain and consumers’ gain an' ('qnally wi'ightcd in tlu' 
social welfare function, there is always a welfare loss undi'r th(' B-M nu'chanisin. 
AnotİKu- inefliciency is that tlu' priai chargi'd under B-.VI's mechanism may ('vi'ii b(' 
higlun· than the unregulated monopoly price if the probability that the regvdator has 
assigned to tlie tnu' cost of the linn prior to rcîgulation is vc'ry low.
B-M’s mechanism ensures that the subsidy paid t.o tlu' firm do('s not ('.xcc'ed con­
sumers’ surplus; indeed, the amount of the subsidy might be much smaller t.han the 
t.otal consumers’ surplus \îOx is sufiiciently close to t.lu' t rue value of 0. In that casiu 
th(' producer’s net gain would be realized very clos(' to zc-ro, whih' consunun's would 
extract almost all of the surplus. So the regulator might find it to the beiu'lit of 
consumers to spend on research to learn more about, 0. allowing him to reduce the 
uplier bound 0\ of tlui cost parameter with full conlidence.
At this point, a natural question to be asked is vvİK'tlun· in the presence of a 
finite number of firms bidding for the monopoly franchise it is possible to construct, 
a, mechanism which can extra,ct. sonu' part of tlu' snbsidy given to t,lu' n'gnlati'd 
linn, if not all, while still guaranteeing a, nonn('galiv(' gain to tlu' la'gulal.ed (inn. 
'I lu' answi'r is alrc'ady provich'd in the study of Hioi'dian and Sappington (11)87) 
who (following tlu' g(Mi(!ral analysis of B-M) (h'sigiu'd a, Bayc'sian franchise' bidding 
scİK'ine which maximizes expect,I'd consumers' welfare' for a se'tting whe're there' are 
finite' number eif firms whiedi might have eliflerent kinels e>l techneileigies represe'iite'd 
by e'onstant marginal exists. Tliei firms acquire private' signals abend, their respe'ctive' 
private technologies before the' winning proe:ess while the^ y learn the'ir teedmology just 
a,fte;r thei winning biel is announced. As usual, the' setuf) exist is assumeel to be sei
oj)( iinal I'dguhitory po licy  has no dcpciu lcncc  on (,hc l^clicfs of the  rcgtilalor and l)oils flown to the  L-M inechanism  
with hnnp-s inn  tax.
lai’ge l.hat, it is proliil)itavely costly to luvve more' llian one linn producing. So the 
right to produce is awarded to only om^  iirin.
riie o[)timal scheme involves a menu of franchise contracts which consists of prices 
and transfer payments as a function of the winning i)roducer’s bid (tlu; expected 
marginal cost) and tlui ex post realized marginal cost,. TranslV'r payments hav(' 
two components. One is a subsidy which induces the winning firm to r(w<ui.l its 
i('alized marginal cost after tlui bidding and is paid aft.er production. 'Г1к' otlier 
component is tlu; Iranchise lee which is ¡raid by the wdnning firm immediately after 
b('ing awardc'd the franchise. 'I'he contracts in the nuum are raidmd, with contracts 
involving prices closer to marginal costs, more generous production subsidies and 
larger IVanchise fee's being locatc'd at higher ranks. I'drms simultaneously announce 
t.lu'ir ])rivat(i (expect,ed marginal costs while the higlu'sl. r('])orted ('xpected marginal 
cost constitutes the winning bid. 'I'lie winning bidder musí, sell at, the |)rice eepialing 
tlu' adjusted marginal cost (according to the regulator's b('liefs).
One of the most striking implications of the mechanism is that llu' optimal selling 
|)ric(' and quantity, as well as the optimal production subsidy are independent of 
tlui number of potential bidders. So competition influencx^s the optimal scheme only 
through th(; franchise fee. Another implication, which was stressed by Riordian and 
Sa])pington (1987), is that the analysis holds even when there is only one producer, 
in which case there is naturally no competition for bidding. 'I'he optimal scheme has, 
nevertheless, a very important interpretation even in t hat case as it, gc'iieralizes H-M’s 
modi'l of regulation into a setting where the monopolist has superior but im])('rfed 
information about its marginal cost.
.Л more r(x:ouit Bayesian a|)proach is the study of balfont and l irole (198()). 'The 
informalional assumptions a.dopt('d in tludr framework arc' (piit(' dilferent from tlu' 
OIK'S used by 18-M. 'The regulator observx's th(' total cost of the firm which profluces 
a, public good, but not the components of the total cost: t he i)roductivity (elliciency) 
l)ara,meter, the firm’s effort levc'l and a random pa.ram('1,('r which can l)C infx'i'preted 
as an observation or accounting error. By the Revc'lation Principle, the regulator 
14'stricts himself to a truth-telling mechanism which induces the firm to reveal its 
true ('fficiency parameter and to choose an effort level which is socially optirna.1. 
'Го this ('11(1, the regulator calculates a deterministic award as a function of the 
announced efficiency parame1,('r and tlu' ex post, l.ol.al cost. 'Г1и' regulator faces a.
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Ira(l('-()f[ l)('tvv('rii iiulucing r('V('lat,ion ol Inu' producti\’ily ])aranu'l<u' which is too 
cost.ly and inducing (dfort, which neccssitatos a fixed-price conlract as in l^M. So tlu' 
o])t.iinal iiicenlivi' scheme appears t,o Ix' an incxuitivi' coni.ract, wliich i^art.ially shares 
i,li(i cost, of the iiriri. Laffont and 'Firole (1986) also show that tlu' optimal incentive 
sclumie results in a lowin' output and a lower eilort com[)ar(Kl with t lu' lull-iniormation 
case since the firm’s cost is oidy partially reimbursed. Another finding is that the 
I'iigulator can use (for any distribution of cost disturbance) a reward function which 
is linear in cost, d'lie fixed transfer to the firm is increasing with the share of the 
cost I'i'imfnirsed to the firm in the t.otal cost. Moreov('r. thci share of the cost which 
is r('iml)nrs(xl to the firm is increasing in the eifici('ncy of the firm. So, the' most 
('ffici(uit firm chooses a fixed-price contract,, wherea.s tlu' h'ss efnci('ut firms pnd'er an 
iiKX'iitive contract.
f'nder a dynamic (at least two ix'riod) regulatory fra,mework. there exist some 
other a,p[)roach('s which are gcuierally called non-Bayesian. 'The uon-Bayc'sian ap- 
proaclu's to regulation problems also differ among tln'inscdves according to whctluu· 
tlu'V ai'(' v(U'ifiabl(' or not. Soim  ^ economists have argiu'd that in monopoly r('gula- 
tion, nu'clianisms that only make ns(' of obsc'rvabh' cost and demand data may be 
called verifiable. 'They have further claimed that v('rifiability prevemts the manipu­
lation of either the firm or tfu; regulator as it allows a third party to judgci whether 
a, regulatory mechanism lias been properly applied. In tins contx'xt of mechanism 
design, regulation is described in the study of I'insinger and Vogelsang (1981, ]).388) 
as follows:
"Regulation is essentially an information geiK'rating proci'ss in (uivirou- 
mnits with asymiiK'tric dist ribut ion of informât ion. .Normally, part icipant s 
in t ill' r('gulat('d market, a pi'/o/■/ha.v<' Ix'ttc'r infoi ination about t lu'msıdvi's 
and about. ea,ch other than outside ri'gulators. I'lius an institution has t,o 
b(' set up to collect certain data on the régulât('d imlust.ry, which is tlnm 
nsi'd to enforce certain rules pert aining to efficiency and equity. ’
f'insinger and Vogelsang (1982) (henceforth F-V) wi're first t,o clesign a, mecha­
nism which is both non-Bayesian and verifiable. k'-V jiroposed that if the firm is 
|)rovid('d with a subsidy equal to incremental consumers' surplus, then tlu' prices 
that th(' firm will choos(' will convergí' to marginal cost price's ovc'r tinu'. .As the' h'-V
nK'duulisin uses a first-order aiiproxiinat.ion to tlu' elia,ng(' in eonsunu'rs surplus, the 
optimal subsidy and the optimal selling ])riees (h'pend on the last pcu'iod s cost and 
demand data, which are common knowledge. I.ater. this mechanism was criticized 
from scweral points. I'hrst, o[)t.imal selling prices in the h'-V mechanism do not con- 
v(uge to marginal cost prices in one period. Moreover, t.lu' prices may not b(! stable 
in a changing environment. As tlie F-V mecfianism doc's not tak(' t.lu' intertemporal 
cost effects into account, the monopoly firm might manipulate tlu' mechanism.^
rite increiiKMital surplus subsidy (ISS) scheme pro])osed by Sappington and Sibley 
( 1!)8<S) is anotlier non-Bay('sia,n (ixarnph'. d'hey developed an incremental and discrete' 
time' vc'rsion of tlu; L-M schenu' that meets some of tfu' criticism raisc'd against L-M. 
'Flu' ISS scheme resolves some of the distributional problems that might arise under 
tlu' l.-M scheme.
.'Mtfiough tfie ISS scheme uses the same technique' as h'-V to iueluce the firm to 
eİK)e)se |)rie:e;s which will conve'rge to marginal cost, ))rice's. it diffe'rs from the F-V 
nu'chanism as it is not verifiable. The ISS scheme use's the exact e-e)nsumers’ surplus 
cliange in defining the optimal subsidy given to the' firm. Thus, in the ISS scheme;, 
the' regulator is assumed to have no information abe)ut the; e;ost e>f the firm while he 
is assumed to know all about elemand and the firm’s e'X])enditures.
Subsidizing the firm with the incremental consumers’ surplus net of the lagged 
ace;e)unting pre)fit indue;es the; firm t.o set price at marginal e:ost in e;ve;ry |)e;rie)el. 
The' ISS mechanism has some ele;sired proi)ei'ties sue-h as the firm’s ope;rat,ing at. 
minimum e:e)st in every perioel and its being awa,rde;el strict,ly pe)sitive ])rofit,s only 
in the first period. Sappington anel Sible'v (1988) pre)veel that, give'ii that the' firm’s 
elisce)unt rate is uidcnown to the re;gulator, and that the re'gula.tor has ne) tee'hnole)gical 
iide)rma,tie)n. the ISS a.warels are' the le'ast among tlie; re'nts to the re'gnlate'el firm in all 
Markenv regtilatory me;cha.nisms'  ^ that guarante'e marginal e’ost prie e's in e;very perioel 
sid)s<'e|uent te) the first, riiey further she)weel that il the (inte;rte'mpe)ral) eiisex)unt 
rate' e)f the' firm is knerwn to the re'gulator, then via a suitable; tax rate it is j)ossible 
t.e) e'liminate; almost all the first pe;riod rents ae;e;rueel t.e) t.lu' firm.
Ve)gelsang (1988) was very quic.k to analyze the relationship bet we;e;n the I'-V anel
V()g(ilsang (1988) for a more dctiiilecl d iscussion of these ¿irguments.
Sapj)in^ton and Sil:>ley (1988)  def ine a Markow reit^ulatory ni(H:hanisin as f)iH‘ which hastes c o m p e n sa t io n  to th(i
l inn in (tach period only on its current pt'rformancti and on its ])ei iorm ance in th(  ^ pr(u:edinц, ptM’iod.
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ISS iiK'clianisins and to d('sign a. lU'w n'gulatory policy which is hybrid Ix'lwc'on t,heni. 
Il(' showc’d l.lurl, although th(! h'-V nu'chanisin is ajrproximatxdy tlu' saíne as ISS, it 
Ix'haves (]uit,e diil'erently. 'Г1к' h'-V mechanism lacks basically two highly desirable 
proirerties that ISS has: First., the prices do not convcnge to marginal cost price's in 
one period, and secondly, the F-V mechanism is not stable in a changing environment. 
So, l)y using a chord-approximation to consumers’ surplus change' betvve'en any two 
pe'iiods, Vogelsang tried to find a closer approxirnatiein to ISS which retains all the 
eh'sira.ble preipe'it.ie's ol ISS, but. a,t t.he same time alse) ret.ains t.hei ve'i ifiability preiperty 
е)Г t'-V. .Although this ne'W me'eihanism was founel te> e-eiinciele wit.h ISS for some 
trivial cases (sue:h as when demand is linear), in ge'iie'ral it eloeis not. elominate either 
the' h’-V mee:hanisrn or ISS. On the e:ontra.ry, there' are' situations where the' latter 
me'e'hanisms perform better than this hybrid mee:hanism. Vogelsang’s e:e)nclusie)n was 
t hat to e:onstrue’t a. hybrid me'chanism superior te> F-V anel ISS, one' should make' use 
e)f prie'.e, exist anel ejuantity inlorrnation of not only t he' last jierioel but of all the' past 
])e'rioels. 'That is to say, the change in ex)nsumers’ surjilus must be' a.p])re)xima.ted in 
the' highest eirder se> that no room for strategic manipulation will e'lnerge.
.As a e:ounterpa.rt to all those studieis whie;h analyze' the' elesign of e)])tima.l peilicy to 
ix'gulate a monopolist in the presence of asymmetrie· inlormation abeiut techneilogy, 
there: exists a strand of literature in which the regulatieni takeis plaex' uneler incomplete 
infeirmation about elemiand ratheir than exist. Ihe'ix' are' varieius reiaseins why the 
rneineipeilist. might have better irdeirmatiein abeiut. ele'inanel than the' reigulat.eir. hirst 
eif all the' firm has superieir kneiwleelge about seime' attribut.es eil eh'manel suedi as 
epialit.y anel reliability eif the' proelue:t. Moix'over. unlike' the re'gulator, the' firms in 
ge'iie'ral elevóte significant reseinrces t.ei marke'ting stuelie's which lu'lps h'arning abeiut. 
ele'inanel."’ Riorelian (1984) ('xamine'd the' reigulat.ion preiblem vvlu'n ehnnanel whie'h 
is uidíiiown tei the' regulator eSianges stoe:hastie:ally. 1 he' mee'hanism he' eh'signe'd 
inveilvx's lump-sum subsieliexs as a. fune’tiein eit t he price' se't by t.lu' linn anel t.he' e'a.|ia.city 
eif t he firm which ineluex; the firm to unilaterally cheieise' seie'ially eipt.imal priexis. The 
trade'eiff betwexui a higher price and a lower subsiely e ix'ateis incentivéis lor the: firm tei 
signa.1 demand exinditieins truthfully. By using an optimal peak-leiad pricing rule''
a very rich discussion of these  reasons,  see Hiordicin (1984).
' ’ lint jxiak-load pricing rule is such (hat  at. tlie jnic(^ s(it by the iirin, llu  ^ regulator taxtts away any ])roiits (or
s\il)sidi7,(ts loss(ts) ol)tain(Hl at full ca]3acity to guarantetî zero prt)fits at full capacity.
t,li(' r('gulator guaraiiU'C's that, tlic iinn hrc'aks even in all state's while' inelue'ing the' 
(inn l.e) prie:e; its i)re)elue-t, at marginal e:e)st,.
1 he; iae:t l.iiat thei eixpe;cte;el subsidy is zenx) unele'r H,ie)ielian s (1984) ieignlate)ry 
mce:hanisin is a highly elesired property as it implie;s that the systenn is enitirely 
se'lf finanehrig. Se) even if the ex)iisurners are taxed by a (,we)-part tariff tx) subsielize 
the' firm, theu'e is no reason lor exnisurnen's ter jump e)ut e)l the marke;t in the' lerng 
run as the expee:te'd value of the subsidy that the firm will reex'ive^  is zero. In this 
me'ehanism, the' re;gulator oidy ruieds information alrout exrsts; but he must also 
be' able' t.e) e)bserve ])riex' anel e:apae:ity. 'Flie mee-hanism is e'ihehe'nt, even whe'ii the 
re'gnlate)!' e:an not me)nitor the e:apae'ity; however, in that case the' regulator nex'ds 
te) know t.he stochastic structnre of demand to exnnput.e t he optimal capacity e)f the 
firm.
liiorelian’s (1984) rersults are not ve'ry general as heî restrict attention to the e:a.sei 
vvhe'ix' thei firm has ex)nstant marginal ex)sts. l.ater. Le'wis and Sappington (1988a) 
e'xtenide'd Riordian’s (1984) model to a e:ase where both ele'enxjasing anel nondecreasing 
marginal (X)sts are alloweel.*'  ^ In their study, the' re'gulate)r’s [)ix)ble'm is define'd as 
maximizing the social welfare subject to the incentive' ex)mpatibilit,y anel inelivielual 
rationality exmclitienis. ‘ *
Lewis anel Sappington (1988a) define the first-be;st |)e)licy as e)ne whiedi we)uld 
be imi)leiiiented by the regulator it the demand inlerrmation wenx' available tx) him 
give'll that ex)nsurners’ neit gain is more heavily weight.e'd than the' pix)ducer’s gain in 
sexcial welfare. The first-best jiolicy consists of marginal cost prie ing supplementexl 
by a.n o))timal subsidy (tax) e'epial to the' operating hisses (profits) of t.he firm at, 
the' re'|)e)rt.e.'el elemanel. One' e>l thenr findings is that the' first.-be'st pe)lie:y is a le'asible 
seilutieni tX) the ix'gulateir’s probh'in when marginal exist is neinelexnx'asing. 4'he'ei|it,imal 
subsiely in that case meitivate's the firm to use its private; kneiwh'elge of elemanel to 
imple'ine'nt the' soehally elesirabh' outexime, so the' inleirmational asymmed.ry abeiut 
ele'mand is inconseejuenitial for the reigulator. On the' either hanel, when marginal 
exists eledine with output, allowing the firm to choeise the .selling priex' beeximeis sei
' “Mvtiwis iuid Sapp ington  (1988a)  hccivily borrowed from the  general analysis oi i'juesnerie and Laflont {198-1), w h id i  
.admits th<î d em a nd  information to be privcite to ¿1 regulated firm.
' ' rh(i foriiKR' condition  is tha t  the firm imd(îr the optim al j^olicy must not h.ave any inc(Titiv(t to misre])resent its 
sii])(M ioi· chmiand information whih^ the lattttr ('ondition st<at(fs tha t  tin; lirm should  not  b(i (oiîthI to lu’oducit unless  
it obt.ains a nonnegative  g.iin.
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cosi ly thaï. 1 İKİ |)ricing (hicisioıı is not dc'h'gat.rd to tlu' lirin a.ny mori'. In l.lıat, ca,sc, 
tİK' regulator himsoir dotormines a single price (Гог all ri'alizations of the unknown 
di'tnand iniormation) as a. function of his ])rior beliefs about (hunand.
Lewis and Sappington (1988a), after having pointed oui tlu' ini|)ortant (pialitative 
dimension that arise when the firm has a superior knowledge about demand rather 
than cost, concluded that
“..dx'fore attempting to draw any general conclusions about appropriate 
regulatory policy in the presence of asymmetric information, it is impera­
tive' that the nature' of the' information asymmelry be' carefully ielentifie'el.'’
In the' samei year, Lenvis and Sa])pington ( 1988b) e'xte'iidexl their ele'sign for re'gidat- 
ing a natural monopolist to a e ase where the re'gulator is imperfeclly inforrneid about 
both ihe firm’s cost function anel the demand function it faces. I'heir approaeih to 
se)lve; the' reigulation problem was a Bayeisian one, so they assumeel that the' re'gulator 
has se)tne' belied's about ex)st anel demand represente'el by a joint jirobability elensity 
function. 'Fheir solution technieiue borre)Ws from Laffont. .Vlaskin, aiiel Rochet (1987) 
anel .VIc.Alee and Me:.Vlillan (1988) which we will dise-uss later.
Lewis and Sappington ( 1988b) showed that tluire are' some similaritic's betwe'en the 
e)])timal regulatory policies with one and two sourexis e)f unexirtainly. First, when de­
mand unexirtainty beex)meis inconsexjuential, the optimal regulate)ry |)olicy ex)iiverges 
te) the' e)iie eleisigned by И-М, while it eonverges te) the' re'gulateny pe)licy ele'signeel 
by Lewis and Sa])pington (1988a.) when cost unex'rtainty becomc's inconse'e]uential. 
Sc'conelly, under the optimal mex’hanism with two seiurex-'s ol une e'rtainty, the' e)])ti- 
mal prices increiase with demand anel ex)st re'alizatiein. like they do unelen· Bayeisian 
re'gulate)ry me'e'hanisms with e)iie' sourex' of unexirtainly. Lhirdly, ihe' firm's ])rofit is 
the' higher, the smaller is the ix'ali/x'el ex)st whiedi is the exise alse) when e)iily ex)st is 
unknown. .Vise), there are' situai ions in whie:h jiriex' e'.xex'e'els marginal ex)st whe'ii be)th 
de'inanel anel cost are unknown to the' reigulator like in the' eiase wlu'n the re'gulator 
has inex)inpleM.e informed,ion a,bout ex)st only.
Le'wis anel Sappington (1988b) alse) fe)unel some im|)ortard. (|ualitative elifterenexis 
whe'n be)th demand and cost arei uidiiiown to the regulate)!', do pre'vent the firm from 
uneh'rstating its eleunanel parameter, optimal price may be set bele)w the re'alize;d 
marginal ce)st. Inele'ed. it is more' likely that price is se't bele)w marginal e'ost when
Id
I lu't nui |)d,iaiiu'ici ( liai actoiriziiig ilu' unknown j^ ati, ol dcniiaiid tJu' finn lares is low. 
Mor(H)voin less pricing ant,lioril,y will he dedegaU'd 1o t lu' linn when both demand and
(<)s1, nn(.('il.a.iniy aie ])iesent (oinpared t,o when t.lu' la'gnlaior lacc's oidy one source 
of uncertainty.
Monopoly regulation is, in tact, a special case ol an adverse-s('lection problem in 
a, gcuKual ])iincipj)al-agent Iraniework, which lias Ix'en e.xterisively discussi'd by the 
inrormation economists in tlu' last two decades. Adverse-selection problems arise 
whenever the principal has incomplete information about some action or type (e.g. 
th(> (dfort level) of the agent that it hires. 'Fhe objc'ctivi' of the principal is to choose 
an optimal decision to maximize his welfare subject to some feasibility conditions, 
such as the individual-rationality condition for the a,gent. .As llu' principal face's 
informational asymmetry, by the Hevelation Princi|)l('. he may design an optimal in- 
(•('iitive scheme that will induce the agent to truthfnlly reveal his private information.
.As a. corner stone in the principal-agent literal un'. the study of Cuesnerie and 
balfont (1984c) dese'rves a. special reference as it provides a cornpk't (' characterization 
of implementable mechanisms as well as the solutions in a class of incentives problems 
which covers the income tax model of Mirrlees (1971), the inoch'l of government 
ri'gulation of a monopolist by B-M, the nonlinear mono|)oly pricing model of Mussa 
a.nd Rosen (1978) and the model of public control of a sedf-rnanaged linn by (iuesnerie 
and Laffont (1984a,b), among others. In fact, as it is apparent from (luesneri(i and 
bailout (1984c), the principal-agent problem with adverse selection is nothing but 
a ix'gulation problem with incomplete information wlu'ii the regulator assigns zero 
w('ight to the wellaix' ol the agc'nt with private' information in I lu' social we'lfare. 
.So th(' optimal incentive' sche'ine's that se)lve's with the' principal-age'nt pre)ble'm are 
Ie'e hnie'.ally no elilfe'rent t han the' re'gvdate)ry meedianisms. .Nh'vert he'h'ss, it is we)rth 
te) brie'liy summarizes some ol the' re'ex'iit stuelie's in this esonl.esxl,. as Ihesy ha.ve' vesry 
impe)i'tant esconomic impliccitions.
.Vlussa and Ke)se'ii (1978) e'xainined a class of noidinear pricing problems when 
the' ge)ods produced are quality differentiated. In tlu'ir sestting, the monopolist has 
ine:e)mplete inlormation about the consumer’s valuation fe)r ejuality, but knows the' 
elistribution of the unknown valuation pararnetesr over consumers. Noidinesar pric­
ing e e)rre'spe)nels to a mechanism in which each e:onsumer’s purediases and payment 
eh'pe'iiel endy e)ii lha.t customer's repe)rteel valuatie)ii parameter. I’uele'r the' e)ptimal
polic y (which borrows from .Mirrhvs ( 1!)7I)), the uionopolist (principal) assigns dif- 
Ι(Μ·(ΊΐΙ costumer types to didercnit varic t^ies of goods. .Mussa and Hosc'ii (1978) showed 
that there are some dissimilarities between a monopolist's optimal cliscriminating so­
lution and the competitive solution. Firstly, except lor the consumer who has the 
highest valuation I'or quality, every consumer buys a lovvvr qiuility from tlui monop­
olist than bought under competition. Secondly, the loss of consimu'rs’ surplus due 
to the monopoly increases with valuation lor quality, d'liirdly, tin' maximum range 
of (¡uality is givatcn- in the monopoly pricing case than the one in the competitive 
|)ricing ca,se. I'burthl.y, tin; monopoly price- is greaU-r 1 haii the competitive price-, and 
the- price- dilferenitial inci’e-ases with an incre-ase; in e|ualily. I-'inally. in contrast to tin- 
ordinary Ihciory of monopoly, it is shown that the e|uantity sold by the- monopolist 
ma,y (-xc(!(-el the (|uantity sold under marginal cost priehiig.
He-side;s va.rious ee;onomic implications, iVIussa and Hose-n's (1978) studv has also 
a te-chnical contribution to the- mechanism d(;sign lite-rature, name-ly the- so calle-d 
"bunching Uichnique'’. 'The ne-ed lor this technique arise-s in their me-e:hanism as the 
optimal quality is not nondee’reasing in the agents' wduation everywln-re. Λ in-ces- 
sary condition for a. mechanism which includeis an optimal de-cision and transfen· to 
be- ine'.entive compatible is that the decision variable is nonde;cre.-asing (nonincreasing) 
in the private parameter whenever the agent’s marginal rate of substitution between 
elee'ision and transfer leveds is strictly increasing (ele-e:re;asing) in the; private; pararne;- 
le-r. 'rherefore, Mussa and Re)se;n (1978) bunched those- eonsumers whose; valuation 
parame;te;rs generated a wiggle in quality uneler the- opt imal mechanism. By assign­
ing the- same- amount of epiality to the- consumers that are- bunche-el (whie;h is e-ejual 
1o the- me-an of the- wiggle), the- quality as a ele;e;ision x'aiiable- was ce)iist.rue-te-el te; 
be- neenele-e'reasing in the- age;nls' valuat,ie)n see as le) induce- the; age-nts te) re-ve-al their 
priva.te- vabuition para,me-ters truthfully.
.Mussa and Rosen (1978) finally propose-d as a future- re-se-are'h pre)ble;m that one- 
ce)ulel |)io(itably extend their mode;l to the; case where- e:e)iisumers inelividually ele-e:ieie 
be)th on the ejuality of units the;y will e:onsume and on the; eiuant ity of such units, 
and it was Maskin anel Rile;y (1984) that examine-el this proble-m. ΊΊκ;γ she)we-el 
that, whenever the; cenisurners have preferences (charae;te‘rize;d by simple parameters) 
e)ve-r both e|uality and eiuantity, the selle-r’s e)ptimal strate;gy is te> sell multiple- units 
in bunelle-s. and higher quality units are- solel in pae-kage-s e)f a elifferent size- from
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(.lıos(î of lower quality units. 'I'lic' study of Maskin and Riley (1!),S1) is welkknown 
in the principal-agent literature' as it also presents tlu' fundamental characterization 
theorem for the optimal selling strategy of a monopolist, which readily generalizes to 
a principal-agent relationship. Using this theorem, they were abh' to show that the 
optimal selling strategy involves pricing larger quantities at succc'ssively lower unit 
prices.
One interesting result obtained under the nonlinear pricing framework of Maskin 
and Riley (1984) is that nonlinear pricing is optimal only if the firm has constant 
marginal costs. Later in 1994, .S|)idber showed that noidinear pricing under unknown 
demand is approximatedy efficient, that is the maximal monopoly profit is almost a,t- 
taiiK'd uiidei- nonlinear pricing with increasing marginal costs if th(> size of the sample 
of consuiiK'rs grows. Spulber (1994) also introduced the reference point pricing in 
which consumers' payments depend on their reports of expected consumption. He 
prov('d that nonlinear reference' point pricing implenu'uts the optimal solution which 
maxirnize's the monopoly profits.
.'Ml tin; incentive-compatible mechanisms until 1987 were designed for cases where 
incom[)lete information could be characterized by a singh' ])aram('ter. In that year, 
Laffont, Maskin and Rochet (1987), while studying optimal nonlinear monopoly pric­
ing mechanisms, extended incentive-compatible mechanisms to the case of two di­
mensional privuie information. In their study, they assumed that consumers’ demand 
was linear, and its slope and intercept coefficients weix' unknown to the regulator. 
By iising a new change of variable technique (later called as the LMR technique), 
tİK'y reduced the two-dimensional uncertainty to a one-dimensional uncertainty, and 
thus tlu'y were able to find an incentiv(i-com|)atible nonlinear pricing schedule which 
indmx's consuiiu'rs to reveal their unknown demand parameters.
Omyvear later. McAfee and .McMillan (1988) characterized incentive-compatibility 
conditions for a mechanism with multidimensional umx'rtainty. (¡eneralizing the 
analysis of Laffont, Maskin and Rochet (1987), they obtained tlui optimal nonlin­
ear monopoly pricing scheme when the monopolist has information about only the 
distribution of a multiplicity of i)ararneter of the demand curve which is not necessar­
ily linear. McAfee and McMillan (1988) further showed that the qualitative results 
r('ga,rding nonlinear pricing schemes with one-dimensional uncertainty genercilize to 
tlu' mullidimensional case. 'I'lie multidimensional incentive com[)a.tibility condition
f()
IİK'Y dıaractcii'izcd cnal)led iMcAfec and McMillan (1988) l,o also examine Uıe oplimal 
bundling policy Гог а nıultiproduct, monopolist. 'ГЬеу showed that the monopolist 
has three alternative pricing policies: To price each commodity sc'parately, to offer 
ordy bundles of commodities with a single bundle price or to sell either separately 
or bundled with the bundle price different than the sum of the s<?parat(; prices of 
commodities comprising the bundle. They also prov('d that the third strategy, that 
is the mixed bundling strategy, strictly dominates tlu' former two st rategies from tlu; 
vi('wpoint of the monopolist.
Vbu'ious sl.udies in tlu' literature showed that a nonlinear-pricing monopolist gener­
ally underproduces with respect to the competitive case and, moreover, whenever tlu' 
consununs’ valuations for any good are not very diffeixmt from each other’s, monopo­
list extract s almost all of the consumers’ surplus So t here arises a need for regulating 
t-h(' nonlinear-pricing monopolist. This problem has been considerc'd by Katz (1983) 
and Laffont (1987). Katz’s (1983) approach assurtu's that the regulator does not 
know t,h(' distribution of consumers’ demand and cannot dictate a price schedule, lie 
only id('utiiies conditions which guarantee that a local increase in t he level of outi)ut 
l(>ads to an increase in social welfare. Laffont (1987), on the otlx'r hand, examined 
the problem of regulating a nonlinear-pricing monopolist under the assumption that 
the roîgulator has the same information as the monopolist. He proposed that, using a 
linear or nonlinear tax schedule which mitigates underproduction, the regulator can 
maximize the social welfare which is a convex linear combination ol consumers’ gain 
and the noidinear-i)ricing monopolist’s welfare where the latter has a smaller W('igivt.
B('sid(' all those studi<is which rest on the assumption that the principa.1 or ix'gu- 
lator has incomplete information (single or multi-dinu'nsional) aTout, the ty])(' of the 
ag('nt in a two-f)erson regvdatory framework, t.luîre exists another strand of literal,ure 
which deals with mechanism design when both the ])rincipal and t lu; agent, have pri­
vate' information. The previous mechanisms which have b('(;n designed for tlu; case 
where one type ol person has private information are' lU) le)nger use;bd in the more 
ge'iieraJ case e>f multilateral asymmetric information. In lact, mee;hanisrns which must 
be; eh'signed t,o organize an institution or a market shonld necessarily involve a bar­
gaining proce;ss between parties both of which have' iruxuriplete information before 
the' ('e|uilibrium is attained,
.Me'eiianism ele'sign with a bargaining proe;e;ss was stueiieul by Vickre;y (1961),
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D'Asprernont and Cerard-Vanii (1979) and My(n'son (1979) among others.' ' Vickrey 
(1961) showed that when several agents with conllicting interests have incomplete 
inlormation (about demand and supply, tor example), it is irnpossil)le to find a mech­
anism lor negotiating the terms of trade which satisfies the following three conditions 
at. the same time: (i) Private information is truthfully revealed by each agent, (ii) 
the system is self financing and (iii) the final equilibrium allocation is Pareto ef­
ficient ex post. Later, weakening the incentive criterion from dominant strategy 
to Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, D’Aspremont and Cerard-Varet (1979) showed that 
Bay('sia,n incentive-compatibh' mechanisms (which guarantee to each agent the max­
imal exp(’cted payod wlu'ii he trutlifully rc^ports his ])riva,te information given that 
all the otlH'r agents do the same) could achieve Pareto efficient allocations with no 
outside subsidies. Their mechanism, however, lacks an irnportanl property which is 
known as (ex ante) individual rationality condition ensuring that each agent partic­
ipating in the mechanism will have a nonnegative expected gain before the agents 
report: their private information.
.Vlyerson (1979) ('xtcMisively examined the problem of a regulator (arbitrator) who 
tries 1,0 select a collective choice for a group of individuals. Ihi considered an orga­
nization in which there are a finite number of agents with unknown characteristics 
coming from a finite set. The group of players also has a finite set, ol choices (strate­
gies). I'lach player luis a payoff as a function of the group stratc'gy and the vector 
of |)layer’s type's. Pvery player has a private probability distribution over possible 
Vf'ctors of player types which is also known to the arbitrator. Each ])layer also knows 
tlu' marginal probability of his ty])e. 'I'he choice mechanism which is the probability 
assigiK'd by the regulator to any choice conditional on tlu' response's of players about 
l.lu'ir types is also common knowledge.
luider these assumi)tions, .Vlyerson (1979) sugge'ste'd that a choice mechanism 
is Bayesian incentive-compatible' ’ if the conditionally-e'xix'cted ut ility payoff of any 
player is maximized when that player reveals his true type given that, all other i)layers 
truthfully respond.
.Vlyerson’s (1979) first result was that no feasible choice mechanism has any equi­
libria (allowing some anticipated dishoiursty) which cannot be generated by some
' also Lairoiit. and Maskin (1979),  CdiaU.orjco and Sarnuclson (1979),  (dia ltorjco  (1980) ,  Myorson (1981).  
' D ’Asproinont and ( Jorartl-Varct (1977) Idr a gonoral definit ion of Bayesian incentive-rornpatibil ity .
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[■('asihlo' Bayesian inceniive-c.oinpalihk' choice ineclianisin. Ih' also claimed iliat, t.lu' 
Barelo opUmality crit('rion slionld be applied relat.iv(' 1o the s('t of all incentive- 
leasihle expected allocation vectors rather than the set of all possible feasible al­
locations, for some feasible allocations might not be implementable under multi­
lateral asymmetric information. So, one should seek the incentive-efficient mecha­
nisms which are the Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms that are not dorni- 
nal.ed by any other Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism, do find the uniqu(i 
incentive-efficient nu'chiuhsm as the solution to the Bayesian colh’ctive choice prob- 
h'ln among the various inc('ntive-compatible mechanisms, .\4yerson (1979) used an 
('xl('iided vc'rsion of tfu' solution concept by llarsanyi and Selten (1972), bascxl on 
eai'li('i· work of .N'ash (1950). lie defined the incentive;-feasibfe bargaining solution to 
b(' the eepiilibrium allocation vector which maximizes the generalized Nash product 
of the incentive-lnasible payoffs net of the conflict payoff wh(;re tlu' conflict payoff of 
a playeu· is defined as the expecte;d payoff of that player when the players could not 
agree in the collective choice problemi. Finally, Mye'rson (1979) she)wed that if the 
e:e)nllict outeieime is not ine:entive'-e;fficient then there e'xists a unie|ue' ine;emtive;-fe;asible 
bargaining solution anel a choice mechanism which implemients that solution.
l.ater, llolrnstrorn and Mye'rse)U (1983) cfiaracte;rize;d the effieiient and durable 
meedianisrns under incomplete information. I ’hey stateiel tfiat the' Pareto efficiency 
e:e)Mce;pt should be; interpreteel se)inewhat difFerent under incomplete' information than 
under full information. An e;e;onornic decision under ce)mpleM,e information is efficient 
in t lie; Pareto sense if and only if there is no other ele'e:isie)n that make;s at, le;ast eine 
ineli vidual bett.er off without making others weirse eilf. llowe've'r. uneler inexunplete; 
iiddrmation this classical elefinition e>f Pare'te) o])timalit,y is rneaningh'ss. fleılmström 
anel .\lyerse)n state;el t,ha.t (1983, |).1800):
to judge whether a i)articrdar form of market e)rganizat,ion is effi- 
edent in an e;e:onomy with incomple;te information, an outside e'e onornist can 
e)iily analyze the elecision rule induced by the market form. This is because; 
he cannot predict what elecision or allocation will be ultimate;ly reacheel 
without knowing the individuals’ private information. Thus, the prope;r 
e)bject for welfare analysis in an ee'.onomy with incomplete iid'ormation is 
the elecision rule, rather than the aedual decision or allocatie)n ultimately
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chosen.'’
A decision rule under incomplete iniorination is then said to he Pareto eihcient 
if and only if no other feasible decision rule can be found that may make some in­
dividuals better off without ever making others worse off. 'I'his definition is very 
ambitious as the notions “feasible”, “better-off”, and “worse-ofP’ admit different in- 
tiU'pretatioris. The set of (classical) feasible decision rules consists of all decision 
rul(!s chosen in the absence ol incentive problems involved in eliciting the necessary 
infonnation from individuals. .Some of the decision rules in this classical feasible set 
may not b(î implementable when individuals have private information. So, individ­
uals must Ik; given an incentive to reveal their private knowledge. Feasible decision 
ndes which guarant(;e truthful revelation are then calk'd incenti\-(;-feasible decision 
I'uk's. 'I'lu' individuals in an economy with incomplete information suppose that they 
ar(' b('lter-ofF if tlu'ir expected utilities increase. Now there are three possible situ­
ations how this ex|)ectation can Ix' comput(;d. 'I'he individuals may calculate tlu'ir 
('xp<'c1,('d utilities as a function of no private information (the ex ante case), of their 
privat(' (intc'i im) information only (the interim case), or of the; join of all individuals’ 
information (the ex post case). So with respect to these three different types of infor­
mational assumptions and two types of feasibility concepts, then' arise six different 
efficiency concepts, llolmstrorn and Myerson (1983) r(;])resented these six different 
(;fficiency concepts also through the measurability restrictions on individual weights 
in a social welfare function. If the relative weight of tin; welfare of (;ach individual 
is constant then one gets ex ante (incentive) efficient rides, if this weight d(;])ends 
only on th(' private infonnation of that individual tlu'ii om; gets inti'rim (incentive;) 
('flicie'iit rules, and if this weight depends on the private irdbrmation of all individu­
als in an arbitrary sense then one gets ex post (inc('ntive) efficient ruk;s. llolmstrorn 
and Myerson (1983) also showed that ex ante (incentiv(') ('fficiency implies interim 
(inc(;ntive) efficiency which, in turn, implies ex post (inci'iitive) ('lliciency.
llolmstrom and Myerson (1983) also introducc'fl the' concept of durability in 
(;conornies with incomplete information. An incentive-leasible (k'cision rule under 
incomiilete information is defined to be durable il and only il tlu' individuals in the 
('conomy wovdd never unanimously approve a change horn this rule to any other 
(k'cision ride, llolmstrom and Myerson (1983) show(;d that there ('xists a nonempty
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s('t of decision rules wliidi are bot h durable and incentive-efficienl.
In Idle same year. Myerson and Sat.lertliwait.e (1983) consideix'd a speciiic bar­
gaining problem known as ‘‘bilat,eral trading under incomplete information”. I'lie 
buyer and the seller each knows their own private valuation parameter For a single 
objc'ct, and they bargain tor that object. In the bargaining game, boldi the seller and 
th(' buyer report their valuations to a coordinator or broker who t hen del,ermines 
wlu'ther the good will be sold and how much the buyer must pay. Again using a 
Bayc'sian incentiv('-(ornpatibh' policy which gives no incentive to tradc'rs to misreport 
th(di' valuations, the coordinator calculates the optimal regulatory |)olicy which is a 
function of the coordinator’s commonly known beliefs about the traders’ valuation 
])arameters for tfie objc'ct.
In tlu' same study, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) tried to find an answer to 
th(' (|U('stion of whether there exists a Bayesian incentivi'-compatibh' and individually 
rational mechanism for bilateral trading which is ex post efficienl."’ Unfortunat(dy, 
lh(' ansvNX'r they found is ‘no'. 'riu\y proved that if tlu' intervals over which the 
s('lh'r's and buyer’s valuations are distributed with posilive probability density have 
a nonempty intersection, then no incentive-compatible individually rational trading 
nu'chanisrn can be ex j)ost efiicient. Indeed, a positive amount of lump-sum subsidy 
is re<iuired from an outside party to create a Bayesian incentive-(X)mpatible mech- 
a.nism which is both ex post efficient and individually rational. 1 hen Myerson and 
Sa.tterthwa.ite (1983) found the conditions for the existence; of a mechanism which 
maximizes ('xpected total gains from trade as a seeond-best mexiianism. hinally, 
iiie lneling a bre)ker inte) the; traeling mechanism as a ne>t se)urce e)r sink e>l me)ne‘v, My- 
e>rse)n anel Sa,tte'rthwa.ite (1983) she)we'el that ex posi e'fficiene:y ean also be; sa.tisfieel 
along with inceritive;-compcitibility anel individual rationality. lle)we'ver, it is found 
that the broker’s optimal trading rne;e;hanism le;ads lo strictly less trading than the 
rne'chanisms which maximize the expe;cted total gains from trade.
d'he; study of Spulber (1988) extends Mye;rson and Satterthwaite’s (1983) bar­
gaining game to a Framework where the buyers of the; e)bject are; e euisurners with an 
unkne)wn demand parameter while the seller is a, firm with unknown supply parame- 
te'i'. Spulbe;r’s (1988) model also alle)ws for a variable' oeitput level and an aelditivedy
l)ihil(H;il trading incclianism is said to l)o ox p ost  oiiiciont if the l)uy<'r gets  the ob je c t  w henever  his valuation  
is higlKM·, and the stdler k<ieps tlui object  whenever  his valuation is higluM'.
21
sc'parablo but, nonlinear common knowledge; parameter. His analysis shows that,, de- 
p(;nding upon t,he relative weights given to the consumers’ and the firm’s welfare, the 
regulation problem as a bargaining game between the firm and tlu' consumers has a 
wide range of incentive-efficient solutions. The regulatory solution which is designed 
as the Bayesian equilibrium of the direct revelation game may involve welfare losses 
due to the costs of creating incentives tor truthfully reporting of private demand and 
supply information. .Nevertheless, as Spulber (1988) showed, the full information 
(;ifici(;ncy may also be attaiii(;d for certain forms of utility, cost and beliefs about 
unknown (h'lnand and sup|)ly parameters.
.Vlost of tin; m(;cha.nisms discussed until this point, though they generate various 
desired rc'sults from tin; viewpoint of the society or tlu' ])layers who choose a particular 
nu'chanism, have been harshly criticized because th('y incorporate' the prior beliefs 
of th(' regulator. As Vogelsang (1988) stated:
“One of the; problems with the Bayesian a|)proach is that prior beliefs 
are not observable. Thus, in order to have a i)olicy impact, the regulator 
may cix'ate a moral hazard problem by misre])resenting prioi· beliefs.”
Now Chapt,e;r f of this dissertation verifies the statement of Vogelsang (1988) by 
explicitly characterizing the bc'liefs that a dishonest regulator in the 13-M framework 
ma.y use as strategic tools to illegally obtain some part of the consumers’ and the 
producer’s gain. It is shown that no belief dominates any other belief regarding 
th(' ex post value of actual social welfare unless the regulator has a belief which 
charact(;rizes the complete information case.*' .So ('V('ry belief is as respectable as 
any other from flu; viewpoint of the society. Ilow('V('r. there exist beli(;fs which yield 
vahu's arbitrarily close to the Ínfima of the producer’s and the consumers' gains 
(which are nil) under the B-M mechanism. Moreover, there exist beliefs which yield 
arbitrarily close values to the suprernum of producx'i's gain. Although then' is no 
belief which yields an arbitrarily close value to the suprernurn of the consumers’ 
gain, for any belief / of the regulator there exists a belief / ' such that maximizing 
th(' consumers’ gain under the belief /  and maximizing tlie social welfare under the 
belief / '  yield the same outcome under the B-M mechanism. Given these findings, it
'' riiis which characterizes the coini)lete information case, of course, is not  ¿illowecl in the B-M m o de l  as the
r(iii,ulator’s bel iefs a ie  restr icted to be posit ive on an interviil of  positivti hmgth.
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is ()l)vious that, a dishonest regulator may signal to the lirni (and/or consniners) l.hat 
h(' has ‘hinfortunately" some beliefs which yield almost, z('ro net producer’s gain (net 
consuriiers’gain) but he is ready to change liis beli(d‘s so as to ensure that tlie firm 
(consumers) will obtain almost tfu; suprernum of net, ))roducer’s gain (net expected 
consumers’ gain) if he was offered a certain amount of bribe. One may object, of 
course, that under the B-M model of regulation like in all kind of Bayesian ixigulatory 
models the regulator’s Ixdiefs are assumed common knowledge, and thus there is no 
room for manipulating the prior b(;liefs. Our claim, however, is t hat an assumption 
that the whoh' society compl('t('ly and independent ly agree upon t lui extent of their 
lack of iid'ormation is too strong to hold in real life. So tlu' assumpt ion that beliefs of 
th(i regula.tor ar<i common knowledge should be inter])ieted as that these beliefs arc? 
nuule common knowledge through the regulator who declares them to t he ])ublic. So 
n'garding the application of Ba,yesian regulatory nu'chanisms to real life probhniis. 
the r(igulator or the agency who lorms beliefs about tlu' private information of the 
regulat(id is always capable of ma,ni|)idating his b(di('fs to his own bcmefit.
In th(' first cha|)ter. the implications of the regulator's hiarning about tlu' ])rivate 
cost, iid'ormation of the regulated ageid, are also examined. We consider some belief 
updating ruh's a regulator who learns about cost may follow and analyze the effects 
of those updating rules on the welfare of the regulated monopoly, the consumers and 
the society as a whole. It is shown that as the regulator’s information about the 
|)iivate cost parameter becomes more precise, the welfare of the monopoly under the 
B-M mechanism may either increase or decrease, depimding on th(' rule by which the 
ri'gulator updates his beliefs. ,So there' are' case's in which t he moneipolistie' firm may 
finel it t,e) its advantage to signal about its private ceist informatieni.
.Vleirc'em'r. it is sheiwn that even if the regulator’s bedie'fs about the jirivate' exxst 
inf'eirmation converge te> the trut h, the social welfare' ae hie've'el t.hrougli t,he ff-M mech­
anism might not converge to its full information optimal level.
The results on corruption and leiarning in monopoly re'gvdation are' extendeel to the 
ge'iu'ral principal-agent model of Cueisnerie anel Lafleint (1984) in (Chapter 2. In the 
same' ediapter, it is alse) proveM tha.t, except for some' trivial cases, it is indispensable 
te) use' the Bayesian approach in monopoly reigulatieni.
('hapten· 3 criticizes the Baye'sian re'gulation in a elynarnic e;onte;xt. Reigulating a 
mult i-period monopoly has been extensively studied by many ee'onomists in the litera-
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iiiix'(('.g.. Baron and Boisanko. li)81a, lf)8(); Sappington and Sibley. 1!)86. 1988). 'Flu' 
ratnon.s sUidy of Baron and Besanko (1984a) showed that, when ilu' regulator has in­
complete iriiormatioii about cost the optimal regulatory mechanism is the repetition 
of the stcitic mechanism of (B-M). In Cluipter 3, it is shown that no Ic'asible Bayesian 
rc'gulatory mechanism is renegotiation-proof urdess consumers’ and producer’s gains 
are oiqually weighted. This chapter also ernphasiz(is the tradeoff a d(isignei' faces 
b('t,w(ien implementing a non-Bayesian mechanism which is renegotiation-proof but 
imdficii'ut and a Bayesian mechanism which is ex ante eificient but not renegotiation- 
prool.
Chapters 4,0,6 and 7 are applications of incentive theory to various regulation 
l)robhmis. flhapter 1 (extends B-M’s model of regnlation to an open economy in 
which the donu;stic monopoly faces a foreign competitor which ])roduces a perlect 
snbstitute. It is shown that the existcmce of import possibility reduces the informa­
tional r(Mits which should be given to the domestic monopoly even vvlum the import 
doc's not a,ctually ta.ke place. Chaptcn· 5 considers tlu' same open ('conorny problem 
as in (diapti'r 4 nnder the assumption that the domestically produc('d and imported 
|)i()ducts are imperfect substitutes. Chapter 4 cUid b link regulation and strategic 
trade f)olicy, the latter of which proposes that governnumt intervention in the trade 
policy can increase social welfare of the home country by shifting l.he oligopoly rents 
from foreign to domestic firms. Thus, t.hese two chapters fall in the so-called litera- 
tur(' of “strategic regulation of international trade".
In (diapter 6, the B-M model of monopoly regulation is exteruhvl to a thix'e-level 
hi('rarchy by including the manager of a regulated firm who is belter iidorrned than 
1,h(' owner into tlu' principal-agent framework. 'I'he r('gidatory mechanism is designed 
so as to giv(' correct incentives to the manager for truthful revelation. 'I'his chapter 
also shows that the difference between the objective's of the manager and the owner 
of th(' regulated firm leads to imdficient social outcomes and low h'vels of managerial 
gain.
h'inally, in Chapter 7 the B-M model of monopoly regulation is extended to a 
( lonrnotic oligopoly.
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Part II 
Theory
1 Corruption and Learning in Regulating a Mo­
nopolist with Unknown Costs
•>y
Seniih Koray 
and
Is rn a il Sağlam
Depart,merit of Economics, Bilkent University, 06533 Ankara
1.1 Introduction
In their famous jraper, Baron and Myerson (1982) considered the problem of reg­
ulating a monopolistic firm with unknown costs. Under the situation where neither 
competition in the market nor competition for the market is possible, one has to deal 
with the problem of regulating a natural monopoly to achieve social eificieiicy. 'I'he 
regulatory solutions proposed until 1982, including the rate of regulation and delega­
tion approaches, were criticized since they did not derive from a normative ap]U()ach. 
Baron and Myerson (1982) modeled the regulation problem by a principal-agimt ap­
proach in which the principal (the regulator) regulates the activity of the agent (the 
firm) to achieve some efficient outcome from the viewpoint of the whole society which 
includes the firm and the consumei's, the latter of which is not rc'garded as a player 
in t.he regulatory game. The demand function is assunuxl to be common knowledges 
whereas the cost is privately known to the firm. I'lie asymmetry in the distribution of 
information in the market leads to an incentive probh'm, that is to say, the firm when 
asked may rnisreport its private cost information il this is to its advantage. By the 
Rev('lation Principle, Baron and Myerson (1982) (B-VI) restricted themselves with­
out, lf)ss of generality to direct revelation mechanisms which ask the firm to ixsport 
its cost and which give the firm no incentive to lie. B-M regulatory policy consists of
foul· outcomes which are functions of tlie iirrn’s cost, report: tlie probability tliat the 
firm is allowed to produce, the optimal price and (piantity of th(' product and the 
optimal subsidy (tax) given to (taken from) the firm to induce the firm to participate 
in regulation and to truthfully reveal its private cost information.
B-M’s approach differs from previous ones in that it considers a more general social 
welfare function in which the consumers’ welfare is at least as lu'avily weighted as 
the producier’s welfare. Since ex post efficiency cannol. be guaranteed for all possible 
values of private cost information via an incentive-compatible mechanism unless tlu' 
consumers’ and the [)roducer s welfares are equally wi'ighted, B-M define the social 
objecl.ive as the expected value of the social welfai'(' function defined above. The 
regulator is assumed to have a commonly known prior belief about cost over a known 
interval. Unless consumers’ and producer’s welfares are ('qually weighted, the optimal 
n'gulatory policy proposed by B-.VI turns out to depcuid upon the prior belief of the 
regulator, and therefore it is calk'd ’Bayesian’.
A gr<;at number of studies in the regulatory mechanism design context have 
adopted the Bayesian approach of B-M. Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) character­
ized the complete (Bayesian) solution to a class of principal-agent problems which 
includes some well-known problems as special cases such as the income tax model 
of Mirrlees (1971), the quality choice model of the monopolist by Mussa and Rosen 
(1978) or Maskin and liiley (1982), and the model of regulating a natural monop­
olist of B-M. Later, Laffont (1987) applied this general solution technique of the 
principal-agent problem to the problem of a nonlinear pricing monopolist (princi­
pal). and furthermore he dc'iived the optimal linear and nordiru'ar f.axes nec('ssary 
to control the nonlinear pricing monopolist. Laffont and Tirok' (1986) examined 
a pi'oblern in which the regulator observes the total cost of tlu' firm, but not its 
individual components; the productivity parameter, the effort level and a random 
parameter interpreted as the accounting error. 'I'lie rc'gulator who is assumed to 
hav(i uniform belief about the [)roductivity parameter uses an incentive-compatible 
policy to induce the firm to reveal its true productivity |)ararnet('r and l,o choose a 
socially optimal effort level. Riordian and Sappington (1987) designed a Bayoisian 
franchise bidding scheme which maximizes expected consumers’ welfare for a set­
ting where there are a finite number of firms which might hav(i different kinds of 
technologies. 'The study of Lewis and Sappington (1988b) extended the monopoly
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i('gulat,ioii i)roblern to a framework wlierc both demaiui and cost are unknown to tfie 
regulator who is a Bayesian statistician. The mechanism of B-iVI which assumes that 
only cost is unknown and that of Lewis and Sappington (1988a) which assumes that 
only demand is unknown are obtained in Lewis and Sappington (1988b) as special 
cases. The Bayesian solution technique of Lewis and .Sappington (1988b) under the 
two dimensional uncertainty is borrowed from Laffont, Maskin, and Rochet (1987) 
and .VIcAfee and McMillan (1988). Prusa (1990) offered a Baycisian approach to 
I'iigulating certain types of transler pricing. Laffonl, (199-1) deserves a special refer­
ence' at this ])oint. In his study, Laflont provides a survey of the main results in the 
conteixt of the new o;conomics ol regulation in the ten ye'ars from Baron and Myer- 
son’s (1982) model of regulation to his book with Jean Tiróle (1998). 'Lhe canonical 
rnode'l for legulation Laffont (1994) developed covers seweral applications to various 
case's such as proenirememt of a public good, simple-natural monopoly, multiproduct 
re'grdation, service' ejuality, polluting natural monope)ly. sharecropi)ing, managerial 
e:e)inpe'nsation, priva,te |)roe;urenneint betwex'ii two firms, internal ee)ntract within an 
e)rga.niza,tion.
'l lu'se' stuelies as well as numeirous e)thers all propose; meeJianisms which irnpleunent 
se)ine efficient outcome using the Bayesian approach. This study is a first attempt to 
analyze the dependence of the Ba.yesian regulatory mechanisms upon the reigulator’s 
prie)r belief. It was already claimed by Vogelsang (1988) and Koray and Sertel 
(1989) that the Bayesian meedianisrns are open to manipulation when the belief 
of the regulator is not accountable to the pid)lic. .Now in this study, we explicitly 
show how a dishonest ix'gulator ma.y corru|)t the monopoly regulation model of B-.M 
which is a t.ypical ('xample of Bayexsian regulatory mechanisms.
One of the findings of this study is that unless the ])roducer’s and consumers’ 
gains ar<; equally weighted in the social welfare, there exists no i>rior beli(4' of the 
rc'gulator which leads to (for all possible values of the unknown cost parameter) 
actual consumers’ gain or actual social wellare arbitrarily close to their respective 
valiu;s obtained under the complete information case. However, as we will show, t.herc' 
('xists some form of prior beliefs which yields almost zero consumers’ gain and social 
w('lfare for all possible values of the cost parameter, except the h'ast efficient one. 
Mon'over, there exist prior beliefs which yield an actual producer’s gain arbitrarily 
close' t.o its supremurn (infirnum) value at. that (X)st parameter, and for each belief
regulation problem to a Crarnework vvliere both dcmaiul and cost are md<nown to the 
i'('gulator who is a Bayesian statistician. 'I'lie mechanism of B-M which assumes that 
only cost is unknown and that of Lewis and Sappington (1988a) which assumes that 
oidy demand is unknown are obtained in Lewis and Sappington (1988b) as s|)ecial 
cases. 'Lhe Bayesian solution technique of Lewis and Sappington (1988b) under the 
two dimensional uncertainty is borrowed from Laffont, Maskin, and Hochet (1987) 
and McAlee and McMillan (1988). Prusa (1990) offered a Bayesian approach to 
rcîgulating certain types of transfer pricing. Laffont (1994) deserves a special refer- 
(uic(' at this |)oint. In his study, Laffont provides a survey of the main results in the 
context of the new economics of regulation in the (.(ui years from Baron and Myer- 
son’s (1982) model of ix'gulation to his book with Jean Tiróle (1998). 'Lhe canonical 
rnodc'l for regulation Laffont (1994) developed covers several applications to various 
ras(\s such as procurement of a public good, simple-natural monopoly, multiproduct 
ix'grdation, s(U'vic(' cpiality, polluting natural monopoly, sharecropping, managerial 
comp('nsa,tion, private procuixunent between two firms, internal contract within an 
organization.
'f lu'se studies as well as numerous others all propose' mechanisms which implement 
some efficient outcome using f.he Bayesian approach. 'I'his study is a first attem pt to 
analyze the dependence of the Bayesian regulatory mechanisms u])on the regulator’s 
prior belief. It was already claimed by Vogelsang (1988) and Koray and .Sertel 
(1989) that the Bayesian mechanisms are open to manipulation when the belief 
of the regulator is not accountable to the public. .Now in this sludy, we explicitly 
show how a. dishonest rc'grdator may corrupt the monopoly regulation model of B-M 
which is a ty|)ical example of Bayesian regulatory mechanisms.
One of the findings of this study is that unless the i)roducer's and consumers' 
gains arc; equally weightoxl in the social welfare, there exists no prior belief of the 
regulator which leads to (for all possible values of fhe unknown cost parameter) 
act.ual consumers' gain or actual social w(dlare arbit.rarily close to tlnúr respcictive 
vahurs obtained under the complete information case, llowciver, as we will show, tJieix; 
exists some form of prior beliefs which yields almost z(U'o consurru'rs’ gain and social 
wc'lfare for all possible values of the cost parameter, except the h'ast efficient one. 
•Vloreover, there exist i)rior beliefs which yield an actual producer’s gain arbitrarily 
closer to its supremurn (infirnum) value at that cost parameter, and for each belief
¿I
of 1.1i(' regulator th(U’o exists anol.her belief which would yield tlu' inaxiinal expected 
consumers’ gain according to l.he foririer belief even when the producer’s welfare has 
nonzero weight in the social welfare.
A dishonest regulator who is aware of these striitegic beliefs might secretly send 
some threatening messages to consumers or the producer pretending that lui has the 
[)rior belief which would yield almost zero gains and that he would accept to replace 
his current prior belief by the b(di(d' which maximizes the expect('d consumers' gain 
(when he is bargaining with consumers) or by the Ixdief which yi(dds the suprernum 
of producer’s gain (when he is bargaining with the firm) if he was paid a certain 
brib(x Provided that l)ribing takes place before the regulator announces his/her 
[)rior beliefs, the optimal regulatory policy continues being incentive-compatible but 
f.h(' m>t social welfare decreases as the regulator’s dishonest gain is not assigned any 
])ositive weight in the social welfare.
In this study, w(' also analyze how the optimal regulatory policy of B-M chang('s 
vvlu'n tlu' rc'gulator learns rnoix' about cost prior to rc'gvdation. W(' will show that for 
dilh'ient paths of beliefs converging to the truth, the social welfare' might converge to 
entirely dilferent points. We will also analyze the eih'cts of differc'nt belief updating 
ruhxs upon the welfare of the [)roducer and the consimu'is, separately.
In Section 1.2, we summarize the mechanism of B-M. In Section 1.3, we show how 
the regulator may corrupt the Bayesian mechanism outlined in Sect.ion 1.2. In Section 
1.1, we examine the effects of regulator’s learning about cost on th(' consumers’ gain, 
producer’s gain and social welfare. Pinally, in Section l.o. some concluding ix'tnarks 
arc' made.
1.2 Baron and M yerson’s (1982) R egulatory M echanism
'I'he monopolistic firm has a cost function C{q,0). where q is the (|uantity produced 
and 0 is a (X)st parameter that is unknown to the regulator. 'Fhe firm’s cost function 
is of the form
('{q,0) — (c'o -f- C\0)q -f- (ki) k]0) if <y > 0 and (",((),())_(). (1)
wIk'ix' C(),C|,A:o,A:i are nonnegative constants, Cq -f- C\0 represents marginal cost and 
kt) + k\0 represents setup cost of producing any positive output. I'lxcept for 0, all 
pai anu'ters and tlu' form of the cost function are common knowledge.
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riu; unknown cost, paraiiu'tcr 0 is bounded within some interval from Oq to 0\ 
(Oo < 0\). 'I'he regulator has ])rior beliefs f{0) about the distribution of the true 
value of the cost parameter 0 in the interval [()q.,0\\. The density function ¡'{0) is 
positive and continuous over the interval
'riu; demand function is assumed to be common knowledge. The inv(;rse demand 
function is denoted by P{.) and it is assumed to be negatively sloped.
'I'he tota.l value' V((i) of an output ol quantity q to consumers is the area under 
thee inverse demand curve given by
r  r i q ) d q .
Jo
The consumers’ surplus is V(q) — P{q)q.
\  (easibh; roîgulatory policy consisting of four outcome functions (r. p^q^s) is de- 
fiiK'd as follows: For any 0 in [do,0i], >’(0) is the [)robability that the' firm is permitted 
to opeial,(' after having reported 0 as its cost, parame1,('r. As a probability, r{0) should 
satisf\·
0 < r{0) < 1. (3)
Provided that the firm is permitted to operate, the regulated i)rice p{0) and the 
regulated output q{0) should satisfy the inverse demand equation
p{0) = P(q{ (3)
Lastly. .'i(O) = .s'‘(0)r{0) is the exported value of the subsidy s’ {0) paid to the linn if 
it is allowed to sell in the reguhrted market with probability r(0) when it reports 0. 
L('t, niO) be the |)i'oiit of the firm if it truthfully rex'eals its cost pararnet.er 0
7T(Ö) =  [ p(0)q(0)  — ( q ) +  C]0)q{0)  — ko — k i 0 ] r { 0 )  +  -^{0), (3)
and let T^iOJ)) be the profit of the firm if it rnisreports its cost parameter as 0 while 
0 is its true cost parameter
'(ÓJ)) = [p{0)qiÖ) -  (co + c,û)q((i} -  Áp -  k,û]r(ÎJ) + .,(/)). (d)
d'o make I,he firm report its true cost parameter 0. the policy must be incentive- 
compatible. That is,
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■k {0 )  — m a x  ■k ' [ O J ) ) ,  \ / 0  6  [ i ^ o . ^ i ] · (7
Filially the regulator should ensure that the regulatory policy is individually rational, 
that is, the profit of the firm is nonnegative:
TriO) >  0 W 0 e [ 0 o , 0 , ] («)
'File feasibility conditions (d), (4), (7) and (8) ('iisure that tlu' linn honestly re­
ports its cost, parameters. The regulator's objective is then to find a feasible regula­
tory policy that maximizes the cixpected social welfare SW'(0, f )  under the beliefs 
f{0). SW'' (0 ,f )  is defined as a weighted sum of tlu' consumers’ ('xpected net gain 
((ixpect('d ronsuiners’ surplus net of the expected subsidy given to the firm) and the 
exp('cted gain of the firm (expivted operating profits plus the expected subsidy given 
by consumers):
SW'iO^f) = / ' '  {[V(MO)) -  p{0)q{0)\r{0) -  s{0}yf{0)d0 (!))
lOo
(h
+ / 7r{0)f(0)d()
'Oo
a G [0,1] is the relative weight of the expected producer’s gain with respect to the 
expected consumers’ gain.
d'he optimal policy (/·, p, (/, .s) to this welfare maximization problem is given by^
p { 0 )  — C() +  <^‘1
will)“
(10)
( 1 1 )
( 12)
Piq{0))^p{0) . (Id)
‘ SiMi B-M for a cletailod derivation of  tlie op tim al  policy.
^"con.u" operator gives the highest  convex function which is hiss than or equal to its ojxirant and F  d en ote s  the  
cuinulativ(i  d istr ibution  funct ion for density  / .  (11) is needed for the cases where j [ 0 )  is decreasing in 0. N ote  
that j  =  whenever  the la tter  function is nondecreasing on [0q ,0\].
do
r{0)
_  J i if V {(¡{O)) -  p{0)q{0) > ko + k\z,,j{0). 
0 if V ((/(Û)) -  p{0)q[0) < ko + kiz,,j{0). (M)
~  [(‘^•0 +  +  '^o +  k\0 — p{0)q{0)]r{0)
i  r{0){c\Pi{0) k\)dO.
Jo
do]
+
As it is clear froni (10)-(12), the optimal regulated price is higher than the 
marginal cost price unless cv = 1, that is when the consumers’ and the producer’s 
gains are (!quall}' weighted in the social welfare. In order to understand whj' this 
price' schedule is optimal, we insert the optimal subsidy in (15) into (5) to obtain the 
|)roducer’s gain
7t ( i9 )  = / v(())(rpi{0) + k\)dO.
JO
VV(' obse'rve that the producer’s gain is incix'asing in q. t he output produced. Alonr 
ov(u·, rewriting (9) as
,SW dA./')= ' {[V iqiO)) -  CiqJ)) -  a  -  (y)n{
we note that there is a tradeoff between the efficiency and the? incentives which 
should be giveui to the producer. So, in order to limit, the informât,ional rents of the 
producx'r, tlu' optimal j)rice is set above the marginal cost.
'I'he e(]uation (14) shows that the producer is allowc'd to producer only if the 
consumers’ surplus at the reported cost is sufficieutly high to cover t he adjusted setup 
cost of production. Finally, we note that the optimal subsidy in (15) is compo,sed 
of two parts; The integral part guarantees truthful revelation while th(' nonintegral 
part ensures that the producer will not make loss when he is allowcvl to produce;.
1.3 C orruption in th e B -M  M echanism
'11k; B-AI’s optimal regulatory policy given by the ('quations (!())-( 15) depends 
upon th(' prior belief /  of the; regulator about the unknown cost, parameter 0. In 
B-.VFs model, the prior belief of the rcrgulator is assum(;d to be common knowledge, 
i.('.. publicly known to both the consumers and the r(;gulated firm. Whenev(;r the
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iK'lii'fof t,h(' rcgula.t.or about tlic monopolist’s cost (b'rivcs from a physical structure 
oi’ |)ast observations about the cost of the firm, tlui common knowledge assumption 
is not too restrictive. Leaving aside the considerations as to how the prior bediefs of 
a i'(igulator may form, we simply claim that when the belief of th(' regulator reflects 
his subjective evaluations and thus are not verifiabh; by the society, there arises a 
moral-hazard problem since a dishonest regulator may cliange tlu' rcigulatory |)olicy 
by manipulating his belief if it is to his benefit to do so. In the following propositions, 
w(' will ('xplicitly show how the corruption may occur.
P roposition  1. Assume that the regulator has the prior belief [(.). There exists 
no belief f'(.) having the property that S W { 0 , f )  > S W {0 , f )  for all 0 G [0q, 0\\ and 
SW {0 , f ' )  S W (0 , f )  for some 0 G
Proof. VVe know from the B-Vl mechanism that the |)iic(' pj{0) = (\)A-e\z,,j{0) max- 
imiz('s the (expected social welfare under the rcigulator's |>rior belief /( .) . Now assume 
that th(!re('xists a b(dief/ '( .)  which strictly dominatc's /(.). Then S W  {0, f )  f{0)d0
> SW{(), f) f{())dO implying Pj {0) docis not maximize the expectcxl social welfare,
which is a contradiction. Q.L.D,
C oro llary  1. Assume that the regulator has the prior belief /( .) . I here exists no 
belief f'{.) having the property that NC(j {0, J') > ,\ ("(!{(). j  ) for all 0 G [f^ o,fA] and 
.VY.Y/ffL/') > N C a { 0 , f )  for some 0 G [(TJ)^].
Proof, riu' proof simply follows from the proof of tlu' Proposition 1, since tlu' con- 
sumc'rs’ gain is e(|ual to the social welfare when a- = 0. Q.K.I).
P roposition  2. Assume Zaj(O) is a nondecreasing function ofO. Then for any 0 in 
[fA).f^ i] and (x in [0, 1], the profit of the firm is a nonincreasing function'* of
'A luncl.ion noiulpriTrLsing (nonincr(iiLsing) in -jpj^ if for soino f ] (0)  and J2{0) sat isfy ing
 ^ ^ [0{),0\],  It IS tn io  tha t  ‘
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Proof, from (6), (14) and (la), the profit of the firm can be wrillen as
-k{0) =
Oo
with (9’ j  = inax ^tf\r
r{0) =
{ci(j{0) + ki )d0,
= 1} and f{0) is given by''
1 if r(t^) > 0,
0 if F(f?) < 0,
where Fft?) = V (q(0)) — p{0)q(0) — kp — kxZaj{0) since z,yj{0) = Znj{0) by the 
assumption that Zf,j{0) is nondecreasing in 0. Differentiating F(/9) with respect to 
z , , j i O )  we get
()Zc,jiO)
ami using p{0) = c,, + Cxz„j{0) and z,,j  = f9 + ( f -  n )y |^  we finally get
<)V{0) 
¡■'(0) 
¡ { 0 )
d
= -{cxq{0) + k i ) { \ - a ) ,
which is rionpositive. So F((?) is nonincreasing in which implies that O^j and
rnin{0j^ j,0x) are nonincreasing in Therefore, the profit of the firm is nonin-
• F(0)creasing m Q.E.D.
Lem m a 1. I'or any c > 0, llicrr. exists a. density fanclion J,(0) such that < (
for all 0 i.n [0{)J)\\ where F,{0) = f  i0)d0.
Proof. Let the density fum tion ff {0) be 
'-expC-)
cxpC-f) -  expi^)
Ify integrating from Ox) to 0 we get the cumulative distribution function IflO) as 
expi}) -expi^-f)
(lb)
I'AO) =
expC-f) -  expi ^ f)'
(17)
' \'V(i know that  r{0)  is not cyclical as the cons\ im crs’ surplus is strictly  concave due to the ass u m p t io n  that  the  
inv(us<' (hnnand funct ion  is neg,atively slop(td.
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a,11(1 dividing (17) by (16) we obtain
FAß)
= c [l-e .x p (------- )],
which is obviously less than or equal to e for all 0 in [ilo,ili].
C oro llary  2. For all 0 in \0oJ)\\ rnonotonically incveasiny in c.
Q . K . D .
(18)
Proof. 'I'al«' any (2 > f | > 0 and 0 € 'I'lien = (,[1 -  e x p (^^ ) ]  <
^2(1 -  < ' 2(1 ..Q.lvD.
C orollary  3. When t approaches to 0, /.(/^) approaches to a Dirac function at 
0 =- ()\, and when t approaches to 00, fc{0) approaches to a uniform distribution.
Proof. \No. will first show that. f, [0) approach to a Dirac function at 0 — ()\ when ( 
a.pproaclu's to 0. Nol(' t hat
-c:r.pA^ )
liin l'r{0) = litn ------j------ ^
o-()· i-o expi^-f) -
= lirn
hexpiOh)
— liiii
exp{0\h) — exp{0oh)' 
hexp{{0 — 0o)h)
h.^ 00 c.xplfOi — 0o)h) — 1 ’
lini
lirn
x p i i 0 - 0 A h ) [ \+ h { ( ) -(),)] 
0^  -  Oa 
1 + hfo -  Oo)
= lirn
c.rp((fA -  0)h){0i -  Oo)'
0 -  On
/,-x. expiiO, -  0)h){0, -  0){0  ^ -  Oo)'
singular \{ 0 = 0],
0 ('Isewhere.
(19)
Now we will show that j( a|)proaches to a unilonn distribution as e goes to 00:
'jcxpC-)
liin fAO) = lirn
-  cxpC·^) -  cxpiA-f)
о i
hm схр(-)  hm ------------------- —
'—'.-o ( (—.X.
lim --- —■, . --------------
Д-0  cxp(Oih) -  exp(Ooh)
lim t;------,— --------------------Л.-0 0xexp{0]h) -  воехр{0о1г)
(h -  Oo Q . E . 1 ) .
Proposition 3. Assıunc Ihal İha regülatör has the prior belief f,{0). Then the 
producer's gain approaches to its suprernum as c goes to 0. That is,
Iiin7ri(y. f,) = sup7r(0,/), for all в 6 [öo,i ı^]..^0 " f
Proof. I'Vom Proposition 2 it follows that < 0. We also know thaï, for a
density function of the form / , ,
\ ^ m z , J ^ 0 ) =  W m z , , j , { 0 ) =  0 =  z ^ f { 0 ) <  z , , j { 0 ).f—f() c-^ 0
since Zaj(O) is nonincreasing in cv and also liin,_o — Ь1гр_ог[1 — exp{^^^)]
0. Thus the producer’s gain тг{0,/) approaches to its suprernurn when f{0) — 
liin,_o Q.E.I),
Lem m a 2. For any M with 0 < Л-7 < oo. there exists a. density function gs{0) such 
that > Ad for all 0 in [do.d,] where CT{0) = g.s{())dÔ.
Proof. 1 x't the density function дь{0) be
Ш  =
W.xp{f)
c . x p i ^ )  -  e x p i ^ )
By integrating from Oo to 0 we get the cumulative distribution function Gf,{0) as 
cxp{=f) -  e x p i i ^ )
(20)
0'ö{0) — ,
exp{-^ )  -  e .x p ( ^ )  
and dividing (21) by (20) we obtain
GdO) ... .O-Oo^ ,,-  b\cxp{— —) -  1].
иЛО) Л
( 21 )
( 22 )
ЗГ)
Now calculating linn_o “ 7^ ·  "'<■ got
) - i ) .
= lim -------- ^ ,6-^ 0
__ -^crr)( )
-^>0 _ J _6'^
0 -  Oo
— l i i i i  cxp(  .. 
.‘. - , 0  0 ) =: OO.
So. with J{0) = lirii^ _(),<76'(^ ) havf! — l i rn^-^a — oo > M  lor M  < oo
Q.K.]).
C orollary  4. hWi.fr«. 6 approaches to 0, gt,{0) approaches to a Dirac function at 
0 =r 0(), and when h approaches to oo, (jt,{0) approaches to a uniform distribution.
Proof. We will first show that gs{0) approaches to a Dirac function at 0 = 0^y when 
b approaches to 0. Note that
\ c x p ( ^ )
\\mg)j(0) = liin ------- j.----- --------
= lim 0-0,  ^'
=  lim
c x p C ^ y
= lim ' *->
.singular it 0 = Oq,
0 elsewhere.
.Now w(' will show that fy,s approaches to a uniform distribution as 6 goes to oo:
;}f)
lim дв{0)6—^'УЭ
lim
é-co e x p ( ^ )  -  ex-p(-|j-)
= lim
i - ~  e x p ( if i ) - e x p (2 fL )
= lim
h
h->o expiiO -  0o)h) -  cxp{{0 -  0,)h)
/,-() (0 -  Oo)e,xpi iO -  0o)h)  -  (0 -  0 , ) схрЦ( )  -  (), )h)
0^  -  Oo
Q . E . D .
P roposition  4. AsHurnt thai the regulator has lh< prior belief of the. form g^(0). 
'¡'ken for all 0 in [0o,0]] the producer’s gain approaches to its injiinurn as 6 goes to 
0. That i.s,
WmniO.gt,) = \ni ir((), f) .
iS-^ 0 ■ /
P roof. From Proposition 2, it follows that < Ü. From L(nnrna 2, we know
that lim#_o — lini¿_o —1] = oo. So, lim,s_.o (^) — lhn¿_o =
O + i l-cy)  liñudo = oo, since ^  is nondecreasing in 0. So, f{0) = Wm^^^ogsiO) 
yields the infimurn of the producer’s gain. Q.lvD.
P roposition  5. Assume that the regulator has th( prior belief of the form дЛО)· 
Thin as 6 approaches to zero for all 0 in »(I consumers' gain and the
social welfare approach to their respective injirna. '¡'hat is.
WmNCCiO.jjt,) = hii NCC{()..f) =  0,and
,s^ () I
\\mSW{0,(j6)  =  \niSW{0, f )  =  0 .
(V-.U ‘ I
Proof. For all 0 G (Oo 0]] we have lim¿_o =
oc. So, lim¿_() = 0 and thus Игпл_о G((l, p,s)
inf; . \C ( l{0 , f )  = inf; ,S’kF(0,./)·
И тл_о0[с,7;р(^) -  1] =
= lim¿^o.SW(¿),p¿) = о =
Q . E . D .
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As I,he rcgulal.or notices tlial liis prior bc'lief about the cost of the firm directly 
alli'cts the net consumers’ gain and the producer’s gain, lui may nsc' this knowledge 
to demand bribe from both the firm and the consumers’ union (which acts on Ixdialf 
of the consumers).
riie regulator may signal to the firm that unfortunately his prior belief is of the 
form c]s{0) with an arbitrarily small b so that tlu  ^ (inn would get a gain arbitrarily 
close to its iniimurn valiu', which is exactly zero, and that he is n'ady to declare his 
b('li('f as of tin; form with an arbitrarily small c which would yield to the firm
a gain arbitrarily close; to its snprernurn value il the regulator is olfered a certain 
amount of bribe'.
On the ce)nsumers’ side, the situation is a bit different. Therre exists no prior belief 
which yields the' supremurri of the ennsumoirs’ gain fe)r all value;s e>f 0. Neverthehiss. 
the' re'gulator can still extract a cen tain part e)f the consumers’ gain as he can threate'n 
the' cenisumers by the' belief gb{0) with an arbitrarily small b which yields te) the 
e'.onsumers a gain arbitrarily e'lose te> zero.
.'\inong the; all social welfare; functions the e:e)nsnmers most pre'fer the one which 
assigns zero weight to the producer’s gain (o' = 0 e ase). We shonlel also note that 
for every belief /  of the regulator, there exists another belief /* ( /) , a function of / ,  
such that maximizing the; e;xpe;cted value e)f the^  se)ciaJ weltare lune l.ie)n which assigns 
ne)iizero wc;ight te> the pre)eluce;r’s gain (e:>; > 0) uneler the beliel ./*(,/) and maximizing 
the' expee;ted e:e)nsumers’ gain uneler the regulator's e)riginal belie'l / yiehl the' same; 
e)nteome uneler the B-M optimal re;gulatory ])e)lie;y. For a give;n /. the be'lie'l /* ( /)  
e an be' e:alculateel as
c-(ff) m
' " ' / . ( » )  / ( » ) '
He'arranging yielels
/■ («)_,, , m
I ■■(()) ' 'l·■(0У
and integrating both sides we obtain 
l n { r i 0 ) )  =(1 -a) ln{F{0)) .  
whie h can be re'written as
r ( 0 )  = /-'(fl)'-“ ,
;18
and (inally diirerentiating yields
r { 0 )  =  i \ - a ) F { 0 r ^ m .
Tlic regulator may then demand bribe from the consumers by signaling that he will 
be replacing his belief J by the belie! J ' i j )  if consumers accept to give a c('rtain 
bribe.
Since the regulator should tak(  ^ the brilxi belorc' lu' announced his [)rior Ixdief and 
Ik'ikx' Ireloix^ ' the monopolist ix'ported its cost paranu'tc'r, tlu; brilx' given by thci firm 
oi’ t.lu' consumers’ is a sunk cost lor them. So when tlu’ bribery takes ])lace, the form 
of the optimal regulatory policy does not change but the level of the social welfare 
d('creas(!s as the regulator’s dishonest gain has no ])ositive weight assigned in the 
social welfare; function.
.\ow, let the re'gulator have the pair of strategic beliefs ( / ^ , / '  ) where p ’ is tlu' 
belie'f that the ro;gulator would declare to punish tlu' (irm or the consuiiH'rs wh(;never 
th(;y obj(;ct to give' bribe and f  is the belief Ihe' re'gulalor woulel ele'chm; te> re'ward 
the'm when the;y aceepi, to give bribe;. More;e)ver, le't /  elenote the actual be'lie'f of 
the; regulator. 'I'liere are at le;ast two e)ptions the re'gulate)r rna.y follow in a brilrery 
situation: The first is to signal to the firm the pair of beliefs iJcfJs) with arbitrarily 
small e: and S which yic;lds to the firm a gain arbitrarily cle)se to its suprernum value 
if the firm give;s bribe and a gain arbitrarily close te) zero otherwise. 'Fhe see;ond 
option is to signal to ex)nsume-;rs the pair of beliefs (/*(/)-,(/a) with arbitrarily small 8 
whie h yields to the; e;onstimers the; supremurn e)f the' e'.\i)e'cte'd gain il the;y pay bribe' 
anel a. gain arbitrarily e'le)se te> ze;re) otherwise.
f'sing the first f)air of belie'fs. the; su])re;mum of the bribe' that (he; re;grdator can 
ele'manel from the firm. Bj{0). for any 0 G [t^ o 0\] is
B f { 0 )  =  7 r ( d , l i r n / , )  -  7r(d , l i i n e / i ) . (24)
Similarly, using the sc;cond pair of beliefs, the supremum of the; bribe that the; re;gu- 
late)r can extract from consumers, B,.{0)  ^ for any 0 G [Oo ()\\ is
BAO) = N C a i O . r i f ) )  -  NCCiOJungs).A-^ O
.\s a, function of the;se two pairs of beliefs, the' ranges of the· total bribe; that 
the' re'gulator can take from the firm and the e:onsume'rs are [0, Bj{0)] and [0, BAO)],
df)
i-('S|)('('1 iv(ily. which both depend on the l(;v(d of th(' cost parameter 0. So, tlie situation 
is a l)a,rgaiuing problem lor bribe under incomplete information.
Since the firm reports its cost parameter 0 after the regulator announced his 
bediefs, the regulator does not know the actual range of the bribe that he can dcmiand 
])rior to regulation. So, if the l)ribe that the regulator demands from the firm (tlu' 
consumers) is too high with respect to the producc'r’s gain (tlu' consumers’ gain) 
which cannot Ix' predicted prior to regulation, the firm (the consumers) would reject 
to pay bribe'. 'Fhe regidator il lu' commits to his ihreat would then announce the' 
worst Ix'lief from the viewpoint of the firm (the consumers) which implies that the 
(inn produces (the consumers buy) nil almost at any marginal cost,. Such a case, of 
course, is not desirable' lor neither the society nor the re^gulator.
As an alt.en-native the; regulator may calculate the' expected producer’s gain anel 
the' e'xpe'e:teel e;e)nsumers’ gain under his actual belie'fs and bargain over them. 'I'his 
se)lutie)ii, howe've'r, may still run the risk that the bribe' elemanded e'xex'eds the actual 
gain e)f the; producer (t,he; ex)nsurne'rs). 'The mechanism as te) how the' bribery between 
the' re'gulator and the; e;onsume;rs or betw(;en the re;gnlator and the' monopolist take;s 
plae;e' is e)ut of e:e)ncern of this study. We only pe)int e)ut that there is a room for 
corruption in the B-M model whenever the belief of the reigulator about the private; 
ex)st parameter of the monopolistic firm is unaccountable' te) the; society.
1.4 Learning about Cost
In t his sectie)n. we will examine the' effects of the' re'gidator’s le'arning more abe)ut 
the' ee)st, parame'te'r 0 on the' e)ptimal me)nopoly ix'gulation mechanism e)f B-Al. 'Flu' 
B-.Vl moele'l is a. single-shot me'e-fianism. and thus we' assume that the' le;arning take's 
plaex; belbre; the re;gulator announex's his be;liefs. We will not be' elisenissing here' epis- 
t.e)mole)gic epK'stions as to he)w the' re'gulator can aexpiire' more pre'e ise information 
about the ex)st, e)f the firm. The' type e)f learning we' e e)iisieler involve's that the' re;gu- 
late)r somehow asex;rtains that the; interval which coniines t.he private; ex)st parameter 
of the firm narrows down and the; regulator then u|)date's his be'lie;fs ove;r the; new 
inte'i'val. Repeating this type of le'arning sequentially, we will first show that eve;n 
if the; ix'gulator’s belie;f e:onverge; te) the; truth, the se)e:ial welfare; may not converge; 
te) it s full information optimum. Now before proex;eding, we will give' se)ine definitions.
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Definition 1. Loji ilio true vahu' oi 0 be denoted by Or and l('t ,/r(.) denote the 
di'ii.sity function representing tlie coinplet(i information about the cost parameter Or- 
The density fri ·)  if’ ^ Dirac function as below:
M O )  =
singular if 0 = Or 
0 elsewhere
Corollary 5. Under the B-h'I's oplirnal regulatory policy, the. social weJJ'arc function 
aUai.ns U.s suprenium when the regulator has the complete injormation about Or-
Proof. If t he regvdator completely knows the cost parameter Or- his belief must be
fri.}.  Note that = 0 and = -do for all 0 > Or- So, q(0) = 0 for all 0 > Or
which implies that under the belied' /7'(.), the producer’s gain woidd be zero and the 
social wedfare would attain its suprernum. Q . E . D .
Now we will show that the |)ath that the regulator follows in a se'quential learning 
while he updates his prior bedief about Or deterrnim's where the social welfare will 
converge.
Definition 2. Let /( .)  = if\_-),fH·), · ·)  denote an injinite sequence, of prior be­
liefs, where for all integers i. > 0, /'(■) Ihc density function representing the 
prior belief of the regulator at time i. Then /(.) is monotonieally inerea.sing a.t 
d'l' >1 f  ‘’1·^ '■ ^ (1.2,...). ,/(.) is said to lx pseudo converg­
ing to fr{.) if for any given e > 0 there exists a nonnegative integer j such that 
1 _  U'iOr + () + F'iOr -  c) < e for all integers i > j .  /( .)  i.s said to be converging to 
[■¡■{O) if it is converging in pseudo sense, and Jor any M > 0 then e.i:ists j  such that 
p{0r)  > M for all integers i > j .
Proposition 6. The sequence of updated probability density functions given by 
(29) — (46) is rnonotonically increasing at Or o.nd converges to fr{.) in pseudo sense. 
Moreover, liin,^.,, SW{0,p{0))  SWiO,fr{0)).
11
1
f { 0 )  =
o elsewhere
(27)
П(0г)=  /  /'-'(ö)i^ö
Jor
(28)
r j O r )  = f ‘ Γ'(0)ά0 
Jo·-'
(29)
7 = 2 · ' -  “ (30)
, 7 'П (% )
"" hiiOr) (31)
A '= / : ÍV ;  /З‘ е (0 , 1) (32)
к' -=
Ь ’ЩОг)  
Or -  o;r'
о;=Ог + ( 1 - 7 Ж  -^^r)
f/‘(û) = <¡ / ‘-'(Ο), 
A'
) + ·^' -  -  ϋ^“ ' ), e K~\Or]
1 + A'
, / ç‘(0;-') + g‘(0r-(l  - a ' ) (û r - 0 ‘-'))
"'■ V 2A‘f ‘-U0r)
0’ = 0 г - ( 1 - а ‘) (0 т -0 ’- ')
0\ =Ог + {\ - г П ( ( ) \ - ' -O r)
Ое[Ѳг,Ѳ\-'] (35) 
( Isc where
(36)
(37)
,r/(ö‘) + \ \Г ' [ О г )
= I  P{Or).
0. elseirhcre
(39)
( 3 0 )
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O', = Or -  -  l%Or -  0\,)
^  r ^ { O r ) { \ + \ ' )
7'/'■ = (r‘(r^) + r'(/;;,))
PiO) =
1 —  7 ‘
r'(oi,)ri'-s'(0;·) 
Or-O', -01,), »€№ .»,■)
0n[0r,0 \]
elsewhere
( 1 1 )
Proof. We will prove Uiat the sequence /( .)  given by (29)-(46) satisfies the conditions 
stati'd in the |)ro|)osition. So hit ns show that /( .)  is monotonically increasing at O-y 
and pseudo convergt's to f r i · ) ·  I'Vorn (44) one can write, for any integ('r /i > 1. that
= (1+A '). (4-o)
f ' - H O r )
A' > 0 For all integers i > 1, hence it follows that /( .)  is monotonically increasing at
Or-
'I'o prove that /( .)  psciudo converges to ,/r(·) take any c > 0. W(' can find a positive 
integer '¿* such that max^(tl7· — FIq) ni=i(^ “  7 )^(  ^~  PP ~  Or) ni'=i(l ~  7^)(1 — 
7/*')^  < f, since lirn,_oo n U i (* “ 7^)(1 ~ “ )^ == Unh-*'» HUi (' ~7^)(1 ~'/^) = 0. From 
(46), we also know that f ‘{0)d0 = 1, V/i > i*. So 1 — F^(0r  + c) 4- P''{()y -  r) = 
0 < r, Vi > r . Thus /( .)  pseudo converg('s to f r i · ) ·
hhually note that lirn,^,, fd', — Oy) = 0 and ■ 1 bus lim,_,-,, 7t ( 0 )  =
JP[c i f / ' (0 )  + kijdf) = 0 and liin,_, ,^ 5'kF(fA/·./')  < SW{0' i · .  j y )  since liin,;_,x, 
q'iO) < P - p c ,  + c \0y) .  Q471).
Proposition 7. The sequence of updated probabilitij d.ensiiy func t io ns  qiven by (48)- 
(52) is mono ton iea l ly  increasiny at Oy and converyes to j y { . ) .  Moreover, liin, ,^x,
S W { ( ) . p )  = S W { 0 , f y ) .
n o )  = 7“-0“ t.J 0 € tp]
( isewhere
(46)
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/ + ki]dO — J / r(d)[ciq' ^{d) + k]]dd,
Jor do·,·
7 6 (0 ,1 ) (47)
a =
{ e \ - ^ -o \ )
{o\-^ -O r )
0^  ^ = o;,-' + a(0r -  0l~') (49)
f i O )  =
>f % < 0 < 0\(/j
0 Isewlicrc m
Proof. VV(' will first, prove that, the sequence given by (48)-(o2) is inonotonically 
increasing at O'j· and converges to fri·)·
hroin (.72) w(' obtain for any integer i > I,
/'(»/■ ) _ «>r'-o;r'). I
luMice /( .)  is inonotonically increasing at Or-
'Fo prove that /( .)  converges to fri ·)  straightforward. P'rorn (49)-(52), we have 
lirn,_,x, Ig^  r{0)[c\q''(0) + ki]d0 = 0, which implies that lim,^oo 0\ = lirri,_oo d), = Or- 
Purthermore / ‘(Or) — oo from (52). So, /( .)  converges to fr{.).
Phnally, from (49)-(52), we see that lirrp^oo 7r‘(fF/·) = Vnui^,^ jgl r{0)[c^q‘(d) + 
k\]d0 = 0; also lim,_,x, (/‘(fl'/·) = F~'(cq + c\0r). Hence lim,_.x, .S'H4'(/4r,/ ')  = 
S W i0 r . f r ) ·  Q.r:.l).
.\'ow. we will analyze how the producer’s and the consumers' welfare would change 
with different belief updating rules.
D efinition 3. Suppose the requlator has the prior belief f{.) over the interval [f4o,61i] 
and farther suppose that the requlator learns that the Jinn’s cost parameter 0 lies in 
th( interval [a,b] inhere Q < a < b and b -  a < 0\ -  0^ ,. Let / “(.) denote the updated 
belief of the requlator about 0 on [a,/;] with F'‘(b) = f “(x)dx = 1. The requlator
is said to be:
i) Rationallq updatinq his belief on [a 6] if f “(0) > f(0), \/ 0 G [a, 6],
ü )  u n t f o r n i l y  u p d a t i i i g  h i s  b e l i e f  o n  [a h] i.j ] ' ' { ( ) )  =  J { 0 )  +  0 .  V  ö  G w h e r e
y- = (io¡ f i ' O f n  + 0 '  f { x ) d x ) l ( b  -  a),
¿¡■i,) proportional ly  updal iny his belief on [a b] i f n o )  = f iO )  * (1 + ,p), V 0 G [a, b] 
where '0 = .la f(^)  ~  ^·
N()l.c that, (ii) and (iii) both imply (i), that is both the uniform and the proportional 
u])dating rules are rational.
Proposition 8. Suppose Ihe regulator learns that 0 lies in [d¿b0i] where > Oo- 
M a n ö v e r ,  lei ihe regulalor rati,anally update his pr io r  belief  f { . )  : [0oJ)\] and.
Jorin the. belief 7^^ . f u r t h e r  suppose and are nonde-
ereasiny in 0 and. a  G [0, 1). 'I'hen under the B - M ’s regulatory pol ic t f  p ' f  O) < p{0),  
<l " (0)  >  q[0) and. 7r ' ' (d )  >  7t ( /7) ,
Proof. ,\s the regulator updates his belief rationally. / ' ‘(Ö) > /(/7),Vd G d]]. 
Uemv., rSO) < r{0), \/() G [011,0,] and /-'“(/7,) = FiO,) = 1. It then follows that
f m < m ·  1"»·"'!· = "+ < ' - '> > 7 ^  < " + ( |  - 'O tiS  = m  while
> (¡(0) lor the inverse d('mand lunction is negatively sloped. hVom Proposition 
2, it follows that 7r“(0) > 'k(O). Q.IO.D.
'The above proposition states that the producer’s net gain incre'ases as the regu­
lator's information about cost becomes more precise, which is very surprising. Note 
that it is not possible to predict prior to regvdation how tlie social welfa.r(i will change 
wIk'U tlu' rc'gulator learns as in the way defined in the Pro])osi1,ion 8 beca.us(' the in- 
cr('as(' in the output hwel and the i)roducer’s gain have counteracting (dfects on the 
social vv('lfar('.
.\ very important implication of this proposition is that tlu' monopolist (if Ik; 
knows that the regulator updates his belief rationally) finds it to his advantage to 
signal that lie is not, as eifici(;nt as the regulator has ('.\])('cted.
Proposition 9. Suppose the regulator learns that 0 lies in [0,0'f] where 0 ‘f  <
Ч sujxirsrript. ЧГ will stands Гог that  the regulatory j^olicy i imctioiis ¿ire calcu lated  at the u p d a ted  prior
l)(‘li(ti‘ /'^ while the ahstuicti of th<^  suj)(irscri])t ‘u ’ will (hmote that  the regulatory policy is c¿ılculated when the  
l itgulator has th(i Ixditd’ / .
rmn{0'J)\). Moreover, lei iJie nujulator proportionally update kis prior belief f{.) : 
[0{).0\] TZ+ and Jorm the be.hej ,/''(·) : [Oo.O\\ —>■ ¡‘'urtlier suppose
and are nondecrcasiny in 0 and a e [0,1)· Then under the B-M’s reyula-
lory policy p'^{0) = p{0), q'f O) = q(0), тг“(/?) < те{0), N(XJ'^{0) > NC(d{0) and 
SW^fO) > SW{0).
Proof. Since th(' regulator proportionally updates his belief, it follows that f ' fO)  = 
J{()){ \ + -0), Vd G wlu're 0 = -  1. Note also that lor all 0 G [0п,0\],
' xm  ^  /(S(itt)' = Л ? ’ '> )^4d('f-i'«asing in 0 by assumption. So p'fO) = p{0)
and q'fO) = q[0). From (Ь),(1'1) and (F5) vv(' can write
Ічпіп[0* ,0\)
тг{0) -
to
[A,·] + C] q{0)]dl), and
Л ¿// Í )
'k''(0) — / [k\ + Ciq{0)]d0,
Jo
to conrlude that ir'JO) < 7r{0) since = 0" and ()'{ < 0". Also ''(/>/) > SW{0) 
since SW^JO) = h'(//(//)) — (c() + C\0)q(0) — {ko + k\0) — (1 — o) +
cp/(;i;)]07; = SW{0) + (1 -  + cMx)]dx > SW{0)  and O'l < ^
where (B = Tnin{0\Viq(0)) — (cq + ('\Za{0))q{0) — (ko + k\0) = 0}. Note also 
,S'VF''(Y;) > SW(0) if cv G [0,1). Fimilly, NC(T‘[0) > NCG{0) follows from the 
property that SW{0) = NC(!{0) when o: = 0. Q.IGI).
P roposition  10. Suppose the reyulalor learns Ural 0 lies in [Oo.O' ]^ where d“ < 
0]. Moreover. Ud. the regulator uniformly update his prior beliif f{.) : [()[). ()\\ —> 
7?.+ and form the belief f ' f  .) : [tA),tli'] ^  K+. ¡'urther .suppose and are
nondeereasing in 0 and a G [0. 1). Then under the B-M's regulatory policy,
i) p'fO) > p{0), q'fO) < q(0) and w'fO) < тг{0) if f'{0) > 0. Vd G [On.Of] and
O'; < o\
ii) p'fO) < p{0), q'fO) > q{0) and w'fO) > 7v{0) if f'{0) < 0. Щ G and
O; > and
i.u) p'fO) = p{0), q'fO) = q{0) while MfO) < Ti{0), NCCfO )  > NCG{0) and
, s i e " ( d )  >  sw {0) if f '{0) =  0, У0 g  [0o,0';] and o; < o \
K)
Proof. As the regulator updates Ids belief uidlbrnily. f ' ‘ {0) =  f { 0 )  + i/gVd G [0oJ)\'] 
wluu-e ?/-’ = ,/j!' .[{'■ i')dxl(0 '( -  Oo). Now it follows that
_  ¡1 f { x ) d x + j K 0 -  Oo)
f^O ) 1(0) + i>
and
/'’“((9) F{0) ,/o„ y(3')ö^ · '^+ -  <^o) jg f (x)dx
PiO) fiO) m  + >1’
P  jlilRO) -  f{0)]dÖ
f(O)
(fiO) + <!’)f(0)
h'irst l(?t us show that (i) holds. If f(O) is increasing in 0 then /■'(g)
/ ( g )
> 0
and thus p‘'(0) ^  p(0) while f/''(d) < q(0). Moreovc'r. using Proi)osition 2 and th(' 
assumption that dj' < 0" we obtain 7r"(d) < 7r(d).
(ii) follows when f{0) is d('creasing in d, in that ease; ^  -- () and thus
p"(0) ^  p(0) while (/"(0) > q(0). Using Proposition 2 and 0'/ > 0*". we conclude that
7 r" (d )  >  7 r (d ) .
iMiially if f(0) is uniformly distributed, ^  -  0 and thus p^iO) = p(0),
q"(0) = q(0) and 0”" = 0*. So ^ “(0) < rr(0) from Proposition 2 and by the assump­
tion that O'i <  0 \  dims SWpO) >  SWiO), and NCCpO) >  NCdiO). q . e . d .
Last two |)ropositions clearly show that in the case where tlu' I’egulator h'arns 
that (he u])per bound of the interval which contains the firm's cost, paranu'ter is 
low('r than what he has ])r(!viously e.xpectcxl, diil'eixuit, rational iad('s according to 
which tlu' regulator upda.tes his belief may lead to opposite efh'cts on the ro'gulatory 
policy and welfares of the consuiru'rs and the firm unh'ss t he rcigulator has the uniform 
bdid'. The proportional updating rule in learning incr('ases the social welfare' while it 
re'duces the producer’s gain, regardless of the form ol t lu' re'gulator's be'lic'f, l lu ' ('ifects 
of the uniform updating rule on the producer s a.nd consumers’ welfares, howe'ver, 
de|)(uids on the properties of the probability density function which represents the; 
bdief of the regulator about the unknown cost parameter. The Proposition 10 also 
(h'monstrates that if the regulator’s prior belief is common knowledge and represented 
by a d('nsity bmetion which is decreasing in the cost parameter, then the firm finds
it. 1.0 its IxMK'iit, 1,0 signal about tli<; range' of the intc'rval which contains its private 
cost. pa.ra.nicter 0.
' I 'Ik ! above propositions cover onl,y the cases where t he interval [i9o- 0 \ ]  shrinks frotn 
one side when the regulator learns about the cost parameter 0. Unfortunately, we 
do not know yet an example of a belief updating nde which leads to a predictable 
increase or decrease in the producer’s gain or consumers’ gain irresp(;ctive of the 
form of cost, demand and the regulator’s belief when the interval shrinks
IVom both sides. However, for some forms of demand, cost and prior belief, the 
social wellaix' may decrease when the regulator's beli('l about cost, becomcis more 
|)r('cis(>. For example, given an affinely linear demand function P{x) = 16 — ^/1, a 
liiK'ar cost function (o, = k\) = ki = 0 and C| = 1). a welfare wc'ight cv = O.f and 
tlu' |)iivate cost parameter 0 = \\, the producer’s gain and the social welfare are 
calculated vvlnni [0t),0\] = [10. 12] shrinks from both c'lids:
do = 10.00, d, = 12.00, /(d) = 1 7r(fl) = 10.22. ,S'kF(l 1) = 28.90
do = 10.80, d, = 11.90. /(d) = yip 7r(ll) = I 1..87. ,9kF(l 1) 28..58.
It is int<'resting that the producer’s gain increases while the social welfare decreas(;s 
when [do,di] shrinks from both sides. So, it is not geiu'rally true that the actual .social 
welfare increases when the regulator’s precision about, tlu; cost of the monopolist 
increases.
.Now, let us think of an insider of the firm who want to sell to t he regulator some 
('xt.ia informat.ion about the c.ost parameter, 'rhe ix'gulator can not evaluate the 
actual value of tlu' insider’s information in t.cn'ms of an increase in tlui social wedfare 
as tlu' rc'gulator doc's not know the true vahu; of the firm’s private' cost paranud.e'r 
prior t.o re'gulation. Nevertlu'less, the regula.tor can calculate his ('xpe'cted gain from 
an insiden- trading and may tlu'ii decide'on whethen' te> trade' e)r ne)t. Le't the re'gnlator 
have' the belie'f /(d) in [do,d,]. ami le't the insider kne)w the cost parameter d with a. 
pre'ension level'’ e, > [ni/.n(d| — 0.0 — f^o)]~'· 1 hat is. insider knows that 0 lie's with 
pe)sitive probabilitie '^s in [d,d + p] lor some d G [0o. 0\ — p]. lle're, we dene)te the 
re'gulator’s updated belief in [d,d+ p] by
If the regulator chooses ne)t to trade with the insielen·, then the expected soenal
i)r(M:i.sioii Ictvol i.s d(tiiiu;d as ll ic invorso of (.ho length of tint intttrval whore 0 is known to lie witli |)ositivo  
piohahil i l  y.
18
w('llarc uiid(M* the belic'f /( .)  is
= I ' '  ^^W0)f{0)d0,
dOo
whereas the ex ante value of the expected social welfare derived from an insidcir 
tradiiiiz; is
' JOo
r0-{- ^
. W J l W d O -Jo
'Finis l lio inaxirnmn amount of money that a Bciyi'sian regulator is ready to pay in 
return foi· the insid(' information 0 is SW'ju -  SWj.  Hut, of course, this type of 
trading is ('fficient from the viewpoint of the society only if the rc'guhitor’s belief is 
suiliciently close to the truth.
1.5 C onclusions
VVe showed that there exists no prior belief which dominates the actual belief of 
th(' r('gulator for all possible values of the cost parameter regarding the social welfare. 
I'lven though it is tnu' that th(' B-.Vl mechanism doc's not lead to t he first best social 
optimum unless relative weight of the producer’s gain with respect to consumers’ gain 
is one, there exists no incentive-compatible mechanism which performs better than 
the B-M mechanism. Neverthehiss, this mechanism is open to tlu' manipulations of 
a dishonest regulator.
'Fh(' regulator may threaten both the firm and the consumers with (almost) zero 
gain by changing his belief in an appropriate way if (hey do not oiler a (X'ltain |)ar(. 
of their gains to the regulator. Besides, the regulator may also giv(‘ to the firm (the 
consumers) an incxuitive to pay bribe as he can yic'ld l.o the (inn (the consumers) 
almost the supremurn of th(i producer’s gain (the expected consumers’ gain) if it 
(th('y) pays (pay).
VV(' also examined how thci regulatory policy of B-VI changes when the regulator 
learns more about the cost parameter. Our finding is that hiarning is not always 
ch'sirable. The social welfare may decrease while tlu? Ixdief of the ix'gulator convfu'ges 
to t.he ti'uth. Moreover, in some cases it is beneficial for the monopolist to 
about, his cost.
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2 Corruption and Learning in Bayesian Regu­
latory Mechanisms under Incomplete Information
by
Sornih Koray 
and
Ismail Sağlam
l)(;parlment, of İM onomics, Bilkeiit, Univc'rsiiy, Ü6533 Ankara
2.1 Introduction
'FIk' |)ur])ose of this chapter is to ('xtend the results of Chapter 1 which examines 
corru|)tion and l(!arning in tin; monopoly nîgulation model of Baron and iVlyerson's 
(1982) (B-M) to a principal-agent framework.
VVe 'onsidiM· an environment involving a princi])al and an ag('iit. I ’he agent is 
assumed to have a irrivate charact(;ristic which is unol)S(n-vable to t,he principal. 'I'lie 
out.come of the environment depends on a private; characteristic of the; agent. 'Fhe 
aim of the regulator is to maximize tlu' weighted sum of the principal’s and agemt’s 
('X|)('cted welfares under his belief with the principal s wellare IxMiig more heavily 
wc'ighted.' 'Fo this ('iid, the regulator w.I.o.g. restricts hinisell by the Revelation 
Principle to dii(v:t, re'vc'bvtion rno'chanisms which induce' the agent te) truthfully reveal 
his piivate' charae:te;ristie:. 'Fhe' optimal re'gulcitory |)e)lie:y e alculate'el at the re'pe)rteel 
e:haracteristic of the agent turns out to elepend on the re'gulator’s prior belief about, 
the private e;harae;te'ristic of the agent unless the e)bje'e:tive function of the re'gulator 
we'ighs the principal’s and the' agent’s welfares e'e|ually.
'Fhe' ele'])eneie'nce; e)f a mechanism to the re;gulate)r‘s prior belie'f may rende;r the 
e)utee)ine' of the nu'chanism ope'ii to the manipulatie)ns ol a dishe)iie;st re;gulate)r, as 
ge'ue'ra.lly e)bserveel by Ve)gelsang (1988) anel Ke)ray anel Serte-;1 (1989). Ve)ge;lsang 
(1988, p.469) stated that
’ N ote  tha t  our rluiraclcri'/ iition of  the principal-agent problem diilers from the  classical framework where the  
princii)iil co incides with the regulator whos(î objective  is the principiil’s wtdfare.
.■)()
“ O n e  o f  t f i e  p r o b l e m s  w i t l i  t h e  B a y e s i a n  a p p r o a c l i  i s  t l i a t  p r i o r  I x ' l i c ' f s  a r e  n o t  o l > -  
s e r v a b l e .  T h u s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  h a v e  a  p o l i c y  i m p a c t ,  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  m a y  c r e a t e  a  m o r a l  
h a z a r d  p r o b l e m  b y  m i s r e p r e s e n t i n g  i t s  l ) e l i e f s . ”
Ill accordance with the above observation, we find in tliis sliidy certain kinds 
of prior I)eiiefs under which the principal’s and the agent’s wed fares attain their 
respective supreina or iniiina in either ex ante or ('x |)ost sense. Using these strategic 
bodiefs, a dishonest regulator can calculate the expex ted suprernuin of the bribe he 
may demand from tlie principal and the agent, and may act accordingly.
In this study, we also examine the effects of the regulator’s learning more about 
tdi(' agent’s private information on the optimal regulatory policy. We characterize 
soiiH' b(di(d’ updating rules a regulator may follow while he is gel ting more precdse 
information about tdie private type of the agent and analyze tlu' effects of those' 
updating rules on t.lu' principal's a,ml the agent’s wi'll'aix's. We show that more infor­
mation about the agent is not a.lways useful for the society and the principal. More' 
inf.erestingly, the regulator’s learning more about the agent’s private cdiaracteristic 
is not always harmful for the agent. So, the agent may find it to his advantage to 
signal about his private information.
.Moreover, we show Idiat ('ven if the regulator’s bc'liid' al)out t he agent’s private 
information converges l,o tlu' (ruth, the optimal so(ial wedfare may not convi'rge to 
its full information optimal level.
.\('xt, se< tion present s the gc'iieral inodcd and the basic assumptions which borrows 
from (luesnerie and Laifont (198d) and Fmh'iiberg and 'Firole (1991).
S('(d ion 2.3 and 2.4 examine corruption and learning in Bayesian regulatory mech­
anisms when the private characteristic of the agent is representc'd by a single cost 
and benefit parameter. r('S[)e(lively, hdrially, Sc'ction 2.5 contains some comduding 
r('iiiarks.
2.2 M odel
Consider two agents with (|uasi-linear utility lunctions
=  ( 1 ) 
¡¡.■¿(xJ.-O) = V2{x-,0) + i, (2)
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wlK>r<> U| and (¿2 stand for the net, utilities of the first and second aj>;ents. respectively, 
0 is the second agerd/s private' information about his utility function, .r is called a 
decision and i is the total monetary transfer from tlu' lii-sl agent, t.o t he si'cond agemt.'  ^
'I'lu' assumptions about t,he utility functions Id and V·, are
/11. f. d x '^  < Ü,
/12. (PVJdxdO > 0, 
.13. (РѴ\!дхдѲ ^ 0 .
TİK' n'gnlator announces that it will regulate; age'iit 2. Its instruments are t.he' 
e-emtrol e)f t.he' elecision x anel a transfer to agent 2. By the Re'velation Principle' 
[Dasgupta.llammonel and Maskin (1979) anel Mye'rse)ii (1979)] the· re'gnlator e-an re'- 
strie t himself to eliie'e't, re;velatie)u me'e:hanisms vvhieli ask agent 2 te) re'port its |)rivate 
inlormat ion and whieli give te> age'ul 2 no ince'iitive' te> lie'.
'I'lie re'gulator has a private belied'about 0 represe'nte;el by the density function f{0) 
which is pe)sitive on the' interval [0q,0 i] and has a e umulative; distribution function 
!·'{()). 'I'he re;gulator announce;s his prior belief f{0) be'fe)re he asks agent 2 to ref)ort 
his type, 0.
'Fhe; optimal regulatory policy is eh'signeid to satisfy two conditions first of which 
is t hat agent 2 must never expeed, a gre;ater net utility by misreporting than he e:ould 
by t.ruthfully reporting his private information, or more formally:
(l(') іф(0) ,1{0) .0)  > u;{x(Ö).l.(Ö)J)), ЩО.О) G [()o..0^ (3)
Se'e4)iiel condition is t.hat the re'gulate)r never forces agent 2 to be' regulatexl unless 
age'iit 2 e)bt,ains a nonnegative net utility:
(IR) іф:{()),Ш)).0) > 0 . У0e[0o.0^ ('!)
be't. i'iiO. O) elenote; t he; net utility of agent 2 whe'ii he' re-ports his private' paramete;r 
as 0 while' 0 is the; a,e:tnal ])aramete'r. Condition (/Г ) the;n implie's that IJ2İ0J)) = 
I 2(0] must satisfy
('2(0) = max w,2(.r(()),/.(()),(^ ) = U2{xi0)J.{0) .0).
0 (0)
iMidonlKirg I'iiulo (1991),  (laniR I'lioory, i^p.254-255, for c.liif(!r('n( intorpretations of  .7;,/,, and 0 in several  
class of i)robl<Mns siicli as pricti d iscr iin ina l ion . i(^gula(ion. incoiiKi Lax. i)ublic gootl , aiuT.ions and bargaining.
Imoiu iJie envelope theorem. w(' obtain
(IU2 dU2 ()V2
(6)(10 dO ()0
.Nol,ie(i, tlui form of depc'mls on wliether tli(> parameter 0 is a cost parameter
{()V2lOO < 0) or a benefit parameter {dV2¡d0 > 0) rc'garcling the utility of agent 2. 
.Now, let IJ\{0) stand for the net utility of the fii'st agent when the scicond agent 
truthfully reports its private parameter as 0.
'I'Ik' task of the i('gulator is to find a regulatory policy which maximizes (when 
|)ossibl(') the social welfare SW{0) subject to (IC) and (IR). The regulator defines 
SW(0) as the suin of the first agent’s net utility and a fraction (a G [0,1]) of the 
si'cond agent’s net utility:
,S’lT(d) = щ{х(0).Ц0),0) + (YU2Íx{0)J.{0)J)) (>}
f) is th(? r('lativ(! weight the rc'gulator assigns to the' net utility of ag(Mit 2. Inserting 
/(d) = l‘2((^ ) ~ into (7), the regulator’s optimization problem becomes
max SW{0) = Vx{{x[0),0) + V2{x{0),0) -  (1 -  (уШ О ) .  
s.t.
(1C) and (IR).
(8)
.Now we will show that (except for some trivial cases there is no solution to tlui prob-
h'ln (8).
Theorem 1. (Existence Theorem) The non-Bayesian reyulation probkm (8) has 
a solution if and only ij a = 1 or (PV2l d x ()0 = 0.
Proof. See /\p|)endix.
'FIk' theorem states that for nontrivial cases where n G [0, 1) or (PV^/dxdO ф 0 tlnu'e 
is no solution to the welfare maximization problem (8). To find a. regulatory policy 
in nontrivial cas(is, we replacxi the regulator’s objeetiveg namely, the actual social
■Tl
\v('lia.rc, by (,he expec.U'd social vvcdlan' under the regulator's bcdiel about 0. Flu' 
r('gulator’s problem then becomes
max ‘ (l/, {{x{0).0) + V, {x(0), 0) -  [ \ -  f{0)dO (9)
s.t.
(I(’) and (IH,).
Notice' that the solution to (8) when a = 0 or when d'^V'ildxdO = 0 is included in the 
class of solutions to tin- maximization probh'in (9). So, we can focus on the problem 
(9) without loss of any geuierality. Now we will de'iive the opt.imal solution to (9) 
and ('xamiii'' l('arning and corruption when i) is a cost and a beru'lit parametc'r.
2.3 C orruption and Learning w hen 6^ is a C ost Param eter
’FIk! titility of agent 2 is assumc'd to be decre'asing in 0. Now, in addition to (Af- 
Ad), we also require tlu' following assumptions to be satisfied;
/14. dVildO < 0 
/15. (PV2ldxd(P > 0 
.d(). d'^V2l(h--()o < 0
I'Vom (A4), integi'ating (6) yields.
/■"' ()V2
I'liO) =
JO m
\x[0).i))d{}. (10)
and inserting 1(0] = into (9). the' regulator’s probh'in Ik'coiiu's
max / I Vi (x(0).0) + VA40).0} + {\ - o )  / 
■'■(.) Jo,  ^ do
()V2
Sul)j(Mi, to
('¿(OJ)) > UAOj)), y o J e  [fA),(^ i],
> 0 , \ /0e  [OoJ^].
( 1 1 )
( 12)
(13)
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Proposition 1. As.sunic thaï ¿s nondccrcasimj  in 0. Then  Ihe solut ion to the 
niaxim.iz(i.tion problem ( I I )  is:
dv, , dV2 ,, ,/'«?) (PV2
+ = - ( I  -  «)■dx dx l i O)  dxdO (U)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2. A s s u m e  that the regulator has the pr ior  belief f { . ) .  'Then under  the 
opt im al  program ( I f ) ,  there ( xists no belief f ' { . )  siieh that S W ^ f O )  > S W H O )  f o r  
all 0 G [0i).0\\ and S W ^  (0) > S W U O )  f o r  some  0 G [0o,0\].
Proof. S('(^  Appc'iidix.
Corollary 1. A s s u m e  that the regulator has thi pr ior  belief f { . } .  Then  under  the 
optim al  program ( I ) ) ,  there exists no belief f ' { . )  such that U (  {()] — ^'1 
0 G [OmOA a n d Ui ' i O )  > u{{()) for • some  0 G [0oJ)\]·
Proof. See Appendix.
.\ovv. vve will iuialyze how the o|)tiinal decision x(0]  and the net utility of agent 2
mchange with
Definition 1. /1 juxietion g ( p{0) )  is said to b( nond.eerea.sing ( noninereas ing)  in 
li{0) i f  f o r  .some f hi0) , p. 2(0)  sati.sfying p,(d) < //2(d) f o r  all 0 G [(h).0\\, g{ i i \ [0) )  <
Proposition 3. A s s u m e  that is nondeereasing in 0. Then under tin opt imal  
program (!.)), f o r  any  given 0 in [tA)A^ ] a.nd a  in [0.1], x ^ {()) is a nondeereasing  
f u n e l io iT  h i  j l ^ ·
' I l<Mic(tior(h superscript /  over any variable denotes  that  the optimal value of that  variabhi under the regulatory  
nuM hanism  was calcuhited when the regulator holds belief / ( . ) ·
·)·)
Proof. S('o Appendix.
Proposition 4. Assume i,s iioudccreasmg tnO. ¡'hen under ¡he op!irncil program 
nny given 0 in. and a in [0, I], ( .{{0) is a. noninereasing function of
l-V))
/(«) ·
Proof. See Appcnidix.
Proposition 5. Asstimi· that the regulator has the prior
f , {0)  = - e . x p { - ) l [ e x p (  —  ) -  exp{ —  )].
< ( ( (
¡'Inn undi r the optimal, program ( I//)
lim l.rl' (0) = sup i'.i (0).
, - l )  j
■f I
Proof. S('e Appendix.
Proposition 6. Assume that the regulator has the prior
fhsiO) = -  ex.pi-^)].
Tluii under I lu opUrnal program (Ui) 
lim//.f (d) = inff//(^;).
Proof. S('e .'\|)pendix.
.As lli(' regulator no(.ir(!H that tlu'ix' ('xi.st sonu' Ix'liefs und('r wliieh l,lu' vvellare of 
a,g('ut 2 attains its supreinnin or iidiinuin. he may want to us(' this knowl('dg(' to 
dc'inand bribe from ag('nt. 2 .  ' I 'Ik ' ix'gulator may signal to agent 2  that, his j)rior bedief 
is of the form g{,{0) with an arbitrarily small b so that agcnit 2 will obtain a net utility 
arbitrarily elo.se to its iniirnum value, and that he is ready to declare his belief as of 
th(' form JAO) with an arbitrarily small r, which will yield to agc'ut 2 a net utility 
arbit rai'ily clos(' to it.s supremum value if agent 2 oilers to t,he ixigulator a certain 
amount of brib('.
.■)()
Since t,lie regulatoi' should l.al«^  bribe befoixi lu' announces his prior Ixdief and 
lu'nce before agent 2 reports his cost parameter, the l)ribe givcui by agent 2 is a 
sunk cost for him. d'herefore, agent 2 must still r(;port his cost paranuiter truthfully. 
Wlu'iiever the bribery takes |)lace, the form of the opt.imal regulatory policy does 
not, change but the level of the social welfare decrease's as the regulator's dishonest 
gain resulting from the bribery has no weight in the social welfare' function.
Using the belie'fs in Proposition 5 and 6, the supremurn amonnt of bribe, B^O) 
foi· any 0 G [0() 0\] that, tlu' n'gulator can demand from agent 2 is
IB(0) = WmUi’iO) -  liink/.f (d).4->U
Since bribc'iy must occur before' t.he rewo'lation of agent 2, the re'gulator doe's not 
kne)w IB(0) during the' bribery. So the^  situation is a bargaining problem for bribe 
unele'r incompleete' information, and there is no first-be'st solution te) t.his problem.
.As a, se'e:ond-best solution, however, the re.'gulator may calculate' t he exp(x:te-jd value 
of the supre'rnum bribe; under his ae tnal belief and ace:ording te> some bargaining 
solution conce;pt that the re;gulator and the agent agre'e upon, the' bargaining game 
for bribe; may be rese)lveel. If t.he; act.ual ne;t utility e>f agent 2 is abe)ve; the bribe; the; 
regulator asks, agent 2 may acex'pt to j)ay while he woidel reject e)t,herwise.
.\'e)w we will show that as t.he; regulate)!' seepientially learns more' abe)ut the private; 
infe)i'matie)n, the' se)cia,l welfare may converge to a value different tha,n its suirre'inum 
eve'!) if the regulator’s belief e'e)nverge to the' truth. Before proexx'eling, we will give 
se)ine' eleiinitions.
Definition 2. Le;t the true; value of 0 be elenoteel by Oq- and h't / r ( .)  eh'note the 
ele'iisit.y funedhon re;prese;nting the ce)mplet.e; informât ion abe)ut t.he' e e)st, parame'ter Or- 
d'he' density fri·)·. i-s a. Dirac function:"'
MO)  =
singular il d = d-/· 
0 e'lse'whei'e' (Id)
Corollary 2. Undtr the opUinal program (14)> lOu social welfare function attains
’ a inoro formal definition for t.he Dirac d(Misity function can Ini giv(iii as l i i iD _o   ^  ^ /'¡'{0)d0 =  1 and f {0)  =  0
\i 0 -if: Or-
·) /
Us suprcrnum i f  the rcjjulalor has con ıp idc  i.nfonna.lion about OT-
Proof. Sec; Appendix.
Definition 3. Let /( .)  = {/'(·)}. i = 0 ,1 .2 .....  lx an injiiiila sf qucncc o f  prior
Ix li.cfs, where ./ '(.) is Ike density  JuncLion represeniiny I.Ik p r ior  belief o f  the regulator  
about 0 at t ime  i.
i) /(.) is said to be rnonotonieally inereasing at Or if f  ^(Or) > r  H fh), for all
/ > 1 ,
ii) f ( . )  is said to lx pseudo eonverging lo f r i · )  i f  f o r  any  gitx n < > 0 there is a 
posi.ti.ve integer j  sueh that f o r  all integers i. > j, 1 -  l · ' ' {0r-\-e) + ¡■' ' iOr-c  ) < c, and
in)  [{. ) /s said to he absolutely eonverging to f i  i.) i f  U is eonverging in pseudo
s( ns( and also f o r  any  0 < M  < oc, there exists a posit ive integer j  sueh thal
f iO' i ' )  ' '  X  .for all inU gers t > j .
Next vv(' will show l.hat the i)at,h that the regulal.or follows while he updates his 
l)rior belief about Or may determine where the social wedfare will converge.
Proposition 7. There exists a. sequenee oj updated behejs /(.) = {,/'(.)}, i =
0. 1.2,..., which, is nwnoton iea l ly  inerea.sing at Or ond converges lo j r { . )  in pseudo  
sensi  such that under  the opt imal  program (Ui)
lini S l \ U ' ( 0 r )  ^  .S\'\U'‘'{0r).
I —
Proof. S('e Appemdix.
Proposition 8. Tlure  exist a sequence o f  updated beliefs /( .)  = {/'(·)}. i =
0 .1 .2 .....  which İ.S monotonical ly  increasing and absolutely e o n n  ryes to f r { . )  .sueh
that under the opt im al  program (l / j)
li,„ S W ^ ' i O r )  = SW^' ' -{0r).
/ —►oo
Proof. See Appendix.
•A S
VV(' say that tlio ri'gulator is loaniing mon' about I) if the iiit('rval [0o,0\] that
contains 0 with positive probability shrinks from eitlier sides. Now w(' will define
siîveral belief updating rules tlui roigulator may follow while he is learning mor(' about
0 .
Definition 4. Suppose the regulator has the. prior belief f{.) in I he interval [0oJ)\\ 
and further suppose, prior to regulation he learns lluil 0 lies in the interval [a, 6] where 
0{) < a. < b < 0\. Let J'fO) denote the updated, beliej oj the regulator about 0 on [a, 6]
with l'''‘{b) — j'' f ' ‘'{x)dx — 1. The regulator is said to be
i) rationally updating his lx lief on [a h] if f 'fO) > f(0), \/ 0 e [a,/>],
ii) uniformly updating his bid.iel on [a 6] ij j 'fO)  = j (0) -f 0, V where
f.G f{-i-)dx + f{x)dx)/{b -  a): and
Hi) proportionally updating his belief on [a b] if f"{0) = f{0){ \ + V G [«,/>] 
where \ / l ' ; f ( 0 } - l .
Notic(' that both (ii) and (iii) irn|)ly (i), that is to say, uniform and proportional 
u|)dating rules are both rational. .N('verth('less, tlu's(' two updating rules ma,y have 
different effect,s on the optimal rc'gulatory policy. .\lor(iover, as it, will be seen, the 
effect, of any ui)da,ting rule on the optimal regulat,ory policy also depends on from 
which side the interval shrinks while the regulator is learning more about 0.
Proposition 9. Suppose the regulator learns that 0 lies in [0l),0\] where > ¿Iq, 
and let the regulator rationally update, his prior bdiij /(.) : \0od)\\ 7?.+ to foi-ni
the belief f  i.) : [0')y,0\\ —> 71+. .•is.swmc ^  and are nondicreasing in. 0 and 
e\ G [0, 1). Then under the optimal program. (IJ,). x^"{()) < xHO). l·) {0) > f './(f7).
Proof. Se(' Appendix.
.\n implication of this pro|)osition is that, agent 2 (if he knows that the regulator 
updates his belief rationally while he is híarning) íinds it to his adva,ntage to signal 
t,hat he is not as (dficient a,s the regulator has expectod. Also not(' that ev(ui though 
tlu' wí'lfare of agent 2 increases for all 0 G under the rational updating, we
can not |)redict tlu' change in the welfarc' of agcnit 1. a,nd henee the change in the
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social vvdlarc.
WV will now examine the ell'ect of different h'arning rules wheiu'ver [fA),0i] shrinks 
from the right.
Proposition 10. Suppose tJie rvpulaior learns lhal 0 lies tn [0.0'{\ where ()\ < ()\, 
and  lei. the repulalor proportionally update his pr io r  In l ief  f { . )  : [öo.öı] —> 71+ to f o r m  
till beliej ./“(.) ; —*■ 7?.+ . Assume, and. nondecreasiny in 0 and.
o e [0, 1), Then under  the. opt imal  proyrarn (i f),  .r^"[0) = :iA(0). (l{"{()) < U-l{0), 
^  (0) and S W l ' f O )  > S W ^ O ) .
Proof. S('<' Appendix.
When tlu' r('gula.tor learns that 0\ should b(; low('r than what he has previously (>x- 
p('cl('d. th(' welfare of agent 2 dc'creases while the wc'lfares of both agent 1 and th(i 
socic'ty increase! if tlu' re'gulator U])da,t('s his prior b('li('f according to the proportional 
rul(!. Ilow('ver, the situation changes a bit when t.lu' legidator follows a uniform up­
dating rule as shown next.
Proposition 11. Suppose the reyulator learns that 0 lies in [0o,0'f\ where O'f < i/,, 
and let the reyu.la.tor uniformly update his prior heliiJ /(.) : 7^+ to form
till belief f"(.) : [Oo-Of] 7^ ·+. Assume. and are nondi ereasiny in 0 and
o € [0. I), 'Then under the. optimal proyrarn (!■■{).
t) .fJ'AO) > xHO) and < UiiO) if f'{0) > 0. V77 G [0o.0f\.
ii) x.hfO) < xb{()) iff'iO) < i),yO G [0o,0'f].
in) .r.!-‘{0) = r.HO). ILi'AO) < ^¡(0), Ul'AO) > rliO) and SW-ryO) > SW ^O) if
f'{0) = 0. yo G [OmO'f]·
Proof. S(!(' Appeuidix.
Propositions 10 and 1 1 clearly show that proportional updating nde is a. dominant 
rul(' vvhen(!ver [0{)J)\\ shrinks Irom the right as far as the welfare of the agent 2 and 
also t h(' social welfare is considered.
()0
2.4 C orruption and Learning w hen 6^ is a B enefit Param eter
When the private information 0 is a benefit i)arameter, the assumptions (A4-A6) 
change to:
/1 lb d V i l d O  >  0 
/i.v. d'-W2ldxd(P < 0 
/16'. (Pv^idxVw > 0
InU'grating (6) we obtain
l‘0 ‘iy
I!,{()) ^  /  -^{x{d)j))dO.
J(k 00
Tims, inserting l{0) = IP{0) — IdiO) into (9) the regnlalor's probh'm becomes
(16)
m a ; /  /  ( v \ ( P 0) ,0) + y 2{-H0) ,0) - { [ - a )
('■(■)} Joo  ^ ■A/0 00
Snbj('C,t, to
(¡■¿{O) > U2(0),'d0,d G [fAnf'i], 
iPiO) > 0Vf?G [(A),(^ ,].
(17)
(18) 
(19)
Proposition  12. Assume that ' is nomncrcasuiij in 0. ilii ii ihv. solution to
lh( niiixmuzaliov, pi'obU.m (17) is:
0\A , OV2 .
^  - (I - (p-()x Ox
-  nO) (PV2 
fiO) 0x00 (20)
Proof. .Se(' Appendi.x.
P roposition  13. Assume that the regulator has tin prior belief [{.). Then under 
the optimal program (20), there exists no belief f'{·) sueh that SW^iO) > SW^{0) 
for all 0 e [(A),(^ ] and SW^iO) > .SW^O) for some 0 G [0o,0y].
Proof. See .Appendix.
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Corollary 3. Assume that the reyvlaior has Uu prior belief [{.]■ '¡'hen under the 
oplimal profjmrn (20), there, exists no belief J'{.) such that Ui'[0) > i;((0) for all 
0 e [OoJ)i\ and V{'{()) > [;{{()) for some 0 G [0{),0\\.
Proof. Sec Appendix.
P roposition  14. Assume that is noiiinereasiiuj in 0. Thin under the opti-
rnal program (20) for any given 0 in [OoJ)i\ and O' in [0, 1], xJ[0) is a. 11 o n i, n c rcas i. ng 
ftinetion of ’ ·
Proof. Se(' Appendix.
Proposition  15. Assume that noninen asini/ in 0. Then under the optimal
prof/ram (20). for anij piven 0 in [fA),d,] «»d n in [0.1], l'.j(O) is a noniiiereasiiuj 
Junction oj ~J(irJ~ ■
Proof. S(‘(! Ap|)('Ildix.
P roposition  16. As.sume that the regulator luis the prior belief gt,{0) — h(:xp(=l)l 
[i:.i:p(^) — e.'i'pl^)]. '¡'hen under the optimal program (20):
lim 11-2^  {()) = snp U.j {()).·'—() I
Proof. S('(' .Appemlix.
Proposition  17. Assume that the regulator has the ¡irior bidiiJ' /', 
[< xpi'^) — e.i:p(^)]. Then under the optimal program. (20):
l in i  U.l· ( 0 ) =  in f  /  ' { { 0 ). 0  ^ /
Proof. S('e Appendix.
.\oli<(' that, the beliel's which yield the supremuin and iniirnurn of the net utility 
of agc'iit 2 ai'(' .syrninetrically changed with iesi)('c1 t,o the case where 0 is a cost,
0 2
pai-anuitcr. So, ilu' supn'imim of l lui brib(> | liaX t lu' rc'gulator may (l('niand (Voin ago'iil 
2 lor any boiK'iit paramel.cr 0 is П^[0) = lini.v^o / ' f  -  linb_^„ b’./' [0]. I'ollovving llu' 
same conclusions as in Section 3. we can sa,y that i Ik' regulator may demand from 
ag(uil, 2 a certain fraction of the (expected supremum bribe under his prior Ixdii'f so 
that if the agent accepts to |)a,y the regulator declarers his belief as with an
arbitrarily small A and otherwise as /,(/9) with an arbitrarily small (.
Next two propositions show that even if in a s(4)uential learning situation the 
ix'gulal.or’s belief conv(u-ges to tlie l.ruth. the social wedfare may convergi? to a level 
Ixdovv its full information optimum.
Proposition  18. Thnr cxisls a sequence of updated probahilitij density functions 
/(·) -  {/'(·)}. i -  0. 1.2,.... which is monotonically increasing at Or and converges 
to Jr{.) in pseudo sensi such that under the optimal program (20)
hni SW^'iOr) Ф SW^dOr)·
I — ■y.j
Proof. Se(! Appemdix.
Proposition  19. There exist a sequence of updated probability density functions 
/( .)  = {/'(·)}) '' = wfTich is nionotonically increasiny and absolutely con-
veryes to fr i · )  such that under the optimal program (20)
lim SW^'(Or) = SW^-‘-{0r).
I —► •'X;
Proof. S('e AppcMidix.
Xovv vve will show t he oiFocts of sc'veral hdii'f iiixlal.iiig rules on llu' opt imal v o g -  
ulalory policy.
Proposition  20. Suppose. lJu rffjulaloi' learns Ihal 0 lies in [or Of will re 01!^ > /?(). 
Moreover, let the regulator proportionally update his prior belief /'(.) ; [f9o,f9|] —> 
to form the belief f''{.) : ^  1^+· Further .suppose and are non-
increasiny in 0 a.nd fv € [0, f). Then under the optimal program (20). .iF'‘{0) = rF{0),
ri'dO) < u{{0), ulso) > upo) and swF(o) > swno).
()3
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 21. Suppose the repulalor learns l.lw.1 0 lies in [O'^Sh] where 0¡'^  > Oq. 
Moreover, leJ. the. regulator unijoruily update his pi'ior belief f(.) : [0o,0\\ —*· 7^ + 
to form the belief f"{.) : [0'¿.()\\ —>■ TZ+. hurther suppose 
noninereasing in 0 and a E [0. 1). Then under the optimal program. (20).
i) .r.hf o) > :rJ(0) iff'iO) > 0 ,  \/o e  [0o,0(],
a < xHO) and Ul'fO) < iiliO) if f'{0) < 0, ^0 E [0oJ)\\. and
ni) .r.hfO) = :iH0) Ul'f O) > and SW-^'‘(0) > SW^iO) if
['{()} 0, \/0 E [0oJ)'(\·
Proof. See /\|)|H'iidix.
VVIk'h tlu' regulator l('arns that, 0[) should Ik' higher than what h(' has predict,o'd, ac­
tual social w('lfare increases under tlu' optimal program (20) if the regulator update's 
his İH'liiîf proportionally while t.his is not ch'ar when tlui regulator follows the uniform 
updating rule unless he holds the uniform belic'f.
Proposition 22. Suppose the. regulator learns that 0 lies in [0,0'(] where 0'( < 0\. 
Moreover, let the regulator rationally update his prior belief f{.) : [fA),0|] 71+ to
form the belief f"{.) : -> TZ+. Further suppose ' and are nonde-
eriasing in 0 and a E [0, 1). Then under the optimal program (20). .v^f O) > :r- {^0), 
i f i O )  > F{{0).
Proof. S('(' Appe'udix.
d'lu' last. ])roposition shows that under the o])timal pi'ogram (20). ageuit 2 would find 
it to his advantage to signal that his Ix'iu'fit ])a.ram<'t('r is not as high as the re'grdator 
has l)('li('V('d.
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2.5 C onclusions
VVc examined corruption and learning in Bayesia.n mechanisms which regulate an 
(economy involving a principal and an agent where tlu' latter has a |)iivate inlormation 
which can be characterized by a single utility or disutility param('t(u·.
We showcvl that there exists no prior belief which dominates llu' actual belief of 
tlu' i('gula.tor from the viewpoint ol social welfare. 'Fherefore, even though Bayesian 
r('gulatory mechanisms do not h'ad to the first best social optimum unless the ro'lative 
weight of the agent's net utility in tlie social welfan' is one, it is true that no other 
nu'chanism performs Ixdter than Bayesian mechanisms. Neverthek'ss, as we have 
shown, Bayesian regnlatory mechanisms are open to the manipulations of a dishonest 
regulator wlu'iiever tin' ])rior bc'lio'f of the regulator is not observable' to and ve'rifiable 
by t h(' i)ublic.
The' retgulator e:an thrc'aten tlu' age'iit with almost zero net utility by changing his 
b('li('f in an appropriate way if tin' agent does not offer some; i)art of his gain to the 
re'gulal.or as a bribe'. Beisides, the' I'egulator may gi\’e' an incentive' te> that a.gent for 
paying bribe; as he can also yielel to the agent almost the' supremum of his net utility.
VVe also examineel lu)w the e)ptimal re;gulatory policy and the |)rincipars and the 
age'iit’s welfares eJiange when t,he regulator learns me)re' abe)ut the; cost parameter. 
Our finding is that the rule that the regulator follows while; updating his belief may 
affe'e't the e)ptirnal re'gulatory pe)licy in a predictable way.
.-Vise) we; fe)imel t.hat Baye;sian re'gnlatory me;e:hanisms are; path elepenele'nt. 'I'lie' 
se)e ia,l we'lfare' may ne)t e:e)iive;rge' te> it.s ltdl iide)rmat,ie)n e)ptimum e'\'e'ii if the' be'lie'l e)f 
t he' I'e'gnlat.e)!· e e)iive'rges to the' truth.
( ) b
A ppendix  o f C hapter 2
Theorem 1. (Existence Theorem) 'Fhc iwn-Batjcsian regulation problem. (8) has 
a solution if and only if a = 1 oi' (PV2Idx()0 = 0.
Proof. I.et us first assume tfiat X V U d x d O  < 0. 'Hk'h from (6) it follows that
iw>) = -
aiul iiisi'rt.iiig 1(0) — 1. 2(0) — V) (.r(fi). into (7) vv(' obtain
SW(0) = v,((.r,(0)j)) + + (1 _ « ) dV2 (^r(0)J))d0,
n> DO
wliii li can l.)(^  writ,ton as a calculus of wiriation ргоЫсмп:
=  C - " Ф ' ‘о()x .....  ^ DO'
FVφi0 ,)Jh)FV2{A0^) . .0^)
( 2 1 )
Now define
To have a maximuit) of (21), the I'iuler ('quation should be satisfied:
l/Axx.r/J) = f i r A x . x ' . O )  
dU
Calculating li,.(x,.r.'.0) we obtain
x m  + e.) , 0П', X V ,
’ ' ■ * ()x‘ (hr.dt) "thrXi
and <'ainnlal.ing dli,,{.r. -V.0)ГЮ yields
, , ,n -  з*(и  *  V i) T f i  _ T T^^^yi,,(.i.x .0)
So. lh(' ituler ('(]uation is satisfied if and only if (1 — (\)(FV2l dxÔO = 0 which is true 
wIk'u eithcir a — 0 or (AV2jdxdO — 0.
VV(' will skip th(' proof of the tlu'orem lor the cas(' X V 2IdxdO > () as it is very 
similar to tlu' proof of the cas(' we considiued. Q.K.l).
f)()
Proposition 1. Assume is nondecreasing in 0. Then the solution to the 
mizaiion problem ( 11) is
dv, , dV2 ,, ,F{0) cPV2
+ —  = -(1 -  «)-
maxi-
dx ' dx '■ ' '/{()) dxdo'
Proof. After an integration by parts (11) sirnpliii('s as
max i '  (V,ix(0).,0) + V2(x{0) ,0) + (1 -  c p i - ^ ' ^ ( x i O ) J ) ) )  f{0d0. (22)
Tlu'ii diil’erentiating (22) with respect to x(0), we obtain the optimality condition 
(11). 'I'o show tiled, (11) satisfies the incentive-compatibility constraint (12) we will 
lii'st prove that x{0) is nondecreasing in 0. Totally dilferentiating eijuation (14) yields
+ —  + (1 -«)T7777TT^^)l7T = [ - n  ~ ^^)7rAlTiF) ~dx'  ^ ()x^ /{()) (PxM)OJ dO d 0 \ f ( 0 ) '  F)xdO 
()x()0 f(0) dxdO'^
Under the assumptions (A1)-(A()) and the assumption that is nondecreasing in 
0, dxIdO is [)ositive.
Note that the transfer to agent 2 is L{0) = 1)2(0] -  V2{x(0),()) whenever agent 2 
r('|)orts its [irivate i n f o r m e d , ion as 0. So, whenever agnit 2 truthlully reports, his net 
utility beconu's
/■''' ()V2
l'2id) = - l  -F ix(0) .0 )d0 .  
Jo ()0
( 23 )
and t he lU't utility of agent 2 when he rnisreports its unknown paiameter as Ô while 
0 is the true parametc'r is
r,(/^) = -
JO 00
(x{0)J))dI) + V2{x((hF^) -  V2{x{()),0). ( 21)
.Now snbtra.cting (23) Irom (21) we g('t
ov./ hV
i : , { 0 )  -  i j , ( o )  = -  - ^ { x ( ù ) , ù ) d o  +  V 2 { x { 0 ] . , o )  -  i 4 ( . x ( / ) ) , f } ) ,  ( 2 . 5 )
Jo ()0
 ^ p m dVi
r ,(d ) -  IJ2(0) = -  / i - F ix { 0 ) J ) )  -  ^ { x ( 0 ) . 0 ) ) d 0  < 0,
Jo 00 00
(26)
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since' x{0)  is increasing in 0 mule'i· tlie oplimal program (I'l). Tlius the o])1imal 
program (14) is incentive-com|)a,t,ible. To sliow individual rationality constraint, (13) 
also holds is straightforward, d'ho net utility of the agent 2 when lu' truthfully reports 
his private information 0 is
(Ы0) = -
dv.
{x{()).Ô)d() > Ü, У0 G [OoJ)^
Jo ào
which is alwa.ys nonnegative by the assumption (Л1). .So (14) is t lu' solution to the 
ma.ximization probh'in (II). Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. A s s u m e  Hud Ike regulator has the pr ior  belief [(.)■ Then  under  the 
opt im al  program (U,), there exists no belief f ' { . )  such that S W T { 0 )  > S W ^ O )  f o r  
all 0 e  [0o,0\] <4id SW^ ' i O)  > f o r  some  0 G [fA),i?i].
Proof. b('t x f  {()) maximize the' ('X|)ect('d social vve'lfare' in (9) under the regulatorhs 
prior Ix'lief / (.). .Now assume that, there ('xists a belie'l j ' { . )  which strictly dominates 
f {0) .  I'hen S W^ ' i O)  f { 0 ) d0  > S W H 0 ) f { 0 ) d 0  im]dying that xJ(0)  doc's not
maximize' the' expe'e:t.e'el social welfare; which is a e'ontradiction. Q.E.I).
Corollary 1. A s s u m e  that the regulator has the pr ior  belief f { 0 ) .  '¡'hen under  the 
opt im al  program (Uj) there exists no belief j  (0) such that U (  {()) > f or  all
0 G and I j f i O)  > [JI(O) f o r  some  0 G [0^0^]·
Proof. 'ГІИ' pre)of simi)ly follows from the i)roof of the Propositie)ii 2, since the net 
utilit.v of age'nt, 1 is e;e]ual t,o the soenal we'lla,re lune:tie)n when о  — 0. Q.E.I).
Proposition 3. /l.s.s(/,//7c that is nondeereasing in 0. Then under the opt imal  
program (I2i). f o r  ang given 0 in [0i).0\] and a  in [0.1], xH{0) is a nondecreasing  
Jutudion of j(ôy·
Proof. 'I'he total differentiation of (14) with re'S|)e;e't te> Ц — vielelslio)
T âv  + TbT + C ">/(») a w e )  д ( Ш )  <
</-’0
0 x 0 0 '
Q.E.D,Tsing (.A1-A6), we conclude that x ^ O )  is nonde'cre'asing in
Proposition 4. A s s u m e  that  ^  is nondecreasing in. 0. Then  under the opt imal  
program (I. f),  f o r  ang given 0 in [0o,0\] and a  in [0.1], U{{()) is a nonincreasing  
f i inel ion of j ^ ·
0 8
Proof. From Proposition :F \v(' know that when ^  is noiuh'creasing in 0 tlumJ(0)
:rJ(0) is nondecreasing in Note also that c f v j /0x00 > 0 by assumption. Thus
UliO) is noriincreasing in Q . E . D .
Lemma 1. For any ( > 0, there exists a density function f(0) such that ^  < t 
for all 0 in [do, ()\].
Proof. 1 A'A, th(i |)rior density function /(d) be
liO) = (27)exp{‘·^) -  expi'^y
By integrating from do to d w(; get the cumulative' distribution function /'((d) given
l>.v
expi'i) -  rxp(<>^ )
F(())= ,, ,, .
and dividing (28) by (27) we ol)tain 
FAO) „ /A ) - d
(28)
(29)
wliich is obviously less than or eepial to t  for all d in [do,dij. Q.E.D.
Corollary (from Lemma 1). When t approaches to 0, J\{0) approaches to a Dirac 
function at 0 -  d| and. when ( approaches to oc. JAO) approaches to a. uniform 
distribution.
Proof. VVe will first show that / , (d) a.|)proaches l.o Dirac function at d = d| when e 
approaclu's to zero.
-<xpi-)lim/,(d) = bin ---- —^ j j -
hexpiOh)
= lim
h— >0 c x p { 0 \ h )  — cxp{ 0 ( ) h )
 ^ h c x p j i O  -  dp)/;.) 
t —'X' cxp{(0\ — oy iy  — 1
, x - p ( ( d - d . ) d , ) [ l  + / r ( d - d o ) j
= lim
lim
d, -  do
1 + h(0 -  do)
t-x .  e.7;p((d, -d)/i)(d , -  do)
()9
liin 0 -  On
cxpiiO, -  0)h)(0^ -  0){0, -  Oo)
.singular il' 0 = Oi 
0 (elsewhere
.Now we will show that J, ai)proaches to a uiiironn distribution as ( goes to cxj.
liin f,{0) liin
cxpi’·^) -  expCf)
0
= liiii cxpi-} lim
= lirii
' <—yj (■xp{^  ÎL·^  — c:xp[
h
k^o exp{()\h) — exp{0oh)
— lini
/i—0 0t(-xp{0\li) — Onvxp(Oi)li)
0^  -  On
Q.i·; 1),
Proposition  5. /l.ssH/;if: thal Ihc rcgulaior has Ihc prior bdief of the form
f,{0) = ■J-e.j:p(^)/[e.i.7Hy) -
Then under Ihc optimal program (If)
lim //,/' (0) = sup U.i(0) for all 0 G [i^ o, 0^ ].
(-.0 ;
Proof. 1‘Vorn l^ro|)osition 4. it lollows t.haX wIk'u is nondeeii'asing in 0, 11.2(0) 
is uoniuer('asing in . Sate also that liin,_o = linp_o([l — < - ■ > - ' =  0. 
Thus l.'.j(0) attains its supreimnn when tlu' n'gulalor has the prior Ixdiel liiii,_o f,{0).
Q.K.I).
Lemma 2. For any M -with 0 < M < oo. Ilierr exists a density function f{0) such
t h a t ^ > . \ d  for alio in [0n.0,\.
Proof. L(d, f(0) 1)('
<t (0) =
i - T ( - f )
lnt('grating from Oq to 0 yields the eumulative distribution function (h (0): 
expi-^)  -  exp(-^f)
(•dO)
(•■51)
TO
Dividing (dl) by (30) vv(i obtain
) - l ) .
calculating liniA^o we obtain
DV(d)
i-.! »(«)
= lim6[c.xp(^^ft->0 S
ft-.0 i
= liin  ^ ^  \
..''
— liin exp( ) =iS—0 0
So. if f(O) = liinA_.o.(7A(ii^ ) thon VV(' have ^  = oo > .17 for M < oc.’,7.(0)
Q.K.l).
Corollary (from Lem ma 2). When 6 approachrs In 0, gf,{0) approaches to a Dirac 
funcl.i.on at 0 — Oq and when h approaches to oc, (jf,{0) approaches to a unifonn 
distribution.
Proof. We will first show that gt i^O) approaches to a Dirac function at 0 = do when 
h a.pproaehes (,o 0.
\]]ugf,{0j = liin ■rpl·
, s - „  , . 7; p ( ^ ) - c . r / ; ( ^ )
= liin
.-0  c . r p ( ^ )  -  c : . rp (^ )
= liin
e x p C ^ )
= liin
j _
= lirn
.^ -^ 0 (d -d „ )c ;r / ; ( !^ )
.singular if d = do 
0 ('Isewhere
.\’ow w(' will show that gt, approaches to a unilorrn distribution as h goes to oc.
liin (¡8(0) = lim
<S — * O J exp(-l^) -  cxpi-l^)
— liin
* -«  cxpi"-^)  -  <.,■„(M l)
= liin
/i-'O exp{(0 — 0^ ))h?j — cxp((0 — 0\ )li.)
-- liin
/1^0 (0 -  0„)c.xp{{0 -  0o)h) -  (0 -  0, )cxp{iO -  0, )k)
-  Oo
Q.E.D.
Proposition  6. /1,s.s(//m: llial. Uu rcAjulalor has the prior b(dief of Uir form
(hiO)
—0 ,r , — Of). / ~ ^ ' M
IS non in créas-
Thni under lJu' opliwol program (I/,)
\\]nU:f{0) = .1 <(!' cdl 0 Ç [Of),Of].
Proof. Proposition 1 rcaxls that when ^  is norKl('cr('asing in 0, l'i(O) is 
i„g i„ Pron, Lciinna 2, we know that linp·^,, ^  = liniA^o d[exp{ -  1 ] = oo. 
So limA_o.iy6C^ ) yields the iriiimum of the net utility of agent 2. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2. Under IJk; oplimal progmm (IJ,), ike .‘social W(:lf(ii(· func.lion altains
P.s· .sapremirm if the re(julaior ha.  ^ complete informalion about Or
Proof. Wlu'n the regulator knows the cost paraim'U'r Or, its heliel is in the form 
) IP,, = 0 ainl 7^  = oc, V ^  Or. So from Proposition 1. it
follows thaï U{'''(0r) = (>P'''"^'''ky œmlition (14) Ix'eonies
o\'i I itii — () at 0 = Or which together with (Al) implies that V) + 14 attains its' li.i'
supremunn. Therc'fore. the social welfare attains its su|)renium. Q.K.I).
Proposition  7. There exists a suiiienee of updated beliefs /( .)  (/'(.)}· > =
()_ I 2.....  whieli i.s monotonieallij inereasuuj at Or and eonnerges to fr{.) in pseudo
.si n.SI siudi that under Ike optimal program (l.f)
li,„ SW^'iOr) + .S'kl/ '^'-(/ir)·
/ —» X;
Proof. VVe will prove that the seciuence f[0) given bv (:14)-(51) satisfies the condi­
tions stat.c'd in t,h(' pro])osition.
72
J dsewhcrc
r«\-'
r) =
Jor
I'l(Or)  / .r ' (0)do .
r_{Or) = /  ' r^-'{0)d().
7  ^
7‘- '  + 7“ = 0;
1·'-{0τ) ’
= :^'e(0, 1):
-  o;r'
0 \ = 0 r  + {\ - Y ) { 0 \  - f h )
[ , r ' w r ' )  +  ^·'-
дЧО) = i p - 40),
or-o;-'
0 ,
A‘
Ч = 1 + A'
, A 4 ^ r ' )  + m - ( i  - rvQ (^r-^0~ '))
” V 2A‘/-'(^ A/·)
( р : = 0 , . - ( \ - а ' ) { 0 т - 0 р ' )
()\ = Or + ( 1 -  //')(/)', -  Or)
«;> ), I ) 0 t\
» ε |β τ 7 · , |
elsewhere
- I
+ 1
д'іОр + УГ'іОт)
= f 'V h )
Or-Ôl, ( 0 - O p  i [ 0 ¡ ,< 0 < 0 r  
i Г Or < 0  < 0\ 
elsewhere
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0{, = 0 т - {  \ - l ) { 0 r - 0 o )
= р-^ (О г){ \+ У)
i= {гЧор + г’Ю )-
r
гЧОр + /‘ -
ПО)
i' jo-j·)
Or-о;, - o p  \ i0 l ^ < 0 < 0 r  
if Or < 0  < 0\ 
elsewhere
(Щ
( o O )
(ol)
Now U't us show tiial, /( .)  is monotoiiically increasing al, Or and pscnido converges to 
Iri·)· I'Voin (49) vv(' ha,v('
¡'-'{Or)
=  ( I  +  A ' )  V i  >  1. (h2)
Now sinc(  ^ A' > 0 for all inl,eg(irs / ^  |, f{0) is monotonically increasing at. Or-
'Го prove that /(.)  pseudo converges to f r i · )  tal«' any ( > 0. Notice that using 
(4o) and (48) w<; obtain
0 г - 0 1 - ( 0 г - 0 ^ , ) Ц { \ - ъ ) ( ^ - ^ п ) .
k=\
similarly c()inl)iiiing (^ 11) and ( Ki) yields
i.
o\ -  Or (0^ , -  0 г ) Ц {  \ - ъ М ^ -nk·)
{Щ
(54)
k - - \
VVe can find a positive integer i." such that max -  f4{,’) H L ii*  ~7^)( · -i:v '^). (f/(-
^^v ) n L i ( i  - 7 ' ) ( i   ^ -  5 ')n  -  = i i» W x .r iL .( i  -
'■/')( 1 -  ik’) = 0. VVe know from (51) that f'{0) = 0. if 0 ^ [0p0\], So 1 -  l’''{0r + 
< ) + r ‘i 0 r - c )  = ()<(.  Vi > V. 4'hus /(.) |)seudo converges to /r(.).
Nol.(i from (53) and (54) lim,_,x,(fi‘, — Or) = 0. '1 hus, lim,_,,x IJ.^  (0) — 0. Also 
note' < jojp^· So, from (14) lim,^,^, ^  + - ^  ^  () a.t 0 = Or which
im p l i ( 's  th a t .  l im ,-_ ,x , Л 'И /-^ ’ (/А/·) p  SW -^ ' ' ' ( 0 r ) · Q.lvl).
Proposition  8. I'linr. exist a sequence of updated beliefs /(.) = {/'(.)}>  ^ — 
0.1.2,..., which is niou,otonically increasing and absolutely conin ryes to fri ·)  >^u,ch 
that under the optiinal proyram (U{)
li,„ SW^'iOr) = SW^-‘-{0r).
Proof. VV(' will first prove that the sequence givcui by (55)-(r)9) is monotonically 
increasing at Or a.ml absolutely converges to fr(0).
I
(I'i-ollr i0 )  = {
0 G
('ls('vvlu're
(bo)
O'
()V> ■ ■ '^ [ x { 0 ) J ) ) d 0
0 ()0 
i0\-' -  0\)
i0\-' -O r)
JO
dV-i
l)è
'x{0)S))d0. 7 £ (fh 1 )
0[y — (^() * + “  (A) )
( Ô 6 )
(57)
(.58)
n o ) U j (/f j
0 ('Isewlu're
(■59)
•'roni (59) it follows j{-!(o7) = ^^\o\-ll) ~ > ' '  monotoni-
(•ally increasing at Oi·
To prove that /(.)  absolutely converges to /■/■(.). first note that 
0 which implies .r-^ '(^ ·^ ) > f«>'i·'·''.)''·  ^ sing ( A2) we obt am - ‘^ { x ^ '  {0),0) <
— Htn· , m ( x d ’ {0).0) < oo. Thus there exists 0\ such that (ofi) holds. Also not(' 
from (56) that lim,_ x , idf (0)^ 0 which implic's that lim,_,x, (1; = lim,_,^, ff' = O-,·. 
hhirthermore J ‘{Or) = from (59). llenc(\ /( .)  absolutcdy convc'rges to
•AH·)·
hhiially, from (59), we observe t hat lim,_.x, y r j ^  = which imi)lies that lim,^,^, ^  
•''5 _  0 .p 0 = Q.j. Using this result and also the fact that l i r n , f / , j  {Or) = 0, we
obtain SWC{Or) = S]'\n'‘ {0r)· Q.K.I).
Proposition 9. Suppose, the regulator learns that 0 lies in where > Oq.
.Moreover, let the regulator rationally update his prior belief f{.) : l<>
form the belief f ' f  .) : [0^,0\] —> 7^^. Further suppose and jirj^ u.re nonde­
ereasing in 0 and (X € [0,1). '¡'hen under the optimal program (If).  .r^'f O)
Proof. As l.li(' regulator updates his belief rationally, f “(0) > f(0) and hence 
¡‘'"(0) < h'iO), V/7 G fA) while F'fOi) = F{()^) — 1 which imply that <
■^y VO G [0o,0\\. So (roni Pro])osition '■], :vJ (0) < .rV{()) and from Proposition 4,
F ^ ‘{0) ^  U-iiO) Q.IGl).
P r o p o s i t io n  10. Suppose the regulator learns that 0 lies in [0,0'(] where Of < 0\.
.Moreoner, let the regulator proportional ly  update his pr ior  belief f { . )  : [flo,fA]
'R. .^ I о f o r m  the b d i e f  f ' f . )  : [0^).,0f] Тг+. Further  .suppose and  are
nondeerea.sing in 0 and n G [0. 1)· Then under the opt imal  program ( I f ) ,  .id'VO) = 
■vT(0}. F.{“{0) < Fi i O) ,  Ul' ‘{0) > d j i O)  and S W d ' f  O) > S W l { 0 ) .
Proof. Simx; tlu' regulal.or proportionally updatccs his belief, it follows that f 'fO) = 
f {()){[ + Ф), VO G [0o,0'(] where ф = -  1. -\'ot<' that ^  ^
and :iV'fO) = .x^(0), VO G [Oo-.Of]. So '-^{х/фО).!)) = ‘■^{xH0)J)).  Then using
(10), we obtain U.f (0) < 0.1(0) since Of < Oi.
Also SW^"(0) > SWHO) since .S'lT·^  (0) = V/ + ~ (1 ~<'' )^ ·^/ = SW-I(O) +
(I _ o)(f;,/ -  l l f ) .  lunally, l'l"{0) > UliO) follows from the fact that SW^(O) =
I 1(0)  wIkui O' = 0. Q.l·:.!).
P r o p o s i t io n  11. Suppose the regulator learns thal 0 lies in [do,f7"] where Of <
0\. .Moreover, let the regulator unijormly update his prior belliJ /(,) : [/?o,fA] —>
R..  ^ to form the belief f ' ‘{.) : [O^Of] ^+· Turlher .suppose ^  and are
non decreasing in 0 and ix G [0. 1). Then under the optimal program (If), 
i) .rV'fO) > .vHO) and Ui"(0) < Fi(O) iff'iO) > 0. VO G [0,,0f\. 
n) .rT{0) < xHO) iff'iO) < 0. VO G [Om.Of].
I l l )  . v l ' f O)  =  х ф о ) .  i f ( 0 )  <  f t /(/7), O l ' f O )  >  r l ( 0 )  a n d  S W i ' f O )  >  . S W H O )  i f
/'(d) = 0, v o e  [f7(),f/r].
Proof. As the regulator updatcis his b(dief uniformly, /''(d) = /(d) + / ,  Vd G [0o,0f]
7 6
wIk'i'c' (/’ =  lyu I — A^))· Now it, follows that,
.It ./’(■'O^Ax· + i!A0 -  Op)
.fHO) ¡(0) + ■>;'
a,iul
F’'iO) F{0) _ .ft /(■'OiAr + t/^ iO -  Oo) ft .f{x)dx
[-{()) '  fiO) ~ .fiO) + >P .fiO)
i.fiO) + >i>)fiO) ■
L('t us show that (i) holds. If f{0) is increasing in 0 then ^  > () and
thus IVoin Proposition -i, we hav(' xJ'‘{0) > .id{0). .Mso using Pi'oposition 4 yields
/■/"id) < P'./fd).
(iij follows wh('ii /(d) is decrc'asing in 0 as in which case < 0 and thus
./•f''(d) < xHO). .Note w(' can not conclude on the sign of / /  (·) “  / j (·) d· depends 
on t he form of Vi, and also the magnitude of d, -  dj'.
iii) Finally, if /(d) is uniformly distributed, -  ^  = () and thus xJ'‘{()) =
xJiO). So U[‘{0) < ///(d) since d“ < di. Thus S W d ‘{0) = SW^{0) + (1 -  a )( / / /  -  
/ / / ’‘) > ,S'VF/(d), and Ul'‘(0) > / / / (d) -since ///{()) = ,STP/(d) when cv = 0. Q.E.I).
P roposition  12. Assunie ‘ 'N nonincrca.xuuj in 0. Then llw .solution to the 
inaxrini.zati.on problan (17) is
()V\ ()V2 _  . 1 -  FjO) (PV2
I h  ^  dx “  /(d) dxdO'
Proof. Integrating by parts, (17) sim])liiies as 
/■0,
max / l V'i(-i/d).d) +  V2 (-f'(d).d) (1 n)
{.'■(■)} .Jo, ^
I'iO) (N2
()0
(-c(d).d -((iO)
'rii('n dilferent.iating (60) with r('spe<4. to x. we obtain tlu; optimality condition (20).
To show that tlu' inc(uitive-compatibility condition (18) is sa,tisli(xl, we will first 
pi-ov(' that under the optimal i)rograrn (20), x{0) is nondecreasing in d. 'ibtally 
dillerentiating e(iuation (20) yields
I I
(■(n\ (PV2 ,, \ d x
T -  · -V dx dx'^
<r 1-2  ^«·'-■ 
(PxV)o) m
d
= Ki - « ) : t7t(dO^  fiO)
fiO) (
dxdo ()x()0
(PVi , 1 -  F{0) (FVo
+ (1 - n ) · ¡{0) dxdO·^
'Flius, using (y\ 1)-(A3), (A4')-(A()') and the a.ssuinption tiuit ii’ nonincreasing
in 0, we reacii thc' ronclusion that dx/dO is positive.
.Note that tlie transler to agent 2 is t.(0) = (^¿{0) — V'2[x(0)J)) whenever agent 2 
la'ports its private information as 0. So wfieiu'ver agcuit 2 truthfully reports, his net 
utility l)('<’oines
rO ;n/ V .
Jor> oO
( 61)
and lh(' iK't utility of agent 2 wlu'ii he misre])orts its unknown i)arani(^t('r as 0 while 
0 is the l.rru' paranu'ter is
()V>
i m  --=
lOo 00
Now subtracting (61) from (62) we get
(.r(f^),f;)dd+l/2(;r(f;),d)-V2(.r(d),d). (62)
//2(f)) -  (hiO) =
r - A f h - i ’-AO) =
" OV.
0 00
¡T
{x{0)J))dÀ+V2{x(0)J)) -  V2{x0 ),O).
''{x\0),0) -  ^^{x{0)J))]dl)  < 0,
(6;5)
(64)do '  ' '  '  00
since x{0) is increasing in 0 under the optimal program (20). I'hus t.he optimal 
pi'ogram (20) is inc('ntiye-com|)atihle. 'I'o show indiyidual rationalily constraint (19) 
also holds is straight forward. The net utility of the agent 2 when lu' truthfully rciports 
his priyatxi inlormation 0 is
=  /  ^^{40).0)d0 > 0 .  yo e [Oo.o^ ].
Jon 00
which is always nonnegatiye from the assumption (A4'). So (20) is tlu' solution to 
t h(' maximization i)roblern (17). Q.b.D.
Proposition  13. ,4.s.sM/nc IJkU Ihx. rcfjulator has Ike prior hedief [{.). Then under 
lli< oplima.l proi/rain (dO). lk( re (xisls no belie] j  (.) such, Ilia,I, .S H-7 (0) > S\'\'AO)
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for all 0 G [^ A),i^ i] and SW^ {0-j) > SW^(O) for sonu 0 G [^ A),^ ]^·
Proof. VVe know from (20) iliat, :vJ{()) maximizes llu' ('xpcctcd social welfare under 
l,li(' regulator’s ))rior belief ./(.)· Now assuuK' that tlu're exists a Ixdicd / '( .)  which 
stim:tly dominates /(■)· .¡o'·, (0) f{0)d0 > j'l' SW-l{0)f{0)d0 implying that-
:rJ (0) do(;s not maximize the (îx])ec,ted social welfare, which is a contradiction. Q.K.D.
Corollary 3. Assume llial the rajidalor has the prior belief /{. )■ Then under the 
opiimal program. (20), there (.risls no belief f'{.) saeh that lj( {0) > Vl{0) for all 
I) G \0i)J)\\ and UfiO) ^  U{ (0) for some 0 G [0o-0\]·
Proof. The proof simply follows from (lui [)rool ol ihe Proposition l.'f, sinc(' lu't 
ulililA' of tin; first agi'ut is ('(pial to tlu' social welfare' function wIh'ii ev = 0. Q.l·:.!).
P roposition  14. Assume that ‘ is nonincreasing in 0. Then under the optimal 
program (20), for ang given 0 in [(),). 0\\ and a  in [0,1] , x^O) is a noninereasing
funetion oj '
Proof. I.et us take tlie total derivative of (20) with respect to
( 7 ) ^   ^ E f F  " ^ ~
/ (T \ f  (TVi ,, ( f%  ^ j h ___  ,,
F F Ail -  m )
Psing (.Al-A.'f) and (/hl'-/16'). we obtain that xUO) is nonincreasing in '-¡Pp. Q.K.D.
Proposition  15. Assume that p p p  noninereasing in 0. Thi n under the optimal 
program (20), for ang given 0 in [0o.,0\] and rv in [0. 1], (//(/|) is a noninereasing
I unci ion oj ¡[oj'’
Proof. VVe know that when p p p  nonincreasing in 0 tlu'n .¡T{0) is nonincreasing 
'•'(<'0  ^ a.lso that (TV'ild-rdfO > 0 by assumption. 'I'litis U{{0) is nonincre'asing
i „  ' - Œ 1  Q . K . D .
in 1-/·'
J{0) ■
Lemma 3. For all h > 0, there exists a densitg function f{0) sueh that — ¿P < h 
for all 0 in [(A), d] ].
71)
Proof. Lei I,he (lensily funct ion f{0) = =  ;!-e.i7 ;( ^)/[c.r/)( -  c .r /;(^ )].
'Llieii using (.'5Ü) and (31) we ol)t,ain
— (’■s{0) . ~ 'll=  h[ \  -  c ; i:p (— —  )],
g,{0) ^
which is obviously less than or ('qual to 6 for all 0 in
( 65 )
Q . L . l ) .
Proposition  16. Assume that the regulator has the prior belief gf,{0) = j:cxp{-f)/ 
[(erpi^)  — e x p ( ^ ) \ .  Then under the optimal program. (20)
lini IJinO) = sup / ' / (0) for all 0 e [fA,, 0 ^
A - .0  J
Proof. I'Voin Proi)osil,ions 11. it (ollows t hat wlu'n ‘ nouincr(^asing in 0.
H-liO) is nonincreasing in Also we know that limA_o = lini^_o ¿[1 -
<.rp(‘h^)] = 0, 'riius liin,s_o ( '.¡AO) = sup^ / / / (0). Q.K.l).
L em m a 4. hor all M with 0 < .V/ < oo, there exists a density fanetion. /{()) such 
/ /m /- '-^ > /V y /o ra / /f ;m [fA ,.d ,] .
Proof. Let f{0) = IAO)(expij)/[expi^f) -  c.7;p(^)]. 'riien using (27) and (28), we 
obtain
I -/■■■,(») 0 , - 0  I
= <[i-xp(------- ) -  l|.
/.(»)
.\ow calcidating liupv^o ' ^^ 6tain
lint
lAO)
TAO] , 0 , - 0= Inn ( c.rp ---------0  ^ ' ( '
expAT^) -  1
Tcxp{‘^ ) { 0 , - 0 )
= liin<—Ü
= liin exp{----- -^){0, -  0) =  oc > .V/.
'-*() (
Q.L.l).
P roposition  17. Assume that the regulator has the prior belief f, = jaxpir)/
'I'hen under the optimal program (20)
liin f/./'(fi) =  ini l.'liO) Joi' dll 0 E \0{)Ah]·
SO
IS
Proof. I'Voin Lo'iruna '1, vvc know l lial. — 1] = oc.
So, frotii l^ro|)osition 15 it. follows Uial, liin,_o/ - (ti^ ) == \uij U.j(0). Q.l·;.!).
P roposition  18. There exists a sequence of updated probabilitj/ density func 
/■(,) = {/'(.)}, i — 0,1,2,..., which is monotonically increasing at O'r and converges 
to Iri·) in. pseudo sense such that under the optimal program, (20)
liin SW^'iOr) 7^  SW^HOr).
l—^OO
Proof. Wo will prove that the sequence /(.) given by (67)-(84) satisfies the conditions 
stat('(l in the |)ro])osition.
_I
o't-o'H
0
hfiOr) = L
..Or
r i O r )  =
•Ar'
, 7‘- ' + 1
('ls(^whci'('
r^{0)do .
n-\ ,
7 =
ij
V’ = 0;
I -  I'iiOr) '
X‘ =  i T u f  / V ' e ( 0 ,  1);
. _  2g'l'L{0r}
Of-' - O r
(07
d' = Or - i  \ - g ' ) (  O r -  0'-')
( 68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)
(73) 
(71)
r - ' { 0 \ - ' )  + k ' -
<j'i0) = \ r ' i o ) .
0,
A'
1 + A'
, - O ) .O e [ 0 r J ) \  j
0e\(Kr0r\  (75)
(dsewhere
(76)
.81
, (,i'(i)'c') + ,,‘u>T + ( \ - n - ) [ ( ) \ - ' - O r ) ] . :
'· = I + '
0\ =<?r + (l -  Or)
0[^  = Or -  (1 -  rniOr -  0[))
in()\ ) + ^ \ r H O r )  ~
r^{0) = { piOr)
()\ = 0r  + {\ - i ) { 0 \  -  Or) 
= f - ' i O r ) { \ + \ ' )
d\ -Or \ - 0 )  \{0e[0r,0\]
\ i O e K O r ]
oilsevvhon'
/' ^  (r‘{d\) + r'{0\))-
(77)
(78)
(79)
(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)
i iO)  = <! piOr) 
0
) i 0 \ - 0 )  \ i0 e [0 r j ) \ ]  
-^^0e[0i,j)r] 
('Isevvherc
L('t us show l.liat, /( .)  is monotonically increasing al. Or and pscMido converges l,o 
fri·)· hVorn (82) we have
= (1 + A'), V/: > I.
f ‘~ ' i 0 r )
which iini)lies that /( .)  is rnonotonically incrc'asing at Or sinc<' A' > 0 for all /! > 1.
To prov(' that /’(·) pseudo conv('rg('s to /r( .)  Iak(' any c > 0. Notice that using 
(71) and (79) we obtain
Or -  Oi = {Or -  (A))
A:=l
similarly using (78) and (81) yi(dds
I
0\ -  Or = {0^1 -  Or) -  7A:)( 1 -  (n)·
( 86 )
(87)
A;=l
S 2
'rii(!n we can find a positive integer such that inax^id'/· — « l! )n L ,( i  -  - /  )(i -
</')■ W  -  « 7 ')n L ,( l  -  7‘ )(l -  « ‘ )) < < Him·.· l i l . w n L . d  -  7‘ )(1 -  i/‘ ) = 
lini,_.x, (1 — 7 '^)(1 — (v^ ) = 0. W(' also know from (67) that / ‘(d) = 0, if
0 ^ [d(),d‘|]. So 1 — ¡''(O'!· + () + l' (^0'j· — c) = ( ) < ( ,  Vi > /.*. riius /(.) i)seudo 
converges to fri·) ·
Note from (86) and (87) that lim,^^(d‘, -  Or) = 0 'rims, liirp-^ x^, (■-'■f {0) = 0. Also
note that l-/''»(gr) ^  \-F‘{0r) P{0r) j,\o\·) '■ we have lim,_
I—►OCi
;)V ^  ' ) v /
CO 7^  0 at 0 = Or
which implies that lim,:^oo'SVh'· '^(d';·) ^  SW- '^>'{0r). Q.IC.D.
Proposition  19. TIk IT exist a sequence oj updated probability density functions 
/( .)  = {/'(.)}, z = 0, I , '2,..., ivhich is monotonically mcreasiny at Or and absolutely 
eonueryes to /r(·) ■‘’'“ 'd Idol under the optimal proyram (20)
lim SWd(Or) = SW^'UOr).
I —*· <'Xj
Proof, 'hlui proof is very siTiiilar to that of the Proposition 8. VV(' will first sliovv 
t.hat l.lii' se(]uenc(i given by (6o)-(69) in the proof of Proposition 8 is monotonically 
im niasing at Or and absolutely converges to /r(d) under the optimal ])rogram (20). 
Id'orn (o9), tor any integer /. > 1, it lollows  ^ I / s  * > 1 thus /(d) is
monotonically increasing at 0-/·. 'I'o prove' that /(d) absolutely converges to /r( .) ,  first
0 since / ' ‘- '(d r)  = / ’'(dr), and / ' - ' ( d r )  < / '(d r)note' that I-/·' <(Ur) > I-/■■‘(Or)/'-'(Or) " ¡'(Or)
Vi = 0,1,.... .VIore'over, .(/'(d) < lvrni-,,yjX  ^ {0) lor all i. Using (A2) we obtain 
-^ ( .7 ;/ '(d ) .  dj < - l i m i ^ ^ ' ^ { x J '  {0),0) < oc. 'hhus there exists 0\ such that (56) 
holds. Also note from (56), limi- ,^x, / / /  (d)= 0, which implies that lirn,: ,^^^  d( = 
lim,—X, d,', = d'/·. h'urth(!rmore lirn,—..x,/'(d-/·) = oc IVom (59). .So, /( .)  absolutedy 
conv('rg('s to ,/r(.).
l-'inall}', from (59), we'sc'e' (hat lim, \-l· '^(0r) _= 0 which im|)li('s t hal. lim,_x, —\h:
■ S '
= 0 at d = Or- Using this result, and also t he' fact ( hat lim,_. /'./ (d-/·) = 0, w('.
obtain lim,_.x,S'lp/'(dr) = ,S'IP/'(dr). Q.l·;.l·).
P roposition  20. Suppose the reyu.la.tor learns that 0 lies t.n [d)), d|] where d),' > do. 
Moreover, let the reyulator proportionally update. Ins prior belief f{.) : [do,di] —> TZ+
to form the belief f ‘{.) : [do,di] n . Further .suppose '-JlM and ' arc1(0) fn(o)
110u/rn,creasing in 0 and (y G [0, 1). Then under the optinial progrurn (20), ~
./•/(d). /;./'‘(d) < u./(d), /,//"(d) > t ' l i o )  and s w h f O )  >  ,s'kp/(d).
8.8
Proof. As l-ho regulaioi· updaic's his iK'licf |)ropoii ioiially, f"{0) -  f{0)( 1 + (/’). Vd G
I«;;.«,I when, ,b =  ^  -  I. Not.· also li.al So =
/■(I'l*''* = ■''"(<') = ' ’ t i l ) ·  aial I' f
l.'-j(O) since U2 is decreasing in Oq. Not<i also V/  + V'/ = V/ + Vj  which iinplie; 
Ul'‘iO) > UfiO) and SW^'‘{$) > SW^O).  Q.E.D.
<
l e s
Proposition 21. Suppose the regulator learns thal 0 lies in where 0'¿ > Oq.
Moreover, let the regulator uniformly update, his prior belief f{.) : —i· TZ+
to form the belief —>■ 1^+· ¡hirther suppose wnd ' ~pgo)^
no nine reading in 0 and fv G [0, 1). Then under tlu optimal program (20),
0 .v.hfO) > :vJ{0) if f'[0) > 0, Vd G KA),d¡'],
// )X¡'‘(0) < xHO) and lj{'‘i0) < uiiO) i f f iO)  < 0, 'iO G [0o,0·;], 
in) .v.h‘(0) = xHO) ^’('‘(0) > I'liO) and SWl ' fO) > SW^{0) if
['{()) = (), \h0e[0oJT(].
Proof. Th(' regnlalor updatc's his beliel’ nniibnniy so that, f"{0) = f{0) + G
[0'¿.0\\ where //,’ = f{x)dxl{()^ -  0¡^ ). Now it follows that
I -  l ' ' V ) )  . i T  +  '/’ (/A  -  0 ) 
fiO) + ;l·PfO)
and
1 -  F' i^O) 1 -  F{0) f{x)dx + tfiOi -  0) j p  f i x)dx(h
fpO) fiO) f(0) + >,b 1 ( 0)
(fiO) + wjfiO)
h'ii'st h't ns show t hat, (i) holds. U fiO) is incr('asing in 0 then 
and thus IVoin Proposition 11. x-^"(0) > xpO).
(ii) follows wIk'ii f(0) is d('cr('asing in 0. in which cas(' - -  Mfop' > lAoin 
ProiK)sition 11 we conclude that x^“{0) < xpO) and from Pro|)osition 15 it follows 
t hat i^f(O) < U.liO).
h'inally if is uniformly distributiid, d'bus from Proposition
11. x-^'f O) — xpO) and from Proposition 15, //■/ [0) < lh{{0) since O'f < 0[). d'hus, 
SW^PO) > SWpO)  and IJfpO) > UliO) since V/P0r)  + V f  (Or) = V/(0t ) + V/{(h)
and r [ ‘{0) < U-pO). Q.E.I).
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Proposition 22. Suppose IJk r((julalor learns llial 0 lies in [0J)\] where < ()\. 
Moreover,  let the regulator rationallij update his p)'ior Ix l ie f  f { . )  : [0{),0\] 7^ -f.
to f o r m  the heliej ,/^ '(.) : [0()jy¡] 'TZ^. ¡hirther suppose * <i‘^ d  *
nondecreastng in 0 and rv G [0, 1). Then under the optirnal program (20), xf'^iO) >
xJ(0), ut iO)  > Upo).
Proof. The regulator rationally updates his helii f^. So, > f{0) and >
r{0), \/0 e [Oor^ 'l]· ^   ^ £ [(h),O'f]· 'I'lius, Proposition 14,
Q.E.D.xJ '(0) > x-((0) and from Proposition 15, U.¡ (0) > a.iiO).
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3 A Renegotiation-Proof Revelation Mechanism 
for Multi-Period Monopoly Regulation
by
Lsinail Sağlam
Department of Economics, Bilkent University, 06533 /\nkara
3.1 Introduction
Regulation of a miilti-|)('rio(l monopoly has he(ui extensively studied by many 
('conomists in the literature Baron and Besanko, 1984a, 1986; Sappington and
Sil)h'y, 1986, 1988). 'I'he study of Baron and Besanko (1984a) shows that w Ikui the 
1-egula.tor has incomplète inlormal ion about cost the optimal regulatory mechanism is 
th(' ¡'('petition of the static Baron and Myenson's (1982) (B-M) r(!gulatory mechanism.
'Flui static (singl(vshot) B-.Vl scheme is a rcv('lation mechanism which by means 
of an optimal quantity and an optimal subsidy (tax) induces the (irm to truthfully 
¡•('port its private cost parameter. 'I'Ik; optimal subsidy consists of two parts, one 
of which guarantees that the linn will break ('ven while the otheu' |)art (uisures that 
th(' firm will not have any inccuitive to misrc])or(, its cost parametcu'. Since in tlie 
Bai'on and Besardio’s dynamic rcigulatory mechanism the cost inloi niation is revc'ahxl 
in the; first period, the regulator has an incentive' to exploit this cost, informât,ion in 
consecutive periods. After the first period th(' rc'gulator may ha\'(( a willingness to 
so't t he price's at t.he marginal cost revealeel in the first ])eriod and to set the subsidy 
at the' h'vel which yields zero net gain te> th(' firm. The firm, theui, ant.ici|)a.ting 
that the; rc'gulator will act e)pport.unisticall\·, may have incentive's to misre'i)e)rt its 
cost parame'teu' in the? first jie'riod to obtain positive rents in the future periods. It 
was shown by Baron (1989) that the additional re'iits the firm e'arns under such a 
situation would exceed the gain in consumer surplus resulting from the lowe'r prices 
in the |)eriods subsequent to t he first period. ,So, the? re?gulator pr('fe?rs to commit not 
t.o alt(?r the first period scheme? during the re?gulation period.
In the other extreme case where the regulator is unable? to commit to n rnulti- 
pe'i'iod policy, truthful revelation be?come's very costly for the age'iit so that the dif-
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F('r(!ni types of firms will have' a, t('ml(Micy t,o pool (ralchci dfect). In Ix'Iavchmi rom- 
milinent, and non-commitment ( lu're is an inl('rmefiia(('case, so known, commitnumt 
and renegotiation. Dewatripont (1986) shows that the dynamic nn'chanism of Baron 
and Besanko (1984a) is not reruigotiation-prool (iven if the regulator has I,he al)ilit,y 
t,o commit to the mechanism since after the first period in which t.he information is 
revealed, both the firm and the regulator can improv(' upon the Baron and Besanko’s 
(1984a) moxdianisrn to their mutual benefits. The room for such an improvement ex­
ists since under the replica of tlu; B-M mechanism the regulator faces a trade-off 
Ix't.ween the efficiency and the informational rents I ,he firm obtains urdess tlu; con- 
sunu'rs’ and producer’s welfaixis are equally w(Mght('d in the social w(4far(i. When the 
ri'gidator and the monopolistic firm cannot commit not to renegotiate the origiiicd 
contract, the Baron and Besard<o's (1984a) mechanism cannot be sustained, and as 
Hart and Tiróle (1988) and Lafibnt and Tiróle (1990) shows the ('(|uilibrium analysis 
of th(i renegotiation game played b('tweo;n th<! regulator and l.he linn coincick's with 
t,h(' Coasian durable good model. Laffont and 4'irole (1990) shows that the out- 
conu' und('r commitment and renegotiation is internu'diate between those under full 
commitment' and uiuhn· no commitment. Since the full commitment is an idealized 
case, I,he dynamic r<!gula.tory mechanism can be wit hout loss of generality designed 
as ixmegotiation-proof.
'File main purpose of this study is to design an alt.ernative r(igulatory nuícha- 
nism which will prevent the ixigulator and the firm from renegotiating on the ini­
tial contract ÍT) the periods subsecpient to the first peniod. 4'he r('negotiation-|)ioof 
revelation mechanism we pro|)ose is a non-Bay(;sian one since we show that all tlui 
leasible Bayc'sian mechanisms which optimally regnlate a multi-period monoi)oly (in­
cluding Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) mo'chanism) are time-inconsistent unh'ss the 
consumers’ and the producer's gains arc; equally weighted. /Mthough this pap(ir deals 
with a multi-period monopoly regulation |)robl(mi. all the resrdts of the pap('r can 
be gxmeralized to the dynamic extension of the gemnalized principal-agent model of 
(¡uesnerie and Laifont (L984) .
Fhe paper is organized as follows. 'Fhe next section outlines tlu' basic structnnis. 
'FIk' Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) model and the generalized mod(4 of regulation are
' Ihíi íí full coininil. incnt implies tluil  the regulator has the ability to com m it  to a multi-j)(u iod policy and, moreover,  
both th(i riigulator and the firm agree on not to riiiuigotiate on the initial contract.
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|)rovidcd in Section 3.3. In Sc'ction 3.1. we ini loduce I he non-Bayesian renegotiation- 
proof mechani.sm. Finally, in Sc'ction 3.5. .sonu' concluding remarks are made.
3.2 B asic Structures
Consider a monopolistic firm with the cost function C(q^O)·.
C{q,0) = K-\-Oq if <7 > 0 and C((),i?) = 0, ( 1)
wlu'rc' K represents the setuj) cost and 0 represent,s t.he marginal cost of producing 
any positive amount of out])ut. 'I'he form of the cost function is common knowk'dge 
whih' tlie cost param(;ter 0 is priva.t(dy known l.o IIk' firm. We assunu^ tha.t 0 li('s 
in th(' interval [Oy)J)\] where 0^) < Oy. 'I'lie regula.tor has prior belicd's about the cost 
|)aram(d,er 0 represented by a probability density function f{0) which is positive and 
continuous over the int(irval [O^ J)]].
'I'lui demand function is common knowledge. The inverse d('mand function is 
d(Miot(Kl by /'’(.) and assumed to be negatively slopc'd. The total value V{q) of an 
output of 1,he cpiantity q to consmm'rs is the a.rea under the inverse' demand curve is 
giv('M by V{q) = /J P{x)dx and hence the consunu'rs' surplus is l '(//) — iPq)q.
By the Revelation Ib-inciphp the regulator may rc'sl rict himself w.l.o.g. to revela­
tion mechanisms which induce the linn to truthfully r(!port its unknown cost param­
eter. A revelation mechanism consisting of two outcome functions {</to‘’t}t=:o,...,7' Ííí 
defined as follows: When the firm reports 0), qAO) is the output the firm is allowed 
to produce in the period r. (¡iven qriO) the regulatc'd price is compatible with the 
inv('rse demand:
pP0) = PiqAO))· r = (). 1...7' (2)
Tlu' Si'cond outcome function -SriO) is tlie subsidy |)aid to the firm in tlu' pc'riod r 
wlu'n the lirm ret)orts 0. i\'ow h'l, d) 1h' the net total gain of tlu' firm
which is the discounted sum of the operating profits and the subsidy if tlu' lirm 
misrc'ports its cost parameter as 0 while 0 is the tru(' cost |)ararn('ter: 
r r
Y^d^TrAd.o) = J2^^{prid)qA0)  - 1< -  OqAO) + sAd)'^ (3)
T = i ) T = U
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t) is lli(' (liscouiil factor, l o  iiiduci' the firm rc'port it,s t.riu' cost |)arainct,cr 0, t.lic 
policy sliould satisfy the iiicciitivc-conipatibility ('ondition: 
r  T
y ]  t)^Trr{0, 0) = max 0) for all 0,0 in [i?„, i^ i] (4)
r = 0   ^ T = 0
Finally the regulator should ensure that the individual rationality· condition for the 
firm is satisfied that is, the profit of the firm should be nonnegative: 
r  r
Y^S'^nriO) = Y^S'^TTriOJ)) > 0 for all 0 in [0(),0\] (5)
r = 0 r=()
Л i ('gnlatory policy which satisfies the conditions (2). ( 1) and (o) is said to he feasible.
3.3 Baron and B esanko’s D ynam ic Solution: T + 1  R eplica  
of the S tatic B aron-M yerson’s M echanism
In Baron and 13esanko’s framework the aim of tlu' ic'gulator is to find the optimal 
leasible nu'chanism which maximizes the ex])ected social welFire. 'Пю actual social 
welfare is defined as tlu' weight('d sum of the net total consumers' gain (discounted 
strc'am of consumers’ surplus net. of tlu' subsidy given to the firm) and the net total 
producer’s gain:
T
SW{q{0),.s{0)J)) ^ Y y [ V { ( i r i O ) )  -  Pr{0)(lr{0) -  •V(f^ )] + (G)
T= () r=()
n G [0- 1] denotes the weight. Modifying (3) t.o calculate ins('rting it
into (G) and finally t.aking the exi)ectation over 0 yi('lds the expc'cted social vvc'lfare:
(</(»)■ » ) l  =  I"'(Тб’[УЫоу>-s
■>>>4 r = ( )
-(/? + (1 -
rii(' regulator’s problem then l)ecomes: 
max I'Jo [.S'VF(//(f^ ), f^ )]
'iW
subject to (2) ,(1) and (5).
(7)
( 8 )
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Proposition 1. 'I’ho regulatory policy given by (9)-(l 1 j solves tlu' regulator’s prob­
lem (8):
«  +  (1 -  n ) ! ^ ]  r{i)),li). T =  0 , 1 . · · ■ ' / '
f ( O ) '
.p^ (0) ^  r  = 0,],..,7·
.St{0) -  0(lr{0) + K -  pr{0)(ir{0) + / (]r(0)dk r  = 0 , 1 , T.
Jo
( 9 )
( 10)
(11)
Proof. The meclianisrn is tlui repetition of the single-shot B-M mechanism in each 
|)('i'io(l, which is known to be l.lui o|)t.imal revelation nu'c.hanism in a static Iramework. 
So w(' will ])i'()ve l.hal, the re|)lica, ol the' li-M mechanism is optimal in a dynamic
contc'xt. Assume there exists a nu'chanism [q*, .s* }r=o...r  that satisfies the feasibility
couditions (2),(4), (5) and that yields more ex])ected social welfare than {r/o,.so} 
rep(>ated T  + I time's: PJolSW {q{0),0)] > { \ + 6+ . . .  + S''') IJo[SW(qoj)]. Now 
considi'r the random static nu'chauism which is ('(|ual to {</o,.'’o} with probability 
l/( H-... + h’'), {qi-.' l^} with probability <^ /( 1+... + h'·)..... and with probability
h'’/( I -f- ... -f h''). 'I'liis mechanism then yields more' e'xpected seecial welfare than 
which is a ce)utradic(ieiii since' the latteir is eiptimal in the statie- frame'work. 
'riuis tlie' repetition e)f the B-M mechanism is optimal in the dynamic e:e)ntext.Q.E.l).
Since^  the cost anel the demanel structure! doe's not change e>ver the regulation 
period, the erptirnal [)rie;e, the optimal eiuantit}' anel the e)ptirnal subsidy are tinic!- 
invariant, i.e., po — ··· = P'/·, e/o = ... = e/v, .sq = ... = .Si·. 'Fhe optimal price is 
eliste)i'te'el from the! marginal cost, prie:e when e-v 7  ^ 1 as a re'sult of the fact that the' inlbr- 
mational rents I,he firm obtains elue' te> its private information (Y^j.^„S’' q^{x)dx) 
e-ause's a welfare' loss, and the' re'gula.te)r fae:es a. traele'eiff betwc'en the e'lficient pricing 
aiiel the' inibrmatieinal re'iit.s the' linn erbtains. .■\lthe)ugli Baron auel Be'sanko’s (1981a) 
me'e-hanism is not eleiminated by any feasible' re'velatierii mechanism in the' Baye'siau 
se'use'. one' e'an she)W t hat the're e'xist some other leasible ITryesian nu'chanisms that 
the' Baron anel Bc'sanko’s (1981a) me'e:hanism e'ainu)! elominate!.
Proposition 2. 'I'lie rc'gulateiry polie;y {r/‘ , .s‘ },-=o...7· given by (12)-(14) e:haracter-
ize's all the feasible revelatiem me!e:hanisms whie:h seilve' (8):
q ; { 0 ) = q A 0 ) .  r = ()..... 7' ( 1 2 )
90
(13)
( 1.1 )
¡>l{0) = p,{0), r = 0.......7'
r r
r = 0  T = 0
Proof. We will first show that the regulatory |)olicy given by (12)-(14) is o]
'I'he price and quantity are the same as in Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) model. The 
only change is in the allocation of the subsidy ovcu' the periods. I'he subsidy in 
each period can be arbitrarily chosen provided that th(' total subsidy satisfies (14). 
Since the total subsidy given to the firm is the saim; as in Baion and Besanko’s 
oi)timal mechanism, tlu' (ixpectc'd total social w('lf'ar(' under tlu' policy ( 12)-(f4) 
must also be the same as in Baron and Besanko’s model, which was shown to be the 
maximum. Now show that the regulatory policy is also feasibhx 4'he feasibility
conditions (2) and (o) ar<; obviously satisfied. 'L'o check the incentive-compatibility 
condition, we use (3), ( 14) to calculate the discounted sum of the 'I'+l period |)rofits: 
h"7Tr(fl) = j  o' which is the same as in Baron and Bi'satdco’s
mod('l. So (4) is also satisfied. 'I'lie proof for the pari of the proi)osition that there' 
exists no leasible rc've'lation nu'chanism which cannot Ik' represe'iit.ed by (I2)-(14) 
simply follows from tlu' fact l.hat the subsidy give'ii by (14) is tlui minimal total 
subsidy which satisfies (5) and (4). .Now given the minimal subsidy, the expected 
total social welfcire is maximizexl at the quantity given by ( 12). So t he optimal policy
(12)-(14) is the gem'ial solution to (8), which involves Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) 
model as a special case. Q.K I).
I'lu' re'sidt that uruh'r the' above' re'gulate)ry ])oliey the e)ptimal std.)siely in e'ae'h 
pe'i'ie)el can be' arbitrarily che)se'n |)re)viele'd the' e'.onstraint e)ii the' te)tal subsiely is 
salisfie'el gives le) the' re'gidate)r me)re' fre'eelom in tax e-e)llee:ting. If the taxalie)n of 
the' e-onsumers is a time' taking proe:ess, for e'xample. the' re^ gulate)i· might e:e)mmit te> 
implement a re^gulatory |)e)lie:y of the send ( 12)-( 14) uneler whiedi all the informational 
re'iits are given at the' e'liel of the re'gulation perie)el.
Proposition 3. Supposes a ^  1. 'riien there exists no reneigotiatieni-proof reigulatory 
me'chanisrn which solve's (8).
Proof. We knenv that when ev ^  1. all the leasibh' re'gulatory pe)licie;s which solves 
(8) are' given by (12)-(14). 4'he optimal prie;e in (13) is higliei' than the mai'ginal
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cost sincx' fv ^  1. so ailx'r ih(' first jK'i'iod in which th(' (X)st. infonnat.ion is reveakxf. 
both t he; consumers and tdic (inn can Ix' het.t.er off if régulât,or s(Ms t,he pricx' a.t, the 
marginal (X)st and offer some jrart of t.lie additional (onsurners' sm'[)lus (generated 
by the lower price) to tlie firm. So it, is to the mut ual l)enefit of t,h(' regulator and 
the firm to renegotiate over the regulatory policy ( 12)-(14). Q.IO.D.
d'he firm who knows that the regulatory policy is not, renegotiation-proof after the 
first period, ma,y have incentives to misreport its (X)st, parameter in the first period 
if (i) it a,nticif)a,tes that they (t,lie regulator and tfu' firm) will agree upon a better 
<(;nt.ract in the second i)eriod and (ii) the additional ixuits the finn obtains in the 
(ii'st |)('iiod resulting from misreporting exceed the dis(X)unted loss(>s it will obtain in 
th(' future periods. 'I'Ikí fact that iiuxuitive-cornpatibility may not hold under time- 
inconsistent mechanisms then implies that neitlu'r vx ante nor cx post efficiency is 
guarantiXKl under those mechanisms.
3.4 A R en egotiation-P roof R evelation M echanism
VVe will first discuss why a desigiKU· may prefer a non-Bayesian regulatory policy 
to a Bayesian one in a, dynanne model of monopoly ix'gulation when « ^  1.'^  ft, is 
known t.fiat wfuni tin; ix'gulator has in(X)inplet(’ irdorma.t ion about, (X)st, theixî (exists no 
feasible ix;gulatory ])olicy (neither in th(' static nor in t,he dynamic framework) whicfi 
maximizes the actual social welfare urdess the consuim'is’ and tlu' ])roducer's gains 
aix' (X|ually weighted (cv = f case). .So in order to dc'sign a regulatory policy which 
maximizes the social objective when 1, it is iiu'vitable to replace the first-best
social object iv(>. tin' actual social wcdfaixu by a "s(xx)nd-best objc'ct iv('’’. It has becui a. 
(x)nv('iition that, tlu'soHond-lx'st social objc'ct ive should Ixi t lu'exfx'ctc'd social w(dfa,re 
under th(' prior Ixdi('fof the ix'gidator. Tlx' Bayesian approach in ix'gulation has b('en 
\x'rv popular simx' t Ix' well (h'fined social obji'ct ivc' ftlu' ('xpc'ctc'd .social wc'lfaix') 
('nal)l('s the third i)arti('s to nu'asure tlu' ex ant(' ('Ificiency that tlu' ix'gulatory policy 
yi('lds. d'he above' result that no feasible Bayesian regulatory policy which regulates 
a multi-period monopoly is renegotiation-proof is. however, one of the reasons why 
t h(' designer may implement a. non-Bayesian regulatory policy instxiad of a Ba.yesian
wIkmi a =  1, (Ikî íiíísignor docs not. f'ac(î such a choice Bay(\sian and non-H¿iycsian regulatory
|)olicies siiK'c two jK)licies coincid(i.
f)2
OIK'. AııoiluM' reason is t he poU'iil ial corniplion in i 1k' Bayesian nu'clianisins.
rii(i 13a.yesian approach in regulation, has been criticized by nia,ny a,ut,hors 
Vogedsang (1988), Koray and Sert,el (1989), Lail'onl (1994)) sinc(' t,he rnechanisins 
which depend on the regulator’s prior belief can be manipulated if the regulator is 
dishonest. 'I'liis claim is lormally proven in the very recent study of Koray and Saglarri 
(199oa) who characterize the lorm of beliefs which under the stat.ic B-M mechanism 
yield the suprema or infirna ol the actual produc(U’’s and the expected consumers’ 
gain. They claim that a dishonest regulator who is avvaix; of tlu' ('xistence of such 
critical (tlireatening or awarding) beliefs can demand bribe from t he monopolist and 
(or) t Ik ; consuiTu;rs, and therefore' t.he outconu; will 1k ' entirely diir(;rent than what the 
B-.Vl !iu;chanism |)redicts. In the same study, Koray and Sağlam (1995a) also show 
that "more information” about the urdiiiown cost parameter is not, always desirable 
foi· the society uidess it re'prc'se'iits the full iid'ormation case, which implies tha.t the 
socie'ty may Ix' v('ry .sensitive' to t,h(' path the regulator follows while he is l<;arning 
moi'C' about, cost.
.Another W('akness of the Bayesian monopoly régulât ion models is t.hat the optimal 
])iic('s calculated und(;r those m(;chanisms when o: /  1 may be vc'i-y high compared 
to the marginal cost |)rices, and hence; the actual (ex post) social welfare may realize 
v('iy low if the regulator’s prior belief is not sufficie'ntly close to the truth. These 
ob j(;ctions to the Bayesian regulatory mechanisms may induce a regulator to d(;sign 
a. non-Bayesian regulatory mechanism whenever possible;. Nenv we will intro(hie;e one 
such mechanism which has re;ne;'gotiatie)n-proofne;ss as we;ll as seeme; ol the elesired 
pre)i>e'rtie's of the Sappington anel Sibh'v’s (1988) multi-period mexlel, name'ly, the' 
ine-re'inental sm plus sul)sidy scheme.
P roposition  4. The; fe;asible I'e'gidatory poliey given by (15)-(18)
(i) is non-manipulable',
(ii) e'nsure's re;negotiation-pre)e)fne;ss and e'ommitment.
(iii) ensure's marginal cost pricing in every pe'riod (i.e'.. p r i O )  =  O . t  =  (),..., 7 '), anel
(iv) awards the firm strictly positive profits only in the first pe'rie)el (i.e;., nr{0) =
O.r = 1,...,7').
P r ( 0 )  = 0, r  = Ü, 1,..,7’ (fo)
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pAO) = r(qAO)). T = 0.
•sq — A + ( l  +  ... +  (‘) )^ / ( ¡ A O ) ^ ^
JO
.A0) = K, r = l , . . ,7 '·
(Hi)
(17)
(18)
Proof. We skip the part of tlie proof of the ])roposition that the' regulatory ])olicy 
is li'asiblc, which is slraightiorward. I lie condition (i) is clearly satisfied sinc'e tlie 
optninal policy does not dcipend on the r('giilator's hediets. (iii) is guaranteed by the 
('(Illation (lo). do show (iv) holds, it is suiiicient to calculate TToiO) =  Jh){0)q^ ){0) -  
K -  OqAO) +  ■'iAO) = ( ! + . . .  +  A‘’) qAx)dx and 7T,(d) =  (), r =  Finally,
(ii) is (Misured since marginal cost pricing is achievc'd in each period implying that 
th(' regvdator has no incemtive to renegotiate' over the regulatory policy after the? first 
|)('i-iod. Moreove'r. since the snhsidies in the ])eriods subsequent to the first pc'riod is 
minimal under tin' condition that tlxi firm breaks ('vc'ii in each period, the regulator 
has no inc.e'iitive to alter the rc'gulatory scheme afte'r the first period, so commitment 
is also guarant('('d. Q.H.I).
3.5 C onclusions
d’he regulatory policy proposed in Se'ction 3.1 is nothing but a. genieralized ve'rsion 
of the Baron and Besanko (198'la) mechanism lor the; cas(' in which the consumers’ 
and the producer’s welfares are e(|ually weighted. Since under the equal welfar(; 
cas('. tlx; efficient outcome does ix)t depend on the beliefs of the regulator, it follows 
lhal the mechanism given by (b>18) is corruption-proof. Also siix:e marginal cost 
|)i-icing is a.tta.ined in ('ach p('riod and thus tlx'ix' is ix) wedfan; loss, tlxi nx'chanism 
is I'c'ix'gotiation-proof. .Moreover, tlx' prop('ity that all the informational rc'iits an- 
award('d to tJx' linn at the first pc'riod in which tlx' firm reveals its cost paranxiter 
guarantees that tlx'rc' is no commitment probh'm.
It is obvious that this nx'chanisrn is rx)t e.x ante' ('fficient when consnimn's' welfare' 
is more heavily weighted than i)roduc(n· s welfare. .As it may be noticed, under the 
re'gulatory policy (F5-18), the inlormational rents in the first period is equa,l to the 
|)r('S('iit value of tlx' stre'am ol rents the firm would re'ceive in (;ach |)eriod under the 
i('plica of tlx' B-.M nuxlel wlx'ii n =  1.
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In Sa])])inglon and Sibleys ( l ! ) S < S )  "Incnnnenlal Surplus Subsidy" (ISS) scheme. 
i 1k' mono|)olist, receives rents due to its svipcndor iid'ormation oidy in the lirst p('riod 
which rents are equal to the tot.a.1 surplus generated in the economy. Almost entire 
part of the first-period rents in the ISS scheme may Ix' e.xtracted from tlui monopo­
list if the discount factor of the monopolist is known to the regulator. .An important 
point to be emphasized here is that one should bc' careful in making comparisons 
between the incentive mechanisms and the ISS sclKune. The ISS sclunrie is ellicient 
when the expenditures of the firm is observable to the regula.tor with a lag of one 
p('riod. Incentive mechanisms, however, a.re indis|)('nsabl(' when tin' true costs or ex- 
p(Miditures of the monopolist are never observable or v('riiia.ble otlnn wise. Vloreovcîr, 
t,h(' incentives which should Ix' awarded l.o the firm cannot be ('xf.racted from tlx' 
iirm even in a multi-period environment.
f)o
Part III
Applications of Incentive Theory
4 Optimal Import Policy In Monopoly Regula­
tion
by
Ismail Sağlam
DepartriHuit of Economics, Bilkent Uriivcrsily, 06533 Ankara
4.1 Introduction
Hx'gulating a monopolist with unknown costs in a closed economy context has 
IxxMi ('xtensiv(dy studied in the literature. y\mong tlu' many models of regulation, 
howevx'i·, the “optimal” regulatory mechanism und('r incomplete information is due 
to Baron and Myerson (1982) (B-M). B-M consider a static framework in which the 
monopolist has private information about its cost which is characterized by a single 
parameter. By the Revelation Principle, B-M r(;strict themselves witliout loss of 
generality to mechanisms which ask the firm to report its costs and which give to the 
firm no incentive to lie. The regulatory mechanism which is simply a direct-revelation 
ganu' Ix'tween the regulator and the firm provides the maximum gain to tlu' firm if 
it truthfully I'eveals its private' cost paraiiK'teT. 'l'h(' mechanism also guara.n1.e(is a 
nonnegative gain to the regulated firm since otherwise the firm would choose' not to 
produce. The objective of thei reigulator is to maximize the expe'e ted soeual welfare 
which is the sum of the expex-.te'd consumers’ surplus net of the subsidy given te) the 
firm and a fraction of the expected producer’s profits.
'hhe B-M regulatory policy, wliich consists of the: [)iie:e and the' (|uantity e>f the 
good, the subsidy given to the firm and the probability that the firm is allowed to 
|)ie)elue:e, depends on the regulate)r’s bediefs unless 1,he' consumers’ and the proelue:er’s 
gain are expially weighted in the soenal welfare; fune:tion. Due to the informational 
asymmetiy in the IT.VI me)del. I.he regulator face;s a tradeoff betwee;n the te;c,hnical
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('liirionc}' and the allocative ('liidency. So, in order to limit the iidbrinatioiud rents 
of the firm the price of the good is set above the marginal cost provided that tlui 
consumers’ gain is more heavily weighted than the jiroducer’s gain. The deviation 
from the marginal cost price, which is the socially efficient price in the full information 
case, then yields a welfare loss in the B-M mechanism.
'I'his paper aims to show that in an open economy where tlu' domestic country 
has the ability to import unlimited quantities of the good from foreign markets, the 
w('lfar(' loss diu; to informational asymmetry can bc' reduced by using an optimal 
import ])olicy if tlu; import ]>rices are sufficiently low. 'I'he approach taken in this 
pa|)('r to ix'gulation under import option is basc'd on the Ba.yesian principal-agent 
moflel of B-.M.
We assume that tlu' good produced by the domestic firm is not differentiatiul 
from the irnportiul goods. We further assume that the import price of the good 
is ('xogenously determined outside of tlu; domestic country. A foreign firm may, of 
conrs(;, set its selling ])rice as a function of its beli('fs about tlu' marginal cost of 
the doiru'stic firm of tlu' hoiiu' country, but we assume that prior to reguhition the 
im])ort price is known to the regulator and it stays constant during the regulatory 
proc('ss. If the regulator attempts to regulate the selling prices of foreign firms in the 
domestic markets as well as the (piantities, it runs t he risk that if the import pi ice is 
s(;t too low the foreign firms may decline to supply tlu; good since t hey may sell their 
products in some other markets at the unregulated prices. So the oidy enforcenu'nt of 
tlu' regulator on the foreign exporters is via import restriction or import prohibition, 
which implies that the foreign exporters are not included among the players of the 
ix’gnlatory ganu;.
It is natural to assume, however, the ix'gulator may have tlu' ability to commit 
tlu' domestic firm to an individually rational r(;giilatory mechanism. As in t,he closed 
economy case, the donu'stic firm may still have an inc(;ntive to us(' its ])rivat,(' cost 
information as a. strategic variable'. So, using a dirc'ct ix'velation mechanism in the 
open (;conorny framework, the r(;gulator can induce the domestic firm to t,ruthful 
revelation, and then as a function of the import ¡rrice and the cost of tlu; domestic 
firm the regulator may implement the socially efficient outcome.
It is int.i'resting that tlu; existence of the import of)tion may improve the actual 
social welfare even when the o|)timal regulatory {)olicy implies that the society must
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ІЮІ import from abroad. 'Го so(' vvlij- ѵѵч' have' to con.sider the slraXcigic Indiavior 
of a, regulated firm in a direct revelation mechanism with no subsidy. .Assume a 
regulator announces the lollowing regidatory sclumu': 'I'lu! firm is asked 1,o r(;])ort 
its cost. If the reported cost is higher than the import price then the firm will 
])roduce nothing, otherwise it will be allowed to supi)ly all the (|uantity demanded 
at the price associated with the reported cost. Under this regulatory scheme, the 
best strategy for a firm which has a marginal cost lowei· than the import price is, of 
course, to report a cost parameter slightly below tlu' import pricci if the monopoly 
])гіс(' is above the iinporl, price' so that the firm will ol)tain t.he right to produce. Eve'u 
t hough this mechanism is not ('flicient tor the marginal cost of tlu' firm may be very 
low comparecí to t.he import ])i'ic(i and hence to the' r(i])orted cost., it., ruwertlu'less, 
limits the; monopoly profits whenever the import price; is bele)w the; monopoly price. 
'ГІИ' fact that the existe'ne;e of import e)pt.ion might re'press the; ex)st. re;pe>rt and hene;e 
t he' ])rofit of a re;gulated firm in a revelation me;'e:ha.nisrn with no subsidy should be; 
t ake'll into e;,onsiele;ration in designing a direct revelatie)n me.'chanism with an ince'iitive;- 
ce)inpa.tible' subsidy. /\s the ele)me'stic firm’s benefits from lying may be reeluce'd due' 
te) the' impe)rt t.hre'at, the' optimal subsiely anel thus inlormational le'uts of the firm in 
an ince'ntive-e;ompatible mechanism may also be lowe'r in the open e;e e)norny than in 
the' rle)sed есогюту. So the se)e ial welfare in the e)|)e'ii e'e;e)nomy case' iruiy be' higher 
than in the closeel есе)гюту mode;l e)f B-M.
'I'he outline e)f the pafK-;r is as follows: In So'ction 1.2, we elescribe the rergulator’s 
pi'oblem in an open economy model. In Section l..'l, t.he e:loseel economy se)lutie)n 
e)f B-.M as a spee:ial case of e)ur ігюеіеі is eliscusseel. I he e)pen е'е:е)гюту se)lution 
is characte'rized a.nel analyzeel in Section 1.-4. Г'іпаііу. Se;e:tion I.·') ce)ntains some 
e;e)ne-lueling reunarks.
4.2 M odel
Ceuisieh'r an inelustry which eionsists of a single; domestie' proelue;(;r anel a large' numbe'r 
e)f e4)inpe'titive foreign pre)elueers. VVe shall elefine; t he' e:e)st funct,ie)n e)f the; ele)ine;stie·
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firm as:'
C-iqJ)) = K  + Oq if q > 0 and 6'(0,d) = 0.
( 1 )
wlicr(> q is the quantity produced, K is tlie setup cost and 0 is the marginal cost, 
of |)roducing any positive amount o( output. It is assumed that K and t.lie form of 
tlu' cost function is common knowledge, while 0 is i)rivately known to the domest.ic 
firm. 'Fhe regulator has common knowledge over tlu' (hmsity function f{0) which is 
positive' on t.he interval and has a cumulative' elist.ribution function F{0).
.\e)W by the Reve^lation Principle [Dasgupta,Hammond and Maskin (1979) and 
.Vlyer.son (1979)] wei e:an restrict the reigulator without loss of generality to policies 
whie:h require the ele)mestic firm to reqx)it its e:ost parameteir and which give the 
eleune'stic firm no ince'iitive to lie. A feasible re'gulatory policy e:onsisting of the 
e)ute:ome functions (/;, e/,/, e/, e/,„ ,s) is, then, elefine'el as follows:
/•(f)) is the' pre)bability that the' elomestic firm will |)re)eluce after re'pe/rting 0 as its 
e-e)st pararne.'te'r. As a ]ux)bability, r(0) must, satisfy
0 < r{0) < 1. (•i)
'Phe inverse elernand function whie:h we denote by P{.) > 0 is e:ommon knowlc/dge. 
We further assume P'{.) < 0 and P''{.) < 0. d'lu' impe/rt, price is denoted by p„,, 
anel e;xogeriously determined in the loreign market. .Ne/w, let q{0) elenote the e/utput 
pie/eluced by the domestic firm and let qm{0) be/ the' e|uantity oi the' importeel good 
if t he' domestic firm reports 0. 'Fhe total e|uantity demande;d of the/ goexl is t he'n
qAO) ^  q{0)r{0) + qJO). (3)
We' assume that 'law of one price'' holels in the domestic marke/t since the' ele/me/st.ic 
ge/e/el and the impe/rte'd goe/ds are not differentiate'd. whie:h implies that the re'gedator 
levie's a.n ad valorem tarill on the importeel goe/els as a function e>f the cost re/pe/rt e/f 
the' elomestic firm so that both the elome'stically pre/eluce'el and the' importeel ge)e)ds 
will be' sold at the common prie:e' piO). The tariff rate' 1(0) will the'n satisfy
p 4 i + m = p { 0 )  if q,n{0) >0·  (4)
' \V(' .k Ioj)!. .1 siinj^liiiod version of the cost  function of B-M m odel of  ri^gnlation which (inaldes us to ('oinpiire our  
I'csulls willi  tliosii of  H-M.
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'Flic rcigulaU'd price p{0) and the t,o1,a,l quantity (k'lnandc'd q,i(0) ol the good should 
h(' compatible with the inverse demand
p{0) = P{q,[0)). (5)
'The total value V {q,i{^)) an output of the quantity qAO) to consumers is vUiiO))  = 
j i^dO) ajiJ hence the consumers’ surplus is V (qd{0)) -  P{qd(0))qd{0).
Lastly, s{d) is the subsidy (tax if negative) paid to (taken from) the domestic firm 
w Ik 'u i1. reports 0.
( ¡iv('u the outcome functions (p(d), (/(f)),/■(/)), .s(d)). the domestic firm’s profit is 
n{d.O) if it reports the cost parameter as 0 while 0 is t.he true cost parameter:
0q{0)-  K)r{d) + s{()) (b)TiiOJ)) =
In order to guaranti'e that th(> domestic firm rei)orls the true cost, i)ara,meter 0. we 
must have
'¡r{0) = ж{0,0) = max K(dj)), ( 7 )
for all 0 in [0()J)\\· Fitrthermore, the regulator must ensure that the individual 
rationality condition for the domestic firm is satisfied that is,
^{0) > 0 (8)
for all 0 in [f^ o,f?i].
Л regulat.ory policy is said to be Jeasible il it satisfies (2), (d). (4), (o), (7) and 
(8) for all 0 e [ffo,ffi]· Now, tlu' goal of tlu' rc^gulator is to find a feasible regulatory 
policy which maximizes t.he expc'cted social welfare fL'
J(hy
V i q M ) ) )  -  pi0)q(0)r{0) -  p,nqJ0) -  M0}yi(())d0 (9)
Ih
+  CV / 7T(0)fi0)d0
'Oo
'Flu' ('xpected social welfare function, is t.he exjx'cted consumers’ net gain (the 
consuiiKirs’ surplus plus the tariff revenue net of tlu' expected subsidy given to the 
donujstic firm) plus a fraction (cv) of the expected piofit (gain) of the domestic firm, 
o G [0. 1] is the relative' weight the regulator assigns to the (ixpect.('d consumers’ and 
produ'x'r's gain.
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4.3 C losed econom y case: B-M  solution
L('1, us first consider the optimal regulation of the domestic firm vvithiu the coutc'xt, of 
a closed economy. Hy inserting (¡miO) = 0 lor all 0 G [OoJh] hito (f)), the regulator’s 
objective becomes,
H/'’ = I  ' {v{q{0))v{0) -  p{0)q{0)r{0) -  s{())yf{0)d0
r<h
+rv /  K{0)f{0)d0
Jo,,
( 10)
Using tin; trick of Mirrlees (1971) and the envelope theorem yields n'(0) = —r(0)q(()). 
lnt('grating implies
rO,
= / r( r)(j{.v)dx + (II)
7r(di) 1^ '^ e.hos(!n as z(U’o to t.lu' Ixuiefit of consunu'rs. Now taking tJu' (iX])ecl.al.ion 
of (11) and using integration by parts we obtain
n{0)J{0)di0)
Oo
i '  ( / ' '  rix)qix)dx
Oo ^JO
r{0)q{e)F{0)do.
Oa
( 12)
Substituting s{0) = 7t((1) — [p{0)q(0) + 0q{0) — K]r{0) and (12) into (10) we get
<"9 . p'(0)
joo ' m
We can now staXe tlu' optimal rc'gulatory policy in the clos('d (icouomy case.
V{q{0)) -  K -  0q{0) -  (1 -  a )^q (0 )y r{0 ) f { ( ) ]d0 .  (13)
P r o p o s i t i o n  1. Assume that l ' [0) l }{0)  i.s nondcci'i asi iig. Then llu followiruj I'egu- 
laloi'y policy, ( i y)-( l 7) ,  is jeasible and maximizes (Id) among all feasihle regulatory 
poiicies:
P{q{0)) = z M
Zr^ {0) = + ( 1 — o)
p{0) = P{q{0))
m
m
(14)
(lb)
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Н О )
1 if v { q { 0 ) )  -  К  -  z J 0 ) < i { 0 )  >  о
о olherwisc-i
rOi
s{0) = K  + 0q{0) -  P{0)q{0) + / r{x)q(x)dx
Jo
( 16)
(17)
Proof. See Baron and Myerson (1982, pp. 920-921)
'The regulatory policy (14)-(I7) depends on the belief of the rc'gulator unless the 
consumers' and the ])roducer’s gain are (кщаПу w(hght('d in the social welfare func­
tion. 'ГІИ' optimal price and tlui optimal quantity of the good, tlu' optimal subsidy 
and the optimal profit of the firm are depicted in Figure 1 .
F ig u HI·; 1
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The optimal regulated prie(' p(0) is nondeereasiiig in 0. while qiO) is noninereasing 
ill 0. guaranteeing that the profil. of tlu' firm, which is the horizonta.lly shaded an'a 
in h'igure I, is maximized by the truthful revelation, l lu' profit of the firm is also 
called dnformational rents’ since if tlu' cost of the firm were common knowledge the 
o])tirnal regulatory mechanism would yield zero lu't |)roiits to the firm. Under th(' 
informational asymmetry in B-iM’s model, the regulator faces a trach'off betw('en tlu' 
efficiency and the incentives which should be given to the firm to induce truthful 
revelation, and therefore the optimal price is set above I,lie marginal cost of tlu' firm 
for all 0 € (0o,0i] (unless, of course, the expecti'd consumers’ and tlu' firoducer’s 
gains ai'(' ('qually weighti'd in the social widfare funclion) to limit tlu' informational 
r('iits of th(' linn. Ibit the deviation from the marginal cost |)rice wfu'ii a· ^  1 yields 
t.hc' welfare loss, shown as tlie lilack-shaded area in lugure 1.
4.4 O pen econom y case
llc'rc' we wish to examine the ojitimal regulatory solution for the open economy case 
where the domestic firm is facing competition from forcdgn firms. Tlu' regulator who 
acts on befialf of the society has the ability to import unlimited quantit.ic's of the good 
from t.he foreign markets at the comiietitive price p,„. 'Flie regulator's objective in 
t.lu' open economy cas(' is then to find a feasible regulatory policy which maximizes 
(9) subject to q,n[0) > 0.^
P roposition  2 . Afisurnc. Ikal l'{0) f  j  {()) is nondtcvcasinq and P{·) is (dastic a,I the 
price 0] + f ~ ' {()[). Then the followinij regulatory policy, (l8)-(:!/,). is feasible and 
maximizes (!)) among all feasible regulatory policies:
I  oth('rwis('
(hn — P  ( Pin )
J'iO), J 0 )  = 9 + {\
“ I'lic equality  s ign in the constraint of the imixiinization problem is included since even though  we consider here  
an oi)en econom y framework, the regulator may still choose  no imi)ort oi)tion, i.e. qyn(O) =  0, if the im port i)iice is 
too  high.
10··]
It is left 1.0 show r{0)</{0) is noiiiucreasing in 0 vvhicli will guaranU'c' that, n{0.0) — 
тг{0.0) < 0 for all 0,0 € Now since l''{0)l¡(0) is nondecreasing. Zn(0) is
nomlecroiasing, and thus q{0) is nonincreasing. Nol.(' also tha.t
¿ |C ( i(» ) )  -  к . ( о ш \  = < n.
which implies that p{0) is nondecreasing and qd{0) is noiiincreasing. To show r{0) is 
nonincreasing, let us define r(l9) = Viqd{0)) -  K -  z,,{0)q{0) -  p„,\qd{0) -<·/!^)]· 
taking the derivative of Tfö) with respect to 0 yields
-  z[,{i)),0) -  z„iO)<i'(o) -  р м т  -  </'(»!).
d 0
m )
Ihrstly, consider p(0) = zJO). Thom qd{0) = q{0) = T and thus о/'Д0) =
(¡'(0). 'rho'rod'oro;, dV{0)ld0 = —z[^(0)q{0) < 0. Secondly, consider p{0) = p,„. But 
I,horn (26) reducois to
d\'(0)
dO
= Prnd'iO) -  z'jo)q{0) -  zJOWiO) (27)
Now the assumption that P{.) is odastic at the |)iice 0^  + / “ '(/Л) impliois that 
Pi(l(Oi))<iiOi) + Pio(0\)) < 0 since q{Oi) = P~'{z„[Op) = P “ ‘ ((9, + .1'~'{0^)). Using
the assumption that P"{.) < 0 then further implio's Piq{0))q{0) + P(q{0)) < () for
all 0 e since q{0) is nonincro;asing. So, d\'{0)ld0 < 0 implying that r{0) is
nonincreasing. 'I’herefore, (7) is satisfied.
.Now let us check that the regulatory policy is optimal, lb  show tliat tlu' prices 
a.nd (|uantitics of the good in (18), (20) and (2 1 ) are optimal, we will examine thime
s('pa.ra,t(' 0’a.ses. pm ^  0, Ptfi 0 Z/,f(0'j and 0 ^  ]Pn ^  ',^ ;v(f^ )·
Starting with ¡),п < 0. let us substitute' .s(/l) = тг{0) -  [p{0)q{0) + 0q(0) -  l\]r{0) 
into (9) to obtain
IT' = ([ViqAO)) -  [l< + 0q{0)]r{0) -  PmqmiO) -  a  -  а)7г{0)
which can be rewritten as
IT" = qd{0)) -  Kr{0) -  p,„q40) + {pm -  0)qi0)r{0) (28)
'Oq
-( 1 — fv)7r
10Г)
To maximize (28) when Pm < we should dioose (¡{0) = 0 and c/,/(d) = (¡„AO) = <Im 
wliich implies p(0) = p,,,· These ('(piaiions are includc'd in (18), (20) and (21).
' l b  ch(ick Uk; mechanism is also o])t,imal when p„, > 0, we hav(' l,o hrsl, show l.hat 
l,lu! subsidy in (24) is optimal. Using the envelope theorem yields w'{0) = —r{0)<]{0). 
Remember that no domestic firm with 0 > p,„ will 1h' allowed to produce, 'rhereloix', 
a. firm which reports 0 < Pm and hence is allowed to ¡produce should not obtain any 
rent in the range p,„ and Oi, thus the firm’s profit becomes
tt(0) ^  [  rix)q{x)dx,
vvlu're (),„ = min{pm,,f^i}· Using (6) at the optimal policy with 0 = 0 yields (2 1 ).
.Now taking the expectation of the |)rofit function and using integration by parts 
vv(' obtain
rix)(j{x)dx. (29)
0, rO]
Tri0)f{0)d{0) = I r{x)(i{x)l''ix)dx
Jo„ On
0,
r{x)(]{x)F{x)dx,
since (¡{O) must be zero for all 0 G [0,n-,0\]. Using (29) and (24), the expected social 
w(4far(' when 0 < pm b('(X)rnes
kf/'·· = ’ ( [V{(i,ii0)) -  [l< + zJ0)(j{0)]ri0) -  p,„q„A0))JA0)d0 (40)
>0o
where z,y{0) — 0
l^ i^rst let us consider pm > z,y(0). Maximizing (40) implies tha.t ¡A(}d{0)) = z,A0) 
and (¡,„[0) = 0. So, (¡{0) = q,i{0) = P~Aza{0)) and p{0) = z,yi0) are optimal if 
Pm > z„{0). Lastly, under tlui cas(' where 0 < p,„ < z,y(0) maximizing (40) yields 
lA(lAO)) = p{0) = Pm... I{0) = 0, q{0) = P-'izaiO)) and (¡„AO) = q.AO) -  q{0)r{0) = 
— P~Az,A0})r(0) > 0 since r{0) < 1. So the ecpiations (18), (19). (20). (21) and 
(22) ai(' o|)timal. l''inally, to maximize tlui integrand of (40) wln'iiever p„, > 0, we 
choose r{0) so that
1 if V{qd{0)) -  /\ -  ZyA0)(j(0) -  Pm.[qd.{0) -  q{0)] > V{(hn) -
0 otherwise,
which is equivalent to (24). So (p, f/,/, </, </„i, r , /, .s) maximizes (9) among all feasible 
regulatory policies. Q.E.I).
r(fi) =
1 Of)
riu' optimal regulatory mechanism as a, diix'ct rennhation game' played b('t.\v('en 
tlui regulator and the firm is summarized in Figure' 2.
(}m{0)  =  q,n -  q { 0 )
ci{0)^F- ' {zJ0))
F igurk 2.
( R= Regulator, l''=l·'i
'I'he regulator first announces the optimal policy fuiictions (p. i/, r,,s) to the firm 
and asks the firm to report its cost paraim'ter. I'Ik' firm then re'veals its cost i)a- 
rameter since the optimal regulatory |)olicy is desigmxl to be inc('iitiv(' compatible. 
(live'M th(' cost report 0, the re'gulator
(i) does not allow the firm 1o ])roduc(' and irnporls all t.he <iuanli(y fh'mamhxl at 
l lu' import price p,„ if eil.her p,„ is lower than tlu' marginal cost 0 or r(0) = 0. or
(ii) sets the price at the import ])rice p,„, allows t.lu' firm to ])roduce wha.t it wouhl 
l)roduce in th(î closexl economy case, and imports tlu' ('xc(;ss demand if r{0) = 1 and 
th(' import price; p,„. is between z„{0) and the marginal e:ost 0, or
(iii) does not import and impk'rnerits the B-M oute:orne if the import prie:e p,„ is 
higher than Za{0) and r{6) = 1.
d'e) analyze the main feature;s of t.he; optimal regulate)ry |)olicy, it is nsed'ul to eliscuss
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tİK,' ()])l.iınal regulation under the case where the marginal cost of the lirm is common 
knowledge. The optimal price in that case would Ix’ the minimum of t.lu' import 
pricx' and the marginal cost of the domestic (inn. 1 lu' optimal (|uantity demanded 
by consumers is compatible with the inverse demand function. It is clear that if the 
irn|)ort price is lower than the marginal cost of the linn then all the demand is met 
by the imports while the domestic firm stops producing. Even if the import price is 
higher than the marginal cost of the domestic firm, it is not obvious that it will be 
allowed to produce. Note that the; domestic firm when allowed to produce is paid a 
subsidy which covers its operat ing losses. So if the setup cost of the domestic firm is 
lai'g(i (uiough then it may not Ix' optimal to allow tlu' domestic firm to produce (wen 
vvlxm the marginal cost of the domestic firm is below the import priem Formally, the 
firm is allowed l.o f)roduce if and only if the social wedfare geneiated by tluî firm’s 
production is at least as large as the social welfare g('iierated by fix' imports.
Tlx' optimal price in the iix'omplete information case, given by (18), is the min­
imum of the import price aixl the adjusted marginal cost of (he domestic firm 
the latter of which is equal to the regulated price in the closcxl economy nx)del 
of B-.M. is higher than tlxi marginal cost of fix' firm 0 to accommodate to the
firm’s incentives to rnisreport its cost. Given the optimal price, them, the optimal 
(piantity demanded by the consunxns of the donx'stic country is found using the 
inverse demand relationship as in (19). As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, 
tlx' o[)timal prices is nondecreasing aixl herx:e the oiT.imal quantit.y demanded (pur­
chased) is nonincreasing in 0. As (xjuations (20) aixl (22) show, tlx; domestic firm is 
not allowed to produce when either the import price' is less than tlx; marginal cost 
paranx;ter ')f tlx; domestic firm (/;,„ < 0) or it is not socially efficient to permit tlx; 
donx;stic firm to produce {r{0) = 0), in both cases all the demaixl is met by imports.
Tlx' right to produce is warranted to the domestic firm if two conditions hold at 
tlx' sanx' tinx'. lurstly. the import ])rice should Ix' higher than (lx; marginal cost 
paianx'ti'r aixl secondly the firm's setup cost should Ix' sufficiently low so that the 
social welfare obtained when the donx'stic firm su]q)lies some part or tlx; whole of 
tlx' t.otal demand should be higher than the social w(;lfare obtained when all the 
di'rnand is met by imports. 'I'he optimal supply of t.he donx;stic firm when it is 
allow(;d to produce is equal to its supply in the closc'd economy which is iz,,{0)). 
If t lx' import price p,„, is higher than the adjusted cost z„{0) then ( he optimal price
1Ü8
will !)(' p{0) = z,y(0) = min{i)in.Zn{0)} and the lol.al quant,ity dcmianded will be 
P~' {z„{0)) which implies that, all the dc'mand will be met by the domestic firm. 
But. if the import ])rice p„i. it> lower than z,y(0) while' higher t.han d, the oi)timal 
price' will be p{0) = p,n — rni>> {]>m, anel tlie te)tal epiantity elemanded will be
P~^{p„i.) > P~^{~n((^))·, implying that alter the dorne'stic firm sup|)lied an output of 
the; quantity P~Hz„{0)), the excess demand will be' met by imports.
'lb show how the' optimal subsidy varies with 0, we elifferentiate' (24) in the re'gion 
where (?·) = 1 to e)btain
,s'(t;) = </i0){0 -  [PiqiO)) + c,{0)P'{q{0))]) < 0,
sine-e q{0) is nonincreasing and [P{q{0)) + q{0) P'{q{()))] < 0 as she>wn in the proof 
e)f Pie)position 2. 'I’his result implies that the subsiely the firm reeeivers is low if the 
e-e)st parameter 0 is high, and vice' verser
hbiially taking the' derivative of the^  firm’s nel. |)rofits in (25) with reispee:t to 0 
when r = 1
n'iO) =  -r{e)qi0) < 0.
Se). a firm with a low marginal ee)st parameter 0 will e'arn greate'r profit than if il, 
had a high 0.
'I'lie actual social welfare in the open econe)my e ase may be higher than in the 
e le)se'el eH:e)ne)iny e'.ase elue; to twe) edfeicts. Oiiei of the' e'fh'e ts is t he' elevrexrse' in the' 
informational rents of the donuîstic firm due te) the' import threat. hVom (25) it is 
cle'ar t hat if tJie elomestic firm in the e)pen eie:onomy is allowe'el te> produce its e,lose; 
e'e-onomy le've'l of reigulated output q{0), its profits fj'" r{x)q(x)dx. as elepicted by the 
horize)ntally shade'd area in h'igure 5, will be lerss exunpared to the' re^gulatexl profits 
I'll' ee:onorny provieleel p,„ < 0^ . It is ve'i'v intere-sting that
this if'sult holds eveui when p,,,. > p(0) and thus all the' elcmand is nu't, by the' supply 
e)f the ele)ine'stic firm. Since the' informational re'iits e)f tJie firm when allowe'd to 
l)re)eluce is re'elucexl in the open ee-onorny (if p,„, < ()] ). the actual soenal welfare will 
be' higher. The second effect which yields a higher se)cial welfare is the incre;ase in 
t,he' consumers’ surplus due te) an import price below t he closed-e'ceniorny regulated
1 O f )
price z„{0), as shown by the diagonally shaded aix'a in Figure 3.
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4.5 C oncluding remarks
In this paper we characterized the optimal imporl ])olicy in regulating a domestic 
firm with unknown costs. We found that the exislence of the im|)or1, option may 
lead to an increase in the ad.ual social wcdfarci (wc'u wluui the o])t,imal regulatory 
policy implies that all the consumer demand should be supplied by the domestic 
firm. We also showed that the optimal tarifi raised on the imported goods should Ire 
z('i'o while the protection on the domcîstic rnark('l. is provided by (uther the import 
prohibition or the import restriction, 'riiis result is also in accordance with that 
of Bliagwati (1965) who proposed that in a model in which a domestic monopolist 
fac('s competitive foreign suppliers, import restrictions create rnoix' domestic market 
]row('r than tariffs.
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'I'lic results in this study rc'st ui)on the assuiupl.ion that tiu' law of oiu' price' 
holds in the domestic market as the domestically produced and imported good(s) 
are' homogeneous. A natural extension of this stuely is, of e:ourse', to design re;gu- 
late)ry mechanisms when the domestically produceel good is partially or e:e)mpletely 
differentiated from the imported good. .Sağlam (199.5a) provieleel a solution to this 
reigulation problem lor an affinely linear demand Ccise'. As another dimension of open 
ee:e)norny regulatie)ii, Saglarn (1994) also considered the problem of reigulating an ex- 
pe)rting monopolist with unknown costs. This line e)f research which broadens the 
‘iK'W economics of regulation’, initiated by the model of B-M, to international trade 
is called as ‘strategic r<'gulation of international trade'' in the recent study of Laifont
'The lit('ratur('on (,his new research area, though ra|)idly growing, still lacks, how- 
('\’('r. a canonical model of regulation which iniplenK'iils t h('sociall}· ('llicient oul conu's 
in an international context where' the ilonuistic and forc'ign counlric's have both im­
port and export options.
5 Strategic Regulation of International Trade: A  
Case for Protection
i>y
Ismail Sağlam
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5.1 Introduction
Strat('gic trade ])oli< y has been built on the proposition that gov('rnment interven­
tion in th(' t,i'ade policy can incix'ase social welfare of the home country by shifting 
t,h(' oligopoly rc'iits from the forc'ign to the domestic (inns. As tlu' initiators of this 
iK'w sti-and of lit<Tat ur(u BrcUider a.nd Sixuicer (1983. 1985) show that export subsidy 
can !)(' us('d to act as an entry (h'terrcuice to fonugn rival firms. Brander and SptMKX'r 
(1981. 1981) point out that tlu' tariff can be us('d as an effective' tool to ('xtract 
gains from a foreign monopolist, 'riiey also show that the existe'nce of a donu'stic 
competitor in the domestic rnarke't reinforces the case' for a tariff.
'I'lu' results of all tlurse studies rest, on the assumption t.hat in the markets over 
which domestic and foreign firms corn])ete there is a room for supeirnormal profits.' 
The ab.sence of the jaerfect competition in the domestic market justifies the us(; of 
strat(igic trade policy to protect the domestic firms from rival firms. However, the 
donu'stic |)ric(' of the good under the prot('ctionist policies may be still above' the 
socially efficient level.
This papeu' aims to design a mechanism which re'gulates tlu' domestic market 
umh'r incomplete cost, information to attain tlu' socially optimum price's Idr be)th the; 
de)ine'stie· proelueit a.nel the impe)rteel gexad. 'I'lie appre)ae'h simply links the' strate'gie: 
t.iaele' pe)lie-y with the' Bayersian re'gulation the'ory.'·^
Bave'sian re'gulation the'ory was initiateel by the' fameuis study e)f Barean anel .Mye'r- 
sean (1982) (13-iVl). This stuely exansiders the proble'in eaf ix'gulating a natural meanoja-
' Hors(.inan and iVhirkuson (1986) sho\v<Hl l.lnit vvIhuî there is fretî (uitry l^ V firms the strategic  tivide policy  in the  
form of (export subsidi'Ziition is no longer effective,  indtîed it niciy (iven harmful for the  social welfiire.
“ rihs link as a new d imension of regulation was alreiidy mentiomxl in the extensive  s tu d y  of  Laffont (1994) as 
'stra((igi(' i( igulation of  inttu'national trachî’.
oli.sl producing a siııghî good. A |)arainct,cr of the cost, function i.s i)iivately known 
to l.lui (inn while demand is common knowledg('. By the Revelation Princi|)l(' the 
rc'gulator is restricted to policies which ask the firm to liiport its ])rivate cost |)a,ram- 
('t.('r arid which give to the firm no incentive to lie. '['he optimal r('gulatory policy 
which is lound as a (unction o( the regulator’s prior Ix'lief yield a wcdlare loss as the 
optimal |)fice is above the marginal cost unless the consumers’ and tlu' producer’s 
ga,ins are equally weighted. The welfare loss is inevitable as tlu' regulator laces a. 
tradeolF between the informational rents of the firm and the efficicuicy.
'Flu' Ba.yesian approach of B-M is applied to an o[)en economy framework by 
Sağlam ( l99ob). lb' ('xamines the problem of regulating a rnono|)olist which faces 
foreign competitors, and shows that under the assurnpt.ions that the marginal cost is 
privat.i'ly known to tlu' firm and that the domestic product and the imported goods 
arc' not, clifferentiatc'd. the existc'iicc' of the import thrc'at may reduce' the' iid'orrnational 
rc'iil s of the' firm regardless import t.akes place or nol. which raisc's the actual social 
wc'lfarc'. Sağlam (199ob) also shows that due to the informational asymmetry in the 
|)robl('m, a strategic imjiort policy may lea.d to an increase in the consumers’ surplus 
('vc'ii if the import price is above the marginal cost of the domestic firm.
'The motivation for this paper is to extend the analysis of Sa,glarn (1995b) to a 
case where the domestically produced and irnportc'd good(s) arc' not homogeneous 
but. sul)stitutes of each other.'* We preserve' the assumi)tion of Sağlam (1996) that the 
import price of the foreign goods is competitively determined and thus exogenously 
given to the' rc'gulator. The substitution possibility betwc'en the imported and the 
domc'stically f>roduced goods in this study broadens the scope of |)rote'ction in the' 
donu'stie: country. In a. situation where the domestic and the imported goods are not 
elifb're'ntiated the' optimal reigulatory polie:y as a prole'ctionist tool must e'lisure that 
1.İH' domestic e:onsumers buy (he good at the minimum of the import prie:e and the 
re'gulated dome'stic price of t he good. In t hat case, it is inefficient to put a tariff ove'r 
t.he' imports as it will lead to a we'lfare loss. In our framework, wlic're the imported 
and domestic goods are' substitute's, how’ever, it is intuitively cleai· (hat the tariff as 
an o|)timal regulatory instrument may raise the soc ial welfare. It is already knowm 
from the B-M’s monopoly regulation model that the regulated prie:e of the domestic.
’ riKt i)roducl clifrcrcntiatioii ciin be ri.ssiimed to exist  in industries such as m anufacturing industry. .See cilso 
K in g m a n  (1989).
11;{
product, good is incr('a,siiig in the marginal cost of the linn. So 1).\· means of a tariff 
which inversely varies with the marginal cost of tlu' (irm, the regnlator of tlu' home 
country may induce domestic consumers to buy more' of the donu'stic good and h?ss 
of t he imi)ort(xl good if the marginal cost parameter is low, and vic(' verse.
riui pa|)('r is organized as lollows. Section o.2 dc'scrilxis t.he mod('l. d'lu' 0|)timal 
r('gula,tory mechanism is presented in Section .5.3 and analyzed in S<'ction 5 . 1. l-'inally, 
S<'ction 5.5 contains the major results of the paper.
5.2 T he M odel
We consider a. honu' industry in which a single' donu'stic firm produces a single' 
g e e e j e l .  'Fhe' elome'stie' (irm has an aifinely line'ar ex)st fune tion ('{q.O).
( ’{q.O) = j\ + Oq if q > 0 and (2(0,0) = 0, ( 1)
wlie're' q is the e|uantity proelue:eel hy the; elornestie; (irm, K  (> 0) is the setu]) e:ost 
anel 0 is t.he margined e:ost e)f proelucing any positive' epiantity of e)utpnt. K anel the 
(brm e)f t.he; e:e)st function is ce)mme)ri knowle'dge wlu're'as 0 is privately known t.o the' 
firm.'' 'Fhe ex)st parame'ter 0 is kiienvn to lie in the inte'rval [0,<^ i].
'Fhe; elomc'stie·. firm eloe;s ne)t hold t he' full mone)i)e)ly pe)we'r in the' eie)me;stic ma,rket 
as it is faedng ce)mpe'tition freem the' foix'ign firms. We a,ssume that foix'ign (inns 
se'll in the dome'stic market a home)genc;e)us pix)eluct'’ which is l)e)th a. substitute and 
a. stra.te;gie' e e)mple'inent e)f the' ele)me;stically proeluex'el goe)d.*’ d'he e.xport priex; e)f 
the' fe)re;ign product te) the home ex)untry, which we' eh'uote by pj. is assurneel to be 
exempe'titively det,ermine;d in the' foreign market anel givx'ii to the ix'guiator.
'Fhe' elemanel (e)r the dome'stic proeluct a.nd the im|)orteel ge)e>el in the' dome'stic 
marke;t are repre'se'ute;el by the functions C^ dipd· l>,„) aiid (¿„(pd-Pm.]·. re's|)e'et ively. 
wlu'ix' pd is the' marke't price e>f the' elonu'st.ie· good anel is t.he' marke't. priex' e)f t.he'
’ A II lioiigli th(i i(?i>,ulcit.oiy i)oli('y roadily ^.(tiK'ralizos to the case wlntiv' tlif* dom est ic  firm lias nond(Mre,asing marg;inal 
costs oi· t int unknown j)art of tlui ('ost iunction is characlttrized by multi- |)aranieter, wo prtder to ¿ulopt th(i simplified  
vtusion of  B-M 's cost  function as it gives simj^hM’ nisults and also enabhts tint rttader to comparts the riisults with the  
OIK'S obta ined  under the model of B-M.
Mn order to b(i m a th em atica lly  tractable, wo iissume imported  goods are hom ogeneous which m ay be the cas<^  
wIkui consum ers in the  dom est ic  country have imperfect information about  the quality  of  t Ikí foreign goods.
rh(i sub s t i tu t ion  biitween the domesticiilly produced and the imported goods was also assum ed  by Hartigdui 
(1!)!) !) who (examined jnedatory  dum ping  umhu' incom plete  and asymnKMric information.
im ported  good which differs from the export pric(' pj l)v an optim al im port tax. T lu ' 
dc'rnand functions, which are (X)imnon knowledge, aix' of the forms:
Qdipdi Prn) —  (^ d Pd 4" ('dPm 
QmiPd-.Pm)  =  <hn +  l>mPd — Pn
(2)
(••5)
VV(' assume a,i,a,n > 0 and 0 < 6,„ , q  < 1 , that is, the imported and the domestically 
])roduced goods are f)oth normal goods and substitutifs of each ol.luu·; moreover, 
consumers demand more from both goods wfien t.lu're is an (xjual decrease in tfie 
market i)ric(îs of the domestically produced and tin' imported goods. We shall also 
assuiTK.'/ /^ < dm ami < a,i in order to b(' able to chai-actei'ize the opt.irnal regulatory 
UK'chanism.
.\ feasible ix'gulatory policy (X)iisisting of the out(X)ine functions (/;,/. q,{· <lm,
is (h'liiK'd as lollows:
(liven th(' cost re|)ort i9, th(' regulated prices pd{0). p,„(0) and the regulated cpian- 
titii's i/,/(d) , (¡mió) of the domestically produced and the import(>d goods should, 
respectively, satisfy
( J d i O )  =  Q d { P d { 0 ) , P m { 0 ) ) ^
<lm{0) = Qm{pd{0),pm0))·
i^)
(O)
The regulator of the home country levies an ad valorem tariff L{0) on the imported 
goods win'll the domestic firm reports its cost as 0. 'I'lu' tariff rate l\0) is endogenously 
d('t('rmined by:
Pn,{0) = [l+l{0)]Pf ( 6 )
Lastly. s{0) is the subsidy paid to the domestic firm if it rej)orts its costs as 0 .
.\ow let z(d.O) b(' the profit of the domestic fiiin if it misix'pix'sents its <x)st 
paramet('r and re])orts 0 whih' 0 is its cost paranu'ti'r:
= p,i{0)(ld{0] -  Oqd(O) -  l< + 40)·  ( ')
'lb induce the domestic firm to truthful revelation, we should guarantee that
x(0,0) > n{()J)). for all dj)  e [0,di], (8)
I.lial is t,() say, l,lic domestic, (inn must, not 1и' аЫ(' to mal«' a gn'ater profit by 
rnisre|)orting its unknown cost parameter 0 than il could lyy t.ruthbdly rei)orting 
il. Also to ensure that the domestic firm will obtain a nonnegative gain und('r th(' 
regubitory policy, we should have;
7T(tj) = 7r(i^ ,<^ ) > 0, for all e [0,t;,]. (9)
Now consumers’ surplus dou'ived from the donuisl.ic ])roduct good is given by
1*00
V,i{pdi0),p,n(0)) -  Pd(0)(id{0) = /  max{0,Qd(x.p,^{0))} dx, (10)
Jp40)
and similarly consumers’ surplus derived from the imported good is
( 1 1 )V,n{p4(0).PnA0)) -  Pm{0)q,ni0) = / ma.x{(). Q,„{pd0), x ) } dx.Jp,n(0)
d hc' tariff revenue' [p.uiO] — Pi\<lm(0) is re'distribut('d to consunu'i-s. so tlu' lu't con- 
sunu'rs' gain is eh'liiu'il as tlu' sum of the consumeis' surplus derivc'd from bot.h the 
doiiK'stic product and the im|)orted good and the tariff revenue net of the subsidy 
giv('ii to th(' domestic firm. 'I'lu' regulator’s objective is. then, to maximize the social 
w('lfar(' function W{0) whicli is the; sum of the net consunu'rs’ gain anel the domestic 
firm’s profit A
W(0) = /  max{0,Qd{x-P,niO))}dx+ / max{(),Q,u{p<iiO)px)} dx (12) 
Jp,t{0) -'p.nUn
+  [PnAO) -  pj]qm{0) +  Pd{0)qd{0) -  Oqd(O) -  K
A ix'gnlatory policy which satisfiers tfie comlitions (l).(o),(6), (8 ) and (9) is called 
feasible, and if it also maxirnize's ( 12) then it is calk'd optimal.
5.3 O ptim al regulatory policy
P roposition  1 . The irqulaiory poUetj (p.v(i> htj (/.;)-(AV) is fvasibU and maximizes 
lh( social tvelfare. juneUon (Id) among all jeasible ngulaloinj policies:
Pd{0) = hi — Pj) + ( 13 )
' though  the reguhitory iiiechaiiisin rOfichly generalizes to a Biiyesian case when tlie social welfare function
w(Mglis c o n su m ers ’ giiin more heavily  thtin the j^roducer’s gain, we avoifled to do so since Koray and Saglarn (1995a)  
showed tliat when the co n su m ers’ surplus and proilucer’s surplus are no( e(pially weighted a d ishonest  reguhitor may  
m a n iim la ie  his Ixdiefs to the benefit  of eit hei· consum ers or firm if he is offered a ('ertain ¿imount of bribe.
1 1 ()
Pm{0)  =  - -— [a,I +  —P! -  0]
1  ^(I  ^d
<ld{0) =  a,I — Pd{0)  +  ('dpm(O)
^hnd ^) — ('■rn + Ip n P d i^ )  ~  
p,n(o) = [1 + m \ p j
f(h
s{0) -  OqdiO) +  K -  pd(0)(ld{0) + / q.i(x)dx
JO
do)
(H))
(17)
(18)
(11)
Proof. Wo will first clu'ck the regulatory policy is leasibh;. Conditions (4), (o) and 
(G) are obviously satisli('d. do show (9) holds we insert (18) into 7r(d) = PdiO)qd(O) — 
C{(liO)J)) + .siO) to obl.ain 
HP
7r(d) = /  q , i i x ) d x > Q .  (19)
Jo
'I'liiis the optimal regulatory policy is individually rational. 'Fo clu'ck that (8) is also 
sat is lied, note that
T^ iOJ)) -  T^ {0,0) = /  qd{j)d-r· +  {0 -  0)qd{0) = /  [qdix] ~ qd{0)]dx. (20)
Jo JO
To show 7r{d,0) — tt{0.0) < 0. \/dj) G [Odd] simply r('(luces to |>rove that qd(0) is 
noninc.reasing in 0. Differentiating (13) with r('sp(',ct 1o 0 we obtain
p'diO) -
since 0 < h,n 
yic'lds
hi
>  0 . (21)
So pdiO) is increasing in 0. I)ifI’er(Mitiating (14) wil.h respect, l,o 0
p'JO) = 1 -  e'
( 22 )
1. So (li'creasiiig in 0. Now using (lo). (2 1 ) and (22) vv('sinc(' 0 < (·,{ 
ol)t ain
which shows that qd{0) is nonincreasing in 0. 'Fhus (8) is satisfied, and the regulatory 
|)olicy (l!f)-(18) is feasible.
lo dicck tha.(, the regulatory ])oliey is also optimal, we (lifh'ixuitiate ( 12) with 
res])ect to pdiO) and p,n{0) to obtain
0
Pm{0)
max{(),Q„,{pd(0),x)}(lx
- [ P m i O )  -  P f ] -
OfimiO)
dp,i(0) ’
[pAO) -  o\-
dqAO) ()
dpmiO) PpmiO)
/*"X)
/  rnax{{),QAxpp„AO))}dx
Jp,l(0)
[PmiO) -  Pj] P<lmiO)
d p j o y
Now using
PqAO) ()q,i{0)
OpAO) ’ dpJO)
P(l,niO) _  . O(im(0)
PpAO) Op,AO)
— — 1 and
0
Of
)
inax{Qrn{pAO),x)}dx = Tx /  (¿n{pA0),x)dx
P,n(0) O P d \ U )
= l>,n<lni{0),
i )  O rUlA-(dPm(0)
— —  / max{Q,i{x.p,„{()))](lx = - — ^  /  Q,i{x.p,A0))dx
ffju Vn Ji,,,(()) 0pm{0) .1 p^i[0)
= ('-{(¡AO)
wc obtain (13) and ( 1 1 ). I'lnally, to clu'ck (18) is o|)timal, wc us(' the env('loi)e 
th(H)i-(un to obtain Tr'{0) = -r/,/((l) lor almost all 0 G [Odd]· lnl,('graling them yidds 
7r(d) = I'll' (i,i(x)dx. which togdlu'r with (7) imply (18). So. I.lu' ix'gulatory poliey
( l 3)-(bS) maximiz('s tlu' social wdlaix' among all ieasibh' rc'gnlatorv policic's. (J.K.I).
5.4 A nalysis o f the O ptim al R egulatory P olicy
VV(' have already shown in th(i proof of the Proposition 1 that the price of the 
domestic product p,i{0) is inciaursing in 0, while its (|uantity (jAO) is decreasing in 
0. W(' also found that I,he doim'stic price of l.lu' import(id good p,A0) is decieasing
1 18
ill 0. Now IVoiT) (17). it follows that tlu.' o])tiina.l tarilf rate i{0) is drcn'asing in 0. 
.VIoreover, using (2 1),(i^2) and differentiating (16) wit h respect to 0 we oht,ain
<tn(^^) = Pd(O) -  p,J0) > 0. (2d)
'I'hus q,n{0) is increasing in 0.
It, may seem counterintuitive that the optimal regulatory policy suggests to reduce 
the tariff over tlu' imported good whenever the domestic firm has high marginal costs 
since high tariff rates imply a high level of rent shifting from the foreign firms to 
tfu' domestic firm, lb  understand why this is o[)timal. observe wlnui the marginal 
cost of tfu' domestic firm increases, the (juantity of l.lu' domestic product di'creasc's 
İH'iıce both the informational rents of the domestic producer and I Ik' surplus of the 
donu'stic consuiiK'rs d('riv('d from the domestic good decrease. .Now at. low h'vels 
of production of th(' domestic good, the increase in I h(' consunu'i s' surplus d('riv(»d 
from th(' im[)orted good dm' to a fall in the markc't price' of llu' importe'd good 
offsets the sum of the re'sulting decrease in the consunu'rs’ surplus derived from the 
doiiH'stic good and informational rents of the donu'stic firm, theix'fore it is optimal 
t,o reduce the tariff rate accordingly. Conversely, it is efficient to increase th<' tariff 
rate when the marginal cost i)arameter of the firm is low, which will in effect, raise 
the informational rents of the domestic firm and th(' consumers’ gain.
We will now s(îe how the o|)timal regulatory policy change wit,h the degree of 
siibst.itution between tlie dorru'stically produced and the imported goods.
Corollary 1. Assume Cd inereas( s (decreases). I'lx v under the opiimal requlalory 
policy (ld)-(IS):
(i.) The price of Ike dorneslie yood stays eonsLant while Us quanHiy increases (de- 
en ases),
(u) the domestie pne< of tlx imported yood inen asis (d(creases) trhih. its quantity 
d((T( (ises (increases),
(ill) the tar iff rate inereasis (decreases), and
(iv) the profit of the domestie producer increases (decreases).
Proof. Differentiating (13) and (14) with respect to c,/ yi
OpdiO)
()cd
0. (25)
Ilf)
()pn,\0) i + (-4 (a, -  0) + iC,!
Oc.i ( 1 -^•,1 )·'
and (liifo'rentiating (lo) and (16) w(' obtain
0<UO) . Op„A0)^.= p,n[0) + Q -------  > 0,
P; >  0: (•26)
àcd
d(j,n{0) àpmiO)
dc,i
< 0,
(•27)
(28)dc.i dc,i
using (2o) and (26). So (i) and (ii) are satisfied, (iii) simply follows from (17) and 
(26). Finally (19) and (27) im|)ly (iv). Q.K.l).
Xolx' that r,/ r('|)r('s('nts tlu' responsiveness of tlu' (|uantity demanded of tlu; do­
mestic good to th(' pric(> of th(' imported good. 'Flu' ('(|uat ion ( F5) i('\-eals that a high 
v;d)i(' of c,/ results iu a liigher h'vcd of import demand ('\'('ii when therci is no incixursc' 
in t h(' domestic price' of t he imported good. In otlu'r words, the co('ilici('nt c,/ can Ix' 
thought of a measure of (oiK'-dircictioiial) substitution In'tween the imported good 
ami the domestic ])roduct. Now what the Corollary 1 sugge'sts is that as the degree of 
substitution increases the domestic country protects tlu' domestic (inn more heavily, 
which h'ads to a welfare gain for the domestic firm. .Now let us also analyze tlu' 
policy implications of a change' in the responsivem'ss of the import demand to tlu' 
|)i ic(' of the domestic good.
C orollary  2 . Assume b„, increases (decreases). l'h(H under the optimal repnlatory 
polieij ( ld)-( 18):
(i) The pi'iee oj the domestic pood increases (decreases) while its (juantily decreases 
(inere'.eises).
(ii) the. elermestie price of the imported yood stays eonsternt while· its eiaeinUty in- 
e'n else s (ele ernise s).
(iii) the tern.jj rede stays eon.stan.1. and
(iv) the profit e)f the elomestic proeluce r eleiereeises (increeises).
Proof. Differentiating (13) and (M) with respect to />„, yields 
dpÀO) 2lr
i)h„
Pd{0)  +
-  hi ■{dm - P f ) > i ) ,
(•29)
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OPmiO)
Ob,n
=  0;
a,ml (liifereii1.ia.ting (lo) and (16) \vc- obtain
OqdiO) _
Ohuj
OqJO)
0.
( 60 )
(31)
= Pcz(d) +/>„, > 0,
from (29) and (30). So (i) and (ii) are .satisfied, (iii) follows from (17) and (OO). 
Finally (19) and (31) imply (iv). Q.l·;.l).
( ’oi'ollary 2 states that the oi)t.imal protection is independent from the rz'spon- 
si\'('iiess of the impoi t demand to th(' i)riee of the domestic good, d'he net gain of 
t.h(' doiiKistic ])rodnc('r is. however, inversely related to
C orollary  3. Assume the export price of the foreign good, pj, increases (decreases). 
Then under the optimal regulatory policy (ld)-(18):
(i) The price of the domestic good decreases (increases) while its quantity increases 
(decreases),
(ii) the domestic price of the imported good increases (decreases) while its quantity 
decreases (increases).
(iii) the tariff rate decreases (increases), and
(iv) the profit of the domestic producer increases (decreases).
Proof. Differentia,ting (13) and (11) with resp(!ct to pj we obtain
PdfO) b„
()pf
Op,JO)
hi
< 0 .
0;
Opf I -  ('d
and dilferi'ntiating (lo) and (16) yields
(33)
(34)
bOq,l{0)
Opf 1 -  bi
Oq,n{0) _____
Opf -  bl — (
^ < 0. (36)
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'I'lius. (i) and (ii) are saiisiied. 'Го show (iii) holds. w(' (ШГогеп1ла1с l{0) = [pmiO)/p/] — 
1 with res[)cct, to pj to obl.ain
()L{0) 1 ()p,n{0) рш{0) (■¿(‘■d-O)
< 0.()pf Pf dpj pj pj{l ~ cj)
using (14) and (dd). 'Thus (iii) is satisfied. Finally (19) and (ЗГ)) imply (iv). Q.IvD·
Го get a moi4i intuitive understanding of this result., observe that when the (ixport 
price' of the foreign good to the home country dox:reases (due to a technological ini- 
provenu'nl., for ('xarnple), the imported good at tlu' ('xisting protection rate Ik 'c o u u 's 
relalivi'ly ch(ia[)('r w.r.t. the domestic product, thus tlu' demand for the domestic 
[»•oduct d('creas('s. In (dfect, tln'ic' would be a re-nt shifting from tlu' domestic firm to 
its fore'ign rival(s). By increasing the optimal tariff rate on the imported good in a 
way which will ])arlially absorb the' reduction in tlu' ('xport ])rice of I ,he foreign good. 
t,h(' r('gulator will modc'rate tlu' losses of the domestic firm while still guarante('ing a 
high h'vel of gain to tlu' domestic consumers.
C orollary  4. Assume that I he demand for the [on ifjn good increases (decreases) 
((lualltj at. all price levels of the domeslie and the foreign goods. Then under the 
optimal regulatory policy ( I■'))-( 18):
(i) The price of the domestic good increases (decreases) while its (¡uantity decreases 
(increases).
(ii) the domestic price of the imported good, stags constant while its (¡uantitg in- 
er iases (decreases),
(iii) the tariff rate stays constant, and
(ir) the profit of the domestic prodtieer decreases (increases).
Proof. .Note that the d('niand for the forc'ign good incr('as('s (deci4'as('s) ('(pially at, all 
pric(' h'vels of t.lu' domestic and foix'ign goods if and only if a,„ incix'asi's (d('cr('as(is). 
Tin'll differentiating (13) and (11) yi('lds
()p,i(0) 1),
<)a,n
(IPmjO)
()a,„
-  ITm.
> 0,
= 0.
(38)
(39)
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Now using (1 о)Д 16),(;}8) and (·'}')) vv(' obtain
Oqd{0) !),,
( ) ( l  ,n
0(1,niO)
Ocijn
-  i>i
< 0.
1 -  Ы
> 0.
So (i) and (ii) holds, (iii) follows from (17) and (3f 
and (40).
(41)
dually (iv) is implied by (19)
Q.lvl).
(10)
Corollary 5. iJiat Lhc demand for the domestic (jood inn-eases (decreases)
equallij at all price levds oj the domestic and the forcipn goods. Then under the 
optimal ngulatory policg ( l6)-(23):
(i) The price of the domestic good stags constant while its quantitg increases (de­
creases),
(ii) the domestic price of the imported, good increasi.s (decreases) while its quantitg 
decreases (increases),
ill) till tariff rate increases (decreases),
(ir) the profit of the domestic producer increases (tl< creases).
Proof. .Note I,hat, ilu' demand for t.h<! domestic good increases (decreases) (i(|nally 
at all price levels of the domestic and the foreign goods if and oidy if a,i increases 
(decreases). I'hen differentiating (13) and (14) we obtain
=  0,
Oa.i
0p,n[0) Cd 0 .
Odd 1 — eg
.Now using (15).(!()).( 12) and (43) yi(4ds
O(id{0) 1
(43)
Odd
0(j,n{0)
> 0,
— c I
Cd
7 < 0 ·
(44)
(4o)
Odd 1 -  ('d
So (i) a,ml (ii) holds. From (17) a.nd (43), (iii) follows. I'dnally, (19) and (44) imply 
(iv). Q.lNl).
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( ’огоПагу 1 shows l.lial, a |)osil,iv(' (h'inand shock Гог tlu' import<'d good ]('ads t.o 
a change in the 0|)tiinal roîgnlat.ory |)olicy which will shill sonu' pai'1, of llu' irdor- 
malional rents o( the domestic firm to th(' ioreign lirm and the donu'slic consumers. 
Oppositely, ('orollary о states that a, positivi^ (hnnand shock for IIk' domestic prod­
uct implies a higher levc'l ol proUîction which will shift some part of the rents of tfie 
foi('ign firm to the domestic consumers and the donu'stic producer.
5.5 D iscussions
In t.liis artick' we hav(' suggcisted an optimal mechanism which rc'gidates a domestic 
firm with unknown costs facing competition from foreign firms. VVe assumed that 
tlu' importi'd good is a substitute of the domestic pioduct. 'I'he optimal regulatory 
|)oli( у consist s of t.he donu^stic pric(' regulation su|)pk'm('nted by a domestic subsidy 
and an import tax. .Sonu'of our major findings are summarized as follows:
riie ix'gulatory policy we devised is incentive compatible and Kurds to t.lu' iirst- 
Ik 's I social o|)timurn. 'The only informational |)aram('t('r in tlu' nu'chanism is tlu' 
uppc'r bound of the interval which coniines the cost |)ara.meter of the domestic firm. 
'Г1к' up])er bound of the cost helps to determine tlu' distribution of the total surplus 
in tJi(' ('conomy betw(4'ii the doimsstic firm and consumers. So, it is to the Ixmelits 
of consumers that tlu  ^ regulator kurnis more about th(' uidaiown cost and tlius its 
u])p('r bound.
I'lu' price of the domestic good is increasing in tin' cost, realizat.ion ol the domestic 
firm, as ('xpect.ed. VVe found that the optimal tax (tariff) rate on th(' imports invx'rsely 
vaiic's with t,h(' cost parameter of tlu' doimrstic firm. VVlumevcT the domestic firm's 
marginal cost is low, the optimal tariff is high a.nd t Ik' ( piantity of t lu' imports is low, 
which protc'cts 1h(' donu'stic produc('r from the compc'tilion of tin' foreign ('xportc'r 
while 14'ducing Wi'alth shift from the home country to abroad. ()p|>osit,('ly. whenever 
tlu' donu'stic firm's marginal cost is high, tlu' optimal tariff is low and tlu' (piantity 
of t h(' im])ort s is high, which protc'cts the consumers from tlu' iiu'lficient technology 
of tiu' domestic |)roduc('r.
The |)rice of the domoîstic product differs from t he marginal cost of tlu; firm as 
t.lu' domestic good and the im|)orted good are substitutes of eacli other. VV(; showed 
that the (k;gree and direction of substitution has diffeix'iit policy implications. y\s tlu' 
(K'maıul for the donu'stic product lu'conu's more; r('S|)onsive to tlu' itnport ])ric(;. tlu;
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opt.iinal protection incrc'ases which shifts tlie oligo|)oly rcnits of th(' foreign iirrn to 
th(' domestic consumers and tlxi domestic prodncx'r. As tlu' demand for the imported 
good becomes more responsive to the price of th(' donu'stic product, however, the 
existing protection lev(d remains to Ik; optimal while' the irdbrmational rents of the 
domestic producer decr<;ases.
Another finding is that whenever a technological im])rovement rcxluces the export 
price' of the foie'ign good to l.he domestic market., the demand lor the domestic 
proelued, decreases, and thus tlie? domestic firm obtains lowen' profits. 'I'he increase in 
the' e)ptimal tariff rate will pa.rtia,lly absorb the lall in the import |)ric('s which will 
nuKlen-ate the losses of the dome'stic firm.
Onr last two findings are re'lated to the policy implieations of a demand shock 
Idr e'ither t.he impe)rte;d good or the domestic product. positive demand shock for 
imported good cause's no change in the' e)ptimal level of protection or the dome'stic 
prie ei of the imported good while it brings about a re'duction in t he ejuantity of the 
importexl good, and a rise in the price of the doiru'stie· product. .Also the domestic 
|)ie)duc('rfs profit decreas(-;s as the optimal output e>f the dornestie· product falls. A 
|)e)sitiv(' demanel shock for the' domestic good, howe've'r. h'ads t,o an increases in the 
e)|)t.imal tariff rate and also in the dome'stic price of the' imported good while it has 
lu) e'ffect on the price of the elome'stic good. The domeestic firm’s profit increases as 
the' optimal output of the domeistic good increases.
huture research might profit,ably ('xarnine the opt imal e:l('sigii of a regulatory policy 
for an o|)en (K'.onomy case whe're' the domestic firm who faces foreign compel,ition, 
se'lls its |)roduct not only in the' eloiiu'stic market but. alse) in a. lore'ign marked,.
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6.1 Introduction
In their famous paper, Baron and Myerson (1982) (B-M) consider the problem of 
rcîgulating a monopolistic firm with unknown costs. 'The demand and the form of 
th(' cost function in tlu'ir framework arc; common knowledge while' a cost paramc'tc'r 
is |)rivately known to the firm. The regulator is a,ssumed to have commonly known 
])i ior l)('lic;fs about the uidiiiown cost pararnetei·. By the Revelation Principle', B-M 
re'strie-.t t.he'inselves w.l.o.g. to elire;ct lovelation me'chanisrns in whic h the firm is asked 
to rc'port its e;ost. Sinex; the firm may rnisreport its |)rivate information whenevc'r this 
is to its advantage, B-M design an incentive compatible mechanism. The optimal 
rc'gulatory mechanism consists of the optimal pricx', 1 he optimal quantity, the oi)timal 
])robabiIity that the firm will produce and the optimal subsidy whie;h all depend on 
the rc'gulator’s prior belief about the unknown c ost, parametc'r unlc'ss cxuisurners' and 
produex;r’s gains are eepially wc'ighted in the; soc ial wc'llare iunction.
Even though it is admitted that there is no altc'rnative; mechanism which elomi- 
natc's the B-M mechanism from the viewpoint of the society, the Bayc'sian ap|ux)ach 
of the; B-M has bee;n criticized by many e;conomists, including Vogelsang (1988), 
Kora.y and Se;rtel (1989) and Koray and Sağlam (1995a). The gc'nc'ral objection has 
bc'c'n I'aiseel against t he; a.ssum]Mion that in the B-M model the regulator’s prior be;lie;f 
is e-ommon knowledge. As Vogc'lsang (1988) stated, a dishonest rc'gulator may niis- 
rc'prc'sent his beliefs wlie'never t his is to his advantage' since the re;gulator’s be;liefs are 
not observable. Recently, Koray and Sağlam ( 1995a) show how a dishonest re;gulator 
can manipidate his beliefs to the benefits of the consumc;rs or the re;gulated firm il he 
is offered a certain amount of bribe. I'hey also prove that the Bayesian regulatory 
mc'chanisms are; path dependent,. 'I’lierefore, “more; information” about the ])rivate 
cost parameter of the; rc'gulated firm is not always ele;sirable for the; soe;iety.
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The room i'or the existence ol corruption in Hayc'sian regulatory mechanisms is 
partially due to the lack oí a complex hierarchical relationship in those mechanisms. 
'Plie B-M mechanism involves a r(;gulator (who acts on l)ehalf of the society) and 
a regulated (firm) hence represents a hierarchy with t.wo levels. 'There exists no 
ag(uicy or administrator above' the regulator in tiie B-M model who is abh' to check 
whetlier the regulator colludes with either consumers or the; firm to t heir se'lf inte'iests. 
Tiróle (1986), De'inski and Sappington (1987) and Lailont (1990) pr<;sented models 
of higher level hierarchies compared to the B-M mod<9. Tiróle (1986) showed tluit 
t,h(' likelihood of the collusion between t.he firm and the regulator can be decix'ased 
by including an executives to the top of the hierarchy who will changes the' regulate)!· 
resgularly.
As already eliseusse'd by Baron (1989), another hie'iarehiesal relationship in resgu- 
lation models is that an agene-y itiay re'gulate' a firm whose e)wners must, formulât,(' a 
contra.ct, te) motiva,t(' managers to serve their intere'sts. The' B-M moeh'l e)f re'gulation 
as a two-h'vel hierarchical reslatie)nship does not dist inguish betwe'c'n the owiu'r and 
the manager e>f the monopolistic firm. In other saying, the B-M model implicitly 
assumes that the owner and the manager of the regulatesel firm have' the same' kind 
of objective, which is simply the profit maximization, and that tlie' esost is known to 
be)th the owner and thes rnanagesr of the firm. Howevei·. in the real life the manager’s 
objesestives doess not nescsesssarily coinciele' with tliat of the' eswnesr. In ge'iiesral, t.he' man- 
a.ge'r’s e)l)jesetives funestie)n can be' mesele'h'el as an ino’e'asing lunctie)ii e)l the' vve'ighteel 
sum e)f thes te)tal sales and the' net profits whe're'as the' e)bje'e'tive fnne't,ie)n e)l the· e)wne'r 
is t he' nest, jsrofits in me)st of the' esase's. Me)re'e)ver. the manager may be be'ttesr informe'd 
abeent cessts than thes eswner of the firm since the latte'r may not elire'estly monitor all 
1,he ae tions of thes firm. I'nele'r tinsse ce)iisideratie)ns. of e:e)urse. the' B-M mese'hanism 
is no lesnger optimal. A manager who is asked to repesrt the private' ee)st paratneter 
may not do so sinese' the B-M mechanism is eh'signe'el te) be incesnti\’e'-ese)mpatible' e)uly 
lor those managers whe)se obje'e-t.ives are to maximize' pre)fits.
'The' aim of this ])ai)er is the'ii te) extend the B-.M me)desl of me)ne)pe)ly re'gulation 
t.o a t.hrese-level hierarchy by inese)rpora,ting the manage'!· of the !e'gulateel firm inte) 
the' ITM model. 'The regulatory niechanisrn is designed to be ineesnf.ive-cornpatible 
lor the' manager who is Iretter informed than the owner of the firu!. 'I'he analysis ol 
t he' e)ptimal regulatory policy shows that the difference betwesen the' objectivess e)f thes
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inaiiag(M· and the owner of tlu' regulated firm leads lo irndfirient social ontcomes and 
low hivels of managerial gain.
riie outline of the paper is as follows: Section ().2 introduces the model vvdiich 
borrows from I^aron and Myerson (1982). 'I'lie optimal regulatory policy is ])i'('S('nted 
and analyzed in Section 6.3. ('oncluding remarks art' made in Sect ion 6. 1.
6.2 M odel
VVe consider a monopolistic, firm with cost function C(q,0): 
C { q , 0 )  = K + Oq if (■/ > 0 and 6’(0,d) = 0, ( 1 )
wlu're (f is the quantity produced, K is the setup cost and 0 is tlu' margina.1 cost of 
producing any positive amount, of output. It is assunu'd that 0 is i)rivately known 
to th(' manager of the firm, while K and the form of the cost pa,ram(d,er is common 
knowk'clge. 'I'he regulator has common knowledge over t.lu' density funct.ion f{0) 
which is posit,ive ov('r the intc'rval [fA),f^ i] a,nd has a cumulative distribution bind,ion
I'iO).
'The regulator’s problem is t,o design a regulatory nu'chanism as a function of the 
cost ix'port of the manager of the monopolistic firm. By the riwelation principle 
[Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) and Myerson (1979)] wv restrict ourselves 
to regulatory policies which give the manager of the firm no incentive to li<'. A 
feasible ri’gidatory policy consisting of four outcoiiK' functions (/;,(/, /■, .s) is, then, 
(h'fiiK'd as follows:
h'or any 0 in r(0) is the i)robability that tlu' firm will produce after nqiort-
ing 0 as its < ()st parameter. As a probability, r(d) satisfic's
0 < r{0) < 1.
Th(' inv('rs(' (h'lnand function (denoto'd by P(.) > 0) is common knowhxlgc'. VVe 
furtİK'r assume that P'{.)· < 0· Provided that tlu' firm is p('nnitted to ojK'rat.e.
I){0) (the regulated |)rice) and q(0) (the regulated oiitjiiit) should satisfy
,>(()) ^F{q{0)) ,
pUh^iiO) > 0. (4)
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TİK' t.otal value V {(}[0)) of an oıılput of (juaııtit y (¡[0] t.o consunun's is v(r/(ö)) = 
P(x)dx, and hence 1,he consnıners' surplus is V {<ı(0)) — I^{q{0))q(Ö).
Lastly, s{0) is the subsidy ))aid to the firın when the manager of that firm reports 
Ô. (hv(!n the outcome functions {p{0),q{0)^r{())^s{0)'). the firm’s profit is 7r(d,d) if 
t,h(' manager of tlui firm reirorts tin; cost paramet('r as 0 whih' 0 is t,h(' f.nu' cost. 
[)ara.meter:
n{()J)) = [piÔ)q(Ô) -  OqiÔ) -  K]r{()) + s(Ô) (b)
VVe assuriKi that the salary of the manager is in the following form:' 
ai + aiüiÔJ)). n\ > 0, «2 > 0,
wh(U'e 11(0,0) is tfie weighted sum of the sales S{0) = p(())q{0)r{0) and the profit of 
t h ( ’ f i r m 7r(d, 0)
= p{0)q{0)r(0) -  ( 1 -  7) [0q{0) +  l<]r(0) + s{0),
with the wodght 7 e [0,1]. Obviously, maximizing a.\ +0.211(0.0) and 11(0.0) is 
ecpiivalent when the control vai'iable is q(0). So, hei'eafter we shall speak as if the 
manager’s objective function is ¡1(0,0). In order to ('nsur(' that tlu' manager reports 
th(' I ru(i cost parametei’ 0, th(' manager’s objective lunct ion shoidd satisly
H(0) = R(0,0) = max R(().0) for all 0 in [0o,d,j. (7)
Lurtherrnore. the regulator has to guarantex' that tlu' manager's objective will b(' 
nomu'gal.ivx' lor all 0 in [do?f^ i]·
R(0) > 0 for all 0 in [0o,0^ (■S)
A regulatory policy is said to be fca.si.bL· if it satisfies (2), (2). ( I), (7) and (8) 
for all 0 G [d(),fA]· -^ 'ow. the goal of the ix'gulator is to find a h'asible policy that 
maximizes the ex])ect.ed social wellai'e 14"  :
14"· =  r  ([V (q(0)) -  p(0)q(0)]r(0)  -  ,h(0)) f ( 0 ) d 0  +  a  f '  7r{0).r{0)d0 (!))
n.. JOnOo
’ .’list), D'Asprernont. and ( ¡(M’ard-Varnt. (1980) and B asu (1995).
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Tlic expected social vvellare fiinctioii W  is the sum of the expectc'd consumers’ net 
gain (consumers’ surplus net ol the expected subsidy given to the firm) and a fraction 
(cv) of the expected profit of the firm, a E [0, 1] is t,h(^  relative wcnght the regulator 
assigns to the expected consumers and the producc'r's gains.
Regulator
Consimu'rs
Diagram 1. l)ir(x:t Revc'lation Mechanism in Three-level Hierarchy
In tJie above diagram, we summarize the regula!,oi‘y mechanism in our three-level 
hi(u-archiccil relationship. The top level of tfie hierarchy is the regulator, the middle 
l(^ v('l is the manager of the firm wliile the lowest lev('l consists of (“onsurners and tlu' 
owner of the firm. The rcîgulator announces the regulatory scheduh' (p,i/,r,.s) both to 
th(' firm (owner+manager) and consumers. Since t.lu' rc'gulatory policy is (hisigned 
1,0 !)(' inc('ntiv('-com|)at,ible, the manager truthfully rc'ports the cost parameter 0, and 
t,h(' outcome {i){0),q{0), r(0),s(0)) is d('t(U'mined. Tlu' consumers pay, then, s{0) to 
t,h(' owner, and the owner of the firm pays d] + (I2IIÍO) to the manager.
6.3 T he optim al policy
P roposition . Assume 1 /(3 - 2 o )  < 7 < 1 /(2 - o ) .  If F(0)/f{0) is noiid<rrrasm</ 
IIkii. I.Ik: followiiuj mjiilalory policy. (!())-(Id), is [(asihlc and nui.rimizcs (9) amony 
all fca.sil)lc rcyulatory policies:
P{qiO)) = hz,,{0) + (1 -  h)P'iqiO))qiO) (10)
-aiO — 0 A- — <y)
m
.f{0)
and /;, = ( 1 —7( 1 -
1 - 7
- I
1 3 0
p { 0 )  =  P { q { 0 ) )
r{0) =
1 if V { q { e ) )  -  K  -  z,,{0)q{0) > -!i^pi0)q{0) 
Ü otherwise
4 0 ) = [  7Hx)q{x)dx + [l< + 0q{0) -  — —^ pi0)q{0)]r{0)
Jo  1 - 7
( 12)
( 1 2 )
Proof. I'^rst we will show that the regulatory policy is feasible. Conditions (2) and 
(2) ar(' obviously satisfied. 'I’o cheek (8), substitute (13) into (6) to obtain
li{0) z= ¡{(OJ)) = (1 -  7 ) / r{x)q{x)dx,
0i
(14)
JO
which is nonnegative, thus (8) is satisfied, 'lb check condition (7). note l.hat
mô,o) -  Hio.o) -  (1 -  0)q(0))i0) + (i
Jo
)q{x)(l.x. (1.·))
= ( I - 7 ) /  [r{x)q{x) -  q{Ô)r{Ô)]dx.
'Po prove IliOJ)) -  R{0,0) < 0, it is sufficient to show that ı■{0)q{0) is nonincreasing 
in 0. Diflbrentiating (10) in the range where r{0) ~  1 we obtain
P'{q{0))q '{0) = hz'JO) + (1 -  h)[r"{q{0))q(0) + P'{q{0))]q '{0), 
and r('arrangiiig yields
q '{0)[hP'iqi0)) -  (1 -  k)P4qi0))q{0)] = /,y(d).
.\ot(i the assumption that 1/(3 — 2fv) < 7  < 1/(2 — o) iinplicis li > 2. 'lbg(3,her with 
tlu' assumptions P'{.)4^"(·) < 0 and that l''i0)fj{0) is nondecrc'asing. it follows 
that (¡(0) is nonincreasing (and lu'nce p{0) is nomh'cix'asing). 'lb show r{0) is also 
nonincix'asing, \vc (h'liote tlu’ intc'grand in (21) at tlu' optimal policy by V{0) = 
V{q{0)) — K — z„{0)q{0) + [(/' — 4 / 0]p{0)q{0) and tak(' t,h(' d('rivat,iv(> w.r.t.. 0 t,o 
obt ain
^  ~ { i p m )  + i m - i w ,  n«)
= í/'(tf)(/¡ -  l ) ( 2 :^ „(tf) -  P'(q{0))(j{0) + P j P - r
|:)l
Using 1,li(i result, that. q[()) is noniiicrc'asing and h. > 2. it follows lliat, l'(d) is nonin- 
cn'asiiig. So r{0) is nonincreasing, and thus r{0)(j(0) is nonincreasing which (urllu'r 
implies that R{0,0) — ll{0,0) < 0, therefore (7) holds, hdiially, tlu' oi)tiinality condi­
tion ( 10) and the fact that h > 2 guarantees that tlui leasibility condil.ion (d) is also 
sat isiied.
Now, let us show that the regulatory policy is optimal. Using tlu' trick of Mirrlees 
(1971) a,nd the (uivelope theorem yields R'{0) = —r{0)q{0). Integra,ting implies
h>{()) = (1 - 7 ) / r{x)q(x)dx + Il{()^). (17)
JO
H(0\) can be set as zero to the benelit of consumers, and we obtain (14). Using (0), 
(7 ) and (17) yi(dds (l.'l), and from (b) we obtain
,s(d) = 7T(d) + [K -b 0q{0) -  p{0)q{0)]r{0). 
.Now lh(' ('.x|)ect(xl valiu! of (17) bi'comes
'hi
0\ r'h , f0\
ll{0)f[f))d{0) = / ( 1 - 7 ) /  r(x)q{x)dx)fiO)d
Joo  ^ JO
= ( 1 - 7 )  i '  r(x)q{x) I  ' f(0)d0dx,
J 0() J 0{)
=  (1 -  7 ) /  r { x ) q ( x ) l ' ' { - ‘ - )dx·
Joo
Using (19) and n(0) = li{0) — [7/(1 — j)]p{0)q{0)r{0) yields
(18)
(19)
»0 , fOl
n{0)f{0)d0= /  [q(0)j-j^
J0„ JOn -  7
-l>{0)q{0)]r{0)f{0)d(). m )
and substit.ut.ing (18) and (20) into (9) we obtain
'' \V{q(0))  -  K -  OqiO) -  (1 -  o ) ' ^ q { 0 )
JOo fiO)
( 21)
ri0)f(0)d0.
Differentiating (21) then w.r.t. q{0) yields (10). I'diially. we choos(' r{0) to ensure (i) 
th(' inti'grand in the (2 1 ) is nonnegative. Q.b.I).
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Corollary. Under the rejjulalory policy ( ! ( ) ) - ( Id), (he lower the relative weight (-,) 
oj the sales in the manager objective fiuict ion is:
(i) The lower is the price and hence the higher is the (luantitg o f  the good to be 
pivduced,
(ii) the higher is the manager 's  salary,
( i l l )  the higher is the expected social welfare.
Proof. To chock (i), wc diifcroMitiate ( 10) w.r.t. 7  to obtain
/"(,,(»)),,(») = L.z.AO) -  + n  -  i‘)iP"(<iunh(o)
/ , / ■ ' ( , , ( « ) )  -  ( I  - / , ! / > " ( , , ( » ) ) , ( 0 ) 1 , , , ( 0 )  =  l,.,[zjl)) -  / " ( < / ( t f ) ) < / ( » ) |
vvliidi implii's q^ fiO) < 0 since > 0. So (i) is salislic'd. 'I'o show (iii) liolds. w’c 
ol)S('i '\’(' l.hal,
= ,,(«)(/. -  i ) ( 2-„(») -  Р ' Ш Ы » )  + < 0.
I'licrcforc, (iii) is satisfied. Now. (1\'(0)1(Г/ < 0 irnplic's that r{0) is nonincrcasing in 
7 · ( sing t,hc result in (i), w(' tlnni eonelude that R{0) is nonincn'asing in 7 , so (ii) 
is also sa,tish('d. (J.K.I).
6.4 C oncluding remarks
;\n implication of the model is that under the r('gulatory policy it is optimal for 
th(' manager to b(' |)aid a, salary in tlu' form of 0,1 + (i.2'k{0). i.('.. l-o ha.v(! tlu’ same 
ol> j(4’tive as I he owiu'r ol I lu' firm. .Although t h(' gain of t h(' firm’s owner (h'rivc'd from 
s('1ting 7 to zero in the manag('r s salary lunction is not obvious, it is eh'ar that wluni 
7 = 0 th(' mechanism becomes individually rational not only for tlu' manager but also 
for lh(' owner of tfu’ firm, no ma,tt('r the form of tlu' inverse demand curve and the 
prior Ix'liefs of the regulator. So, under situations where demand is privately known 
t,o eonsununs or where tlui prior Ix'liefs of tfx; laigulator about cost (or dcunand) aixi 
mx)bs('rvabl(i by the society, a risk-averse owner might prefer to s('t 7 = 0 in the
I.W
manager’s salary t.o increase 1.1k; likelihood that, t.he n'gnlatory policy will guarantee 
nonnegative gains to the firm (owner+nianager). Morc'ovi'r, as the diirei'encK; bet.ween 
tin; objectives of the manager and the owner of tlu' firm dimiihslu's (as 7 gcx's to 
zero), the (;xpected social welfare under the regulatory policy inci('as(;s and in t.he 
end th(' regulatory rnechanisin r(;duces to that of
Imture research inigfit extcuid t.his model of tlnx'ohwel hi(;rarchy to the general 
principal-agent model of Cuesnerie and Lafibnt (1984).
l.M
7 Bayesian Implementation of Social Optimum 
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by
Ismail Sağlam
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7.1 Introduction
In his recent paper Gradstein (1995) considers the ])roblem of impleımnıting so- 
cia.lly efficient outcoimi in an oligopolistic industry. He shows that if each firm is giv(m 
a l.raiisfer in a similar form j)roposed by Loeb and .Vlagat (1979). oligopolistic firms 
can choose the socially efficient production levef in a decentrafi/a'd way. However. 
Sağlam (1996) stiows that to implement the first-b('s1 policy, Graxlstein’s inc('ntiv(' 
sclumu' i(V|uires sonui restrictions on the cost funclions if a geiun'al social welfare 
criteria is adopted. In the same study Saghirn (1996) also shows that under tlu' 
social welfare function which assigns higher weight t.o tin; consumers’ welfare' tfian 
tlie producers’ welfare, the individual rationality and tlie social efficiency cannot l)e 
satisfied at the same time using the incentive schenu' by Gradstehn, and tfms tlu' 
Bayesian approach to oligoy^olistic regulation is indis|)ensa,ble.
The Bayesian approach in regulation was initiatc'd by the seminal paper ol Baron 
and .Vlye'rson (1982) (B-.Vl) who consieh'i's tlu' probh'in of monoj)oly re'gulation in a 
|)rincipal-ag(;nt franu'work ѵѵікм’е the regulator is tfu' |)rincipal while the monopolist 
is tlu' agent to Ix' regulated and has private cost information. By tlu' Revc'lation 
Princi])le. the r(!gulator is restrictcxl to direct-revc'lation nu'chanisms which give tlu' 
regulated firm no incentive to li(' whenever it is asked to la'port its cost paranu'ter. 
'f'h(' optimal amount of transfer which will inducx; tlu' firm to truthful r('V(dation and 
which will satisfy individual-rationality is directly calcula,t(;d by t h(' techni(|U(' for­
merly used by Mirrlees (1971). Inserting the optimal subsidy into 1 he social obj(!ctive 
function which is defined as tlie sum of the consumers’ surplus net of tlie subsidy 
givi'ii to tin; monopolist and a fraction of the producer’s profits, tf)e regulator cal- 
culati's (he optimal output tfui firm will [)roduc(î as a function of t.he cost report
ol tluí íinn. I'Ik! B-M i'(!gulat,ory nu'cliaiiism is callc'd ■Bayc'sian as i1, (k'jx'iuls ou 
prior beliels oí llie roígulaior about the privat(' cost iiilorniaiioii of ilu' regulated 
firm. Due to the inibrinational asyininetry, tlie optimality can be satisfied oidy in 
ex ante sense. The ex ])ost efiiciency is not guaranteed under th(' B-M mechanism 
i( t,h(; regulator’s belief is not consistent with the truth or if the consuiirers’ and the 
producer’s welfares are not equally weighted. Nevertheless, Bayesian approach has 
b(icome so f)Of)ular as it is not dominated by any a|)])roach in a st.atic framework, 
and besides, it provides a normative a.])proach to regulation.
This paper extends the Bayesian model of B-M to an oligopolistic industry. 'I'he 
paiH’i' aJso provides some results regarding the balancedness r(‘(]uirement in th(i 
Bayesian s(uise.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 7.2 presents the model, and Section 
T.d introduces tfu' optimal regulatory policy. In Sect ion 7.1 general properties of f.he 
o|)limal rcigulatory ])olicy is discussed. I'diially, sonu' concluding remarks ar<' made 
in S('ction 7 . 0 .
7.2 M odel
Consider a Cournotic oligO])oly involving n firms which produce a single product, 
d'he c:ost function of the firm /. = f, ..., n is given by
('ii<li,<Pi) = f<i + if (}i > 0, and = 0, 0 )
wh<M4' for any firm i K¡ is the setuf) cost and éilliiq,) is the variabh' cost of producing 
a |)osit,i\'e qua.nt.it.y of out|)ut,. K¡ and ll¡(q¡) are assimu'd to be common knowh'dgc' 
whih' 0·, |)riva.tely known by tlx' firm Í. VVe also assunu' /\', > 0. > 0, / / '( c )  > 0
and li;'{q,) > 0 for all
Pol Ф = (oi,...,0„) be th(' vector of private cost parameters vvhih' Ф_,; = (φ^, 
.... 0 ,-1 . Oi+i, ··- 0n) be t he vector of the unknown cost |)aram(d,ers excluding VV(' 
shall assume that the regulator has commonly known prior beli('f about фг for all i 
reprc'sented by the density function^ .[¡{Фф which is positive over tfie interval
' \<)t.(i that, wo. assum e strictly  convex variable costs  (strictly  positivtt mar^,inal costs)  to (insure tha t  the  soc iety  
will Ixiiuifit from allowing all tli(i firms to produce a regulated am ount  of ou tp u t  (i)rovid(id the se tu p  costs  of  th(i 
firms ai(i not too  high).
“ VV(! im plicit ly  a ssum e that  tlui privat(i cost j)arameters of the firms ar(i uncorrelated: / ,  (ó , |Ф _ ,)  =  ü, i — 1, и.
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a,11(1 has llic' cumulative' distribution functioıı У'’,(о,). Гог all г = 1...... п. We will also
flciino /(Ф) = and /-,:(Ф-,) = (/, (o9, (Ф, +, ).
'ГЬо firms face an inverse demand function P{Q) wliich is assunuid (,o Ire positive, 
differentiable, and negatively sloped everywhere. 'ГЬе consumers gross benefit from 
consuming the output Q is V(Q) = P{x)dx, hence the consumers’ surplus is
V i Q ) - l 4 Q ) Q ·
By f,he Revelation Principle (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) and My- 
('rson (1979)) w(' shall restrict the regulator without loss of generality to regulatory 
[)olicies which ask firms to re[)ort their cost parameters (j)i and which give them 
no incentive; to lie. Л feasible regulatory policy given by the outcome functions 
(/·. p, f/,:, .s,:), г = 1.....U is then defined as follows:
г,;(Ф) is the probability that the firm i will be allowed to produce when it re'ports 
(/), while' remaining firms report Ф_,. As a probability. /’ДФ) shoulel satisfy
I) < г,-(Ф) < I, A, G e¿>!], г = 1. ( 2 )
We> h't e/,(<i>) elenote the output proelue:ed by the firm i.. The te)tal output Q(<i>) 
|)ie)elue:ed in the market is given by
0(Ф) = ^п (Ф ),,,(Ф ). (:l)
i:=i
VVe alse) define t^ _,(<í>) = (t)(<Í>) — e/,(4))r,:(<Í)) te) be' the industry euit.put net e)f the 
e)utput firm i proelue;e's.
The' prie:e> p(<h) of the gooel anel the total industry output (()(<I>) shoulel be' eom- 
patible with the inverse elemanel:
,,(<!>) = />(елФ)) ( I )
Lastly, •s,(4>), Í — l,...,/i is the' subsidy (tax if nejgative) [)aiel (takeui) to (from) the 
firm i. VVe elefine .s, to be zere) when the firm i is ne)t allowe;d to pre)due:e;.
,\e)w given the oute:ome functions ( r , , e / , ,  .s¿), h't 7r(e.'),, (;¿),, ^_,) be the profit of 
t he' (inn i if it honestly reports its ce)st parameter e/>, while' all other firms report their 
ee)sts as O/. j  = 1..., / — 1,'/’ +
1.17
7г(®,:,  (·/),:, Ф _ , )  =  [рЦфі, <!>_,))  -  К, - о , И Ф^,)))]і\{{ф,.  Ф _ , ) )
Ф-і)) (■))
Similarly, let т г Ф _ ; )  b(i the expected profit of tlu' firm i if it misreports its 
cost parameter ф{ while other firms report their costs as 0 ,, j  = 1. i — f, /І + 1, n:
'^ІФі, Фп Ф -0  =  -  Л'', -  ФіНі{(]г{Ф))]г, ІФ)  +  .S,(4>) (6)
111 order to induce the firms to truthful revelation w(' must guarantee
7Г(0,, фі,, Ф_,) > фг, <!>-,), (7)
for all eg,·, Фі G = 1,.··.».· 'I'his condition, namely, the incentive-compatibility
condition, states that regardless how tlu' other firms beha,v(>. it is a dominant strategy 
for the firm i to truthfully report its private cost parameter фі.'^
ГІИ' regulatory policy must also satisfy the individual rationality condition
7 г ( 0 , ,  0 , ,  Ф_,) > 0. (Ю
for all 0 ,, (j)i G ['■ /^0 <?,■]■ '' — I,····"·· d'hat is to say. no firm should be forced to 
produce; uidess it obtains a nonnc'gative profit.
A r(-;gulatory policy which satisfies the conditions (2), (3), (1), (7) and (8) is 
called feasible. The objective of the; regulator is to lind a leasibh' legulatory |)olicy 
which maximizes the expected social welfare W '  which is the sum of the ex|)ccted 
consumers’ surplus net of the; total subsidy given to the; firms and some fraction 
(0 T <■'! I ) the (ixpe'cted profits of tlu' firms:
,.<I>|  ^ II
V'(f^ (d>)) -  )'·,:(‘h) -  ,s,((l)) +  fv,7r,((I>))/(<I))r/<l) (9 )
J фО l=\
7.3 O ptim al regulatory policy
P roposition  1 . The regulatory policy given by (l())-(l/i) inaxirnizes (9) ainoiig all 
/(’(isíblc regulatory policies:
r(Q(t · ) )  = ( 10)
t.hcll this definition of incentive-compatibil ity  is more genei’cil tlnin the res])onse-j)lan equilibrium m)tion of 
MyiM’son (1979) under wliich no player (firm in our case) exp ects  any gain by unilaterally cluinging its plan (report).
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/ ■ \ 1/1+ ( 1 ~  1\1^ф.^
,,(Ф) = р{0(Ф))
п
c m  = J 2 ' i , m r , w
L =\
( П )
( 12)
1 İIM/(Q(<&))-V■ '(í^,(<^_,))-.^,,(<!>)//,(r/,(cl>))r,(<l>)>()
r,((D) =  <1 . (12)
0 oUu'rwisc
,(<!>) = [I < i  + < k / / i (i/.(<^ )) - p (^ )<■/<(<1^ )](^ ) + /  i h { ( n { .r, <^ -,))'■-(·'■ > (1 '1)
J r/),
Proof. VVe will first check that the regulatory policy is feasible. ( 'onditions (2), (2) 
and (1) are obviously satisfied. To show (8) holds, we insert (14) into (o) by set,ting 
(]>_^  — to obt,ain
..ol
7г(Ф) = / //,:(г/ .^г.Ф_,:))г.(.х*,Ф-,) :^г > 0.
J r / ; ,
'['bus (8) is satisiiod. Finally to ch(x:k (7), observe that
7 г ( ^ , , ( / > ; , Ф _ , ) - 7 г ( Ф ) =  [ ф г  -  Ф , ) 1 1 г { я 1 ( Ф г - , ^ - 1 ) ) Г г { Ф , . - . ‘^ - ф
d o )
(16)
+ j_ //,(^/,(.г-,Ф_,))г,(.х,Ф_,)^Ь;.
Фг у
//,((/,(.i·. Ф_,))'■<(·'■, Ф -,) -  11,{(ц{ф;., Ф-;))г;{Ф;. Ф^;)у1.Х.
'riiiis 1,0 guarantee тг(9 ,·. ci>t, Ф-,) — тг(Ф) < О Гог all о,, о, G \\ч' should Imvc'
(ц{Ф) nonincrcuisiug in 0,. Now k't us fix i. and 1a,k(' tlu' derivative of (10) with r('S|)(X't 
to O; to obtain
% (Ф )
(17
Suppose C(<1>) is increasing in 0,. 'I'lien the LIIS of I In' ('quation (17) is m'ga.tive. 
so the RIIS of (17) should be also negative implying i/,(d>) is decrc'asing in (i); siiux; 
■^ o,iOi) is nondecriiasing in (£>,. Ibewriting (17) lor j  = 1....,/, — 1,/, + l,...,n  yields
(18)= --,.,( 'А ,)//"(< Ь (Ф ))^дф,
1 ;w
So. — 1..··:/. — L / + should also Ix' <l('crcasiii,i>, in o,· But, ilu'u
S r= i (hicreasing in 0 ,. vvhich is a coniradici ion. riieierorc', C,^ (d>) is nonin-
cn'asing in cpi- Now (18) implies that for each fixed i — l....,/i, wc have f/;(d)), j  = 
l . . . . , i — l,'i + l ,...,n  nondecreasing in (;/>;. Then it follows that f/i(<I>) is nonincreasing 
in (1)^  ^ i = l,..,,n . Thus (7) is satisfied and therefore tlu' rcigulatory |)olicy (f0)-(14) 
is feasible.
'lb clujck th(' r('gulatory policy is also optimal, obs(U've that calculating the expec- 
ta,tion of (15) yields
no I .
7r,:(4>),/)(<;b)db, = /  ( /  fd<Pi)d<P,, ( B))
II, ((/,: (b, <1^ - <)) I’I (tb <1^ - -) (<Pi)d(p,.
iiiU'gration by paii.s. Insc'rting (o) and (19) int.o (9) yiedds
II
( 20)
1=1
vvlu're
y, ( b t )  — +  ( 1  ~  ( ^ i )
l · } ^
j  i( bt)
.Now differentiating (20) with respect to f/i(^ 5^ )· we obtain (10). .Note also that we 
want to choose each r,(dl>) as in (b'5) to maximize tlu' int.c'grand ol (20). Finally, to 
show th(' subsidy (11) is optimal. w(' us(? <'iiv(dope tlu'orc'm. Difler('ntiating (5) with 
rc'spi'ct to <p, at tlu' o])timal out])ut, we obtain
A;r(e;„d>_,) = -//,(V/,(<l>)r,(<l>).
O0,
Intc'grating yields
np]
7t(<1)) =  /  //,(i/,;(.i;,<t>_,))r,:(.i'Bl>-,)d.r +  7r(^oj.<I)_,). (21)
7t(o,· . <!>_,) can be chosen as z('ro to the benefit of consumers. So t.he optimal profit 
r<'duces to (15). .Now using (5) tlu' o|)tima,l subsidy e(|uation (14) follows. So the reg­
ulatory policy (10)-(14) maximiz(!s (9) among all feasible ixigulatory policies. Q.K.I).
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7.4 A nalysis o f the optim al regulatory policy
VVe note that due to the infonnational asyininetry. l lx' oi)t,iinal price' ( 1 1 ) is higlieu' 
Üian t lu; marginal cost ol any linn i unless the net profit ol that firm is weighted 
wit.h a,: = 1 in the social wellare innetion. II the re'gnlator were t.o imphnnemt t,he 
fid 1-in formation prices (marginal cost prices) regardless what the \-alne of cv,; is, then 
the irdbrmational rents would he too high and thus 1,he social welfare' would realize to 
1)(' too low. So, the asymrnertric informational rnarku|) in the optimal i^rices is simply 
due 1.0 the trade-ioff the regulator laces between the 1,('clinical allocat.ive efficiencies.' 
Sirin' firm i. with ev, < 1 faces a price which exceeds its marginal cost, the optimal 
epiantity |)roduced by that firm will be lower than what it would produce in the' full 
information case (or when a,; = 1), whidi will limit the informational rents of thal, 
firm.
W(' showed that the' optimal (juantity produced by any firm e/,(d>) is nonincreasing 
in its own private cost |)arameter (pi while nondecre'asing in the private' cost parame- 
t('rs of all othe'r firms It was also found that the' total industry |)roduction C()(d>) 
is nonincreasing in the ))rivate cost irararneter of the firm i — 1,..., n. 'These results 
imply that given that ! .fr{<h) d strictly increasing in b,· for all i = l,...,n , when
a te'chnological sfiock (improvement) reduces the cost, parameter of one of the firms, 
t,h(' epiantity produced by that firm e/,(<I>) increases while the ejuantity produced by all 
the' other firms (t)_,(/l )^ decreases. In effect, the industry output increasers since the 
incre'ase in e/,(<l>) offsets the decre'ase in Q_;(<1>). 'The ie'duet ion in o, also brings about 
some' welfare implications. 'The' profit (informational re'iits) of the' firm i. incre'ases 
while' t he' profits of all other firms decrease.
.\ow we will analyze' how the optimal regulatory policy varie's with the welfare 
we'ight ev, of the' firm i.
C orollary  1. i'ndci' Iht opliinal mjulatory policy (lO)-(lJj). for uich i = 1,....//,.·
(i) The outpiii produced by the Jirrn i is nondecriasiny in o;,, and. thus ihe iiifor- 
mational rents of thc jirin t is nondccreasiny in ev,.
'01)S(irv(î wIkui O', = 0 ,  i =  in iom iat ional  routs of  tho iii ins floes not apjxiar in the social welfare
function for the subs idy  given by the consumers is equcilly weighted as th(î subsidy taken by the firms. 'That is to 
say, the  tradeoff  betw een  the .allocative and the technical efficiencies does no longer exist  and therefore, nuirginal  
('osl i)ric(îs ¿ire (dficient.
(li) the output produced by any fir in except j  or Jinn i is nonincreasiny in o,. and. 
thus the inforniaiional rents oj these Jirrns are nomnereasiny in n,, and 
(iii) the total industry output is noTidecreasiny i.n rv,.
Proof. Let us fix firm z, and take he derivative of ( 10) with respc'ct to tlu' welfare' 
w(Mght cvi to obtain
r ' i c m )  = “ T f f l " ( < ; . ( < l > ) ) ^ ^ .  (22)
Now su])pose Q{^) is decreasing in cv,;. The LHS of llie equation (22) is then positive, 
iinidying the liHS of (22) should also be positive, which further implies that (/,(<!>) is 
increasing in a,·. Now rewriting (22) tor j  = 1,..../. — l.z + l,...,n  we obtain
(2:i)
So. (/,(T) must b(' increasing in a,; for all j  = 1...../ — 1,/i + 1..... n. lint I,hen
i^  increasing in o-,, which is a contradiciion. Therefore, Q(<I>) is nonde- 
crc'asing in and (iii) holds. .Now from (23) it follows that for each fixed i = l,...,n, 
i/,(<l>) is nonincreasing in (Xi for all j — 1 ,..., i — 1, /, + 1, ..., n, and hence i/,(<I>) should 
be nondecreasing in cv, for all i. ~ 1, ...,n. From (lo) it. follows that the informational 
rents of the firm i is nondecreasing while the informational rents of all otlu'r firms 
a.i(' nonincreasing in cv,. 'I'lius (i) and (ii) are also satisfied. Q.Ic.I).
'The Corollary 1 impli('s that under the o|)timal rc'gulatory policy (!())-(1 1 ), the 
lowc'r t h(' welfare' weight of a firm, the lower is the profit and production level of t hat 
firm, while l.lu' higher are the |)rofits and the marke't shares of all other firms in tlu' 
industry.
It is interesting to note that t he Bayesian approach in regulation allows us to check 
balancediKiss reepiirement in both ex ante and ex post sense'. Ex post balane-e'elness 
I’e'eiuireinent can be) writ,ton as
n. '<
5^,s,(< l)) =  -p(d>)Q(<I>) +  5 ^ ( A ' ,  +  0 ,//,(e /,:(<!)))
/=! i=\
(24)
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vvliidi reads I,hat, al1,('r the iirins report, their r('S])('ct,iv(' cost, parameters, t.lu' total 
subsidy calculated at those cost reports should sum up to zero. It is obvious that 
the ex post balancedriess requirement restricts the demand and cost environment, 
but we still lack characterization results.
In ex ante sense, however, it is possible to find some sufficient conditions on 
costs t,o guarantee balancedness ol translers. 'I'he ex ante balanci'diuiss requircunent.
<I>‘ 
J
r
<I>o
-/;(<!>) (^г ( )  + 1< t + '¿a, (0,:) // r,(<I>) = 0, ( 25 )
1=1
a
+ z,,,{(j)^)[Hr{qi{^)) -  / / , ' ( < ■ / . =  0. (26)
1=1
.\ovv from (26) it is ch'ar that il' the cost, of each firm / is givcui by a |)olynomia,l of 
at lea,st, s('cond d('gre('
i
ddi/.p'id) = /d + a , I  > 2, a.2 > 0, and a,„, > 0, m /  2, (27)
in = 1
wIku'c
I
d<pf{<t>) Y  K, = / d<D/(cI>)2,„(cd)r,:(<!>) X ] a,„Cirri -  1),
r. (J) 1 n ij) i
? = 1 //t=l
tlu'ii the balancedness rc'cjuirc'ment will be satislic'd.
(28)
7.5 C onclusions
VV(' characterized the oi)tima,l regulatory mechanism which imph'ments th(' social 
optimum in an oligopolistic industry using the Bayc'sian principal agiuit approach of 
B-M. 'The results rest on tho' assumption that the cost functions are convc'x. Tlu' 
pa|)('r can be extended in an important way to a ease' wlu're tlu' marginal cost of 
each firm is constant and not necessa,rily the same. It can be conjc'ctured that the 
optimal mechanism will then warrant production to tlu' firm with the lowest total 
costs. 'The existence of other firms in the industry will reduce the informational rents 
that, the producing firm will obt.ain since the regulator does not ikxxI to scrcien all
1 13
possibles cost i)a,ranu't(n's if tlu' marginal cost paranu'1('rs of tlu' (inns arc sufficicmtly 
close t.o each other.
J'lie Bayesian approach to regulation has been criticized by many (îconomists, 
including Koray and Saglarri (lOOoa) and (1995b), as this approach may give rise to 
conuption if the beliefs of tin.' regulator are not commonly sharf'd by t.lu' society. 
N('vertheless, we still lack an approach which dominates Bayesian approach in a 
static framework.
İMitur(! research might also examine the problem of oligopoly n'gulation when not 
onlv costs but also demand is privately known to the regrdated firms.
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